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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MARXISTS INTO MUSLIMS:
THE IRANIAN IRONY
by
Abdolrahim Javadzadeh
Florida International University, 2007
Miami, Florida
Professor Barry B. Levine, Major Professor
This dissertation examines the influence of Islamic ideology on Iranian Marxists
during the 1979 revolution. The purpose of this study is to extricate the influence of
Islamic culture, ideology, and terminology on Marxist organizations and on individuals
who identified themselves as Marxists in Iran. This is especially of interest since in many
ways Marxism and Islam are ideologically in conflict. Were Marxists aware of the
influences of Islam in their behavior and ideology? To investigate the irony publications
put forth by several Marxist organizations before and after the 1979 revolution were
examined. A history of such influence both ideologically and contextually is depicted to
demonstrate their political and cultural significance.
Through the study of Marxist political organs, theoretical publication and political
flyers distributed during and after the revolution, the phenomenon of Marxists converting
to an Islamic ideology became clearer. Many Marxist organizations were demonstrably
utilizing Islamic political ideology to organize and mobilize masses of Iranians. This
study shows a historical precedence of Marxists’ usage of Islam in the political history of
Iran dating back to early twentieth-century.
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Primary and secondary Marxist literature showed that Islam was an inescapable
social and political reality for Iranian Marxists. Not only was there a common upbringing
but a common enemy fostered provisional collusion between the two. The internalizing
the idea of martyrdom—of Shi’a Islam—was a shared belied that united Marxists with
Muslins in their attempt to effect sociopolitical change in Iran. Studying Marxist
publications shows evidence that many Iranian Marxists were not conscious of using
Islamic ethics and terminology since Islamic beliefs are part of the taken-for-granted
world of Iranian culture. This contextual belief system, pervasive within the culture and a
change of political ideology is what created the conditions for the possibility of Marxists
becoming Muslims.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION
The path for a political culture and Islamic discourse was made prior to the 1979
revolution…the resistant Islam of Khomeini, the fundamentalist Islam of Shariati, and
liberal Islam of Bazargan, and the Liberation Movement were among the nationalist
constitutional culture.
John Foran

In 1979, the Iranian people gathered enough force to finally oust one of the more
authoritarian rulers in the Middle East, Mohammad Reza Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.
The Shah’s regime was uprooted in a matter of months despite its vast military power and
Gestapo-like secret police, the SAVAK. His regime, dubbed an ‘island of stability’ by
American President Jimmy Carter, was not able to withstand the force behind the
discontent of the Iranian masses. The Pahlavi dynasty, which had ruled Iran for more than
fifty years (1925 to 1979 between the Shah and his father, Reza Shah) was toppled in
early February 1979. Even internationally, those who had previously come to assist the
Shah no longer perceived his regime as salvageable. In the Guadeloupe Conference, the
heads of four ally nations of Iran (U.S., Britain, France, and Germany), suggested that it
was time for the Shah to leave.1 Consequently, he fled the country on January 16, 1979,
which marked a new era for the Iranian people. They were now ready to create a
government of their own choosing, at the very least one that guaranteed basic human
rights. The result was establishment of an Islamic republic. The new government,
however, did not fully carry out the political and economic demands of the Iranians.

1

Gholamreza Nejati. 2000. tarikh-e- siasi-e bist va panj saley-e Iran (Twenty-five Years of Iranian
Political History). (Tehran: Rasa Cultural Institute).
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The Iranian revolution as a mass social revolution involved almost all classes and sectors
of Iranian society against a dictator. Blue- and white-collar workers, peasants, small
business owners, traditional merchants, students, intellectuals, women, and Iranian
students abroad were involved in overthrowing the Shah. Marxist, Muslim, and
nationalist organizations and individuals played major roles in organizing the masses. It
took several months for the actors to become sufficiently organized to create a
revolutionary force – a force so powerful that not even Shah’s mighty military was able
to contain it.
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after 14 years of exile.
The enthusiasm with which millions of Iranians greeted Khomeini may have marked the
first signs of the type of state that would be established in Iran. Islamic ideology, values,
and ethics had played a significant role in Iranian culture for hundreds of years. After the
Shah’s departure, an interim government was set up first under the name of the
Provisional Islamic Republic of Iran. It took the new government almost two years to
suppress the established forces in the opposition, both Muslim and Marxist. Once most of
the opposition was eliminated, the Islamic Republic of Iran was established.
Through the laws of Islam and under the auspices of a new Islamic revolution, more
political pressure was exerted on the people. Invariably, groups in the opposition were
dubbed anti-revolution and banned by the new Islamic Republic government. This held
true for all groups of the opposition, both Marxist and Muslim. The new government not
only restricted all sorts of political freedoms, but also dubbed as anti-Islamic many older
traditions and cultural values, e.g., the Norooz (New Year) celebration; these were then
banned.

2

The problem to be examined in this work involves the influence of Islamic culture
and ideology on Iranian Marxist organizations. This is of special interest because the two
belief systems, Marxism and Islam, are in direct opposition. Such an examination of
Marxism in Iran begins with two primary questions: What culture-specific factors
contributed to Marxists’ conversion to Islam? Were they aware of the influences of Islam
and Islamic culture? The notion of Marxists using Islam or becoming Muslims is seldom
stated or implied in research on Iranian Marxists or the Islamic revolution. The subject of
who converted to whose ideology is usually examined to demonstrate Muslims’ use of
Marxism and not widely understood as Marxists’ conversion to Islam.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to study some of the literature and print
materials published by Marxist organizations in Iran to extract the traditionally
overlooked Islamic terminology and ideas that pepper their literature. A secondary
purpose is to examine and unveil both contextual and ideological inclinations of political
Marxist organizations in Iran.2
The “contextual Islam”, according to Mesbahi, was/is part of a “tripartite Islamic
complex” array of “manifestations of Islam” in both pre and post revolutionary Iran:
“Each one of these tripartite complex was acting in a separate but reinforcing function,
collectively- consciously or sub-consciously- conditioning the emotive/symbolic ethos, the
ideational choices, and political strategies and predicaments of all secular opposition
groups and more specifically the Marxists.”3

2

I am indebted to Dr. Mohiadin Mesbahi for explaining to me the meaning of “contextual Islam” for the
purposes of my dissertation. Through extensive conversations he made clear the idea behind this concept
and how it works in the Iranian political culture.
3

Interview with Dr. Mesbahi, October 13, 2006.
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Finally, this work creates a source for those who are interested in the Iranian
revolution and its outcome. It also shows how ideologies, as rigid as they may seem, are
transformed and can look completely different after changes take place.
There are four facets to this research. The first studies the Islamic ideology and
belief system as a political force against the Shah (Pahlavi Dynasty) and the impressions
it made on Iranian Marxists. The second part delves into the ideas of Marx on religion
and false consciousness vis-à-vis Iranian Marxism. The third part examines a history of
Iranian Marxism as it pertains to Islam and the Islamic movement before and after the
1979 revolution. Finally, the fourth part is an examination of the significance of hybrid4
(Marxist-Muslim) organizations and the individuals within the Iranian opposition. The
overall objective is to create a new understanding of Iranian Marxism using the sociology
of knowledge to study Marxists and their relationship to Islam in Iran.
The Shah referred to the armed opposition as “Islamic Marxists.”5 However, the
revolution became possible because of a more complex set of ideas than the Shah
imagined and the cooperation among the groups within the multifaceted opposition.
While it is true that the revolution was spontaneous,6 leaders of the opposition had to
rethink and revise their ideas to adjust to popular demands. This was true for both
Marxists and Muslims. The common understanding by the left in Iran is that it was
Muslim leaders who borrowed from Marxist ideology, and not the other way around. It is
more plausible to claim, however, especially during the revolution, that it was Marxists
4

Hybrid organizations are those that used both Marxism and Islam to create a third view. Naturally, some
inclined more toward Islam and some more toward Marxism.
5

Maziar Behrooz. 1999. Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. London, New York: I.B.
Tauris Publishers, p. 11.
6

Ibid. p. 13.
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(some, not all) who did the ideological borrowing from Islam and who converged
ideologically. This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how the self-identified Marxists
could become advocates of Islam and avid supporters of the Islamic Republic
government.
As the revolution progressed toward the establishment of a new state, several
Marxist organizations abandoned their ideas of a separate movement and embraced Islam
as a revolutionary alternative. Those who were conscious of this amalgam, including
Ehsan Tabari, a prominent theorist of the Tudeh Party, claimed that they knowingly
merged with Islam. They have rationalized their conversion to Islam as a new ideology as
reasonable and scientific.7 According to Tabari, part of the reason behind the failure of
the Marxists in Iran was “Marxist disbelief in religion including Islam, and their proud
rejection of rich Islamic principles.”8 Among Marxists with overt deference to Islam are
those who claim to have tactically (short-term and for the good of the revolution)
borrowed ideas, but not ideology, to mobilize and organize the revolutionary masses.9
For them, there were two types of Islam: one form as advocated by clerics such as
Boroujerdi, who defended the Shah, and another form as espoused by advocates of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Islam. The former, dubbed reactionaries, were trying
to degrade the real, resistant Islam, “an Islam whose amplifier is Imam Khomeini. These
[reactionaries] were trying to provoke the oppressed Muslims of the world against our
victorious revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”10
7

Ehsan Tabari. 1992. Kazhrahe (Diversion). Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications.

8

Ibid. p. 14.

9

Donya, Theoretical and Political Journal of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran. No. 6,
September 1980.
10
Ibid. p. 18.
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For some researchers, Islam is a progressive movement with answers for
everything; for others it is an ideology for a resistance movement. According to Michael
Fischer, “Islam creates meaning. It is what tells people how to behave, a world view that
has an answer for all human problems.”11 Theda Skocpol claims that “Islam is a gradual
organizer with a network of clergy which resists and opposes inside and outside
oppressors to mobilize people and start a revolution.”12 For John Foran, cultural elements
within Islam are useful in resistance. Foran states, “The culture of resistance is the result
of many groups. They analyze the political economy using cultural elements which
correspond to the experience of everyday life.”13 Foran further says, “the path for a
political culture and Islamic discourse was made [prior to the 1979 revolution]…[the]
resistant Islam of Khomeini, the fundamentalist Islam of Shariati, and liberal Islam of
Bazargan, and the Liberation Movement were among the nationalist constitutional
culture.”14
What I hope to achieve in this dissertation is an examination of Iranian Marxism
and Marxists, and an understanding of the degree to which they have been influenced by
Islam to convert to Islam. Although there is a brief look at Muslim groups and hybrid
organizations, the dissertation is mainly focused on the Marxists and their Islamic
inclinations. The main idea is classification of the dynamics of this relationship. The
particular focus is on Iranian Marxists and culture-specific Iranian Marxism. This study

11

Michael Fischer. 1980. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Madison, WS: University of
Wisconsin Press. p. 14.

12

Theda Skocpol. 1994. Revolution in the Third World. NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 249.

13

John Foran. 1999. Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution.
Translated by Ahmad Tadayyon. Tehran: Rasa Cultural Services, 1999. p. 122.
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Ibid.
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follows the trajectory of Marxism and Marxists in Iran in the 20th century, and
specifically, examines the Marxists’ inclinations toward Islam and Islamic ethics, their
ideological conversion at times, and their tradition of using Islamic terminology.
Readers must bear in mind that this work is not a based on representative sample
of all Iranian Marxists, but instead is an attempt to create an ideal type (a la Weber) of
those Iranian Marxists who accepted Muslim influence.15 According to Weber, ideal
types are:
One-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great
many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints
into a unified analytical construct.16
This work is, therefore, not an exhaustive review of all literature published by Iranian
Marxists, but rather those who were especially influenced by Islamic ideology and its
belief system.

Methodology
In order to establish itself after the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran used
repression to eliminate all opposition. Nonetheless, two major Marxist organizations, the
Tudeh Party17 and the Fadaeean (majority)18, collaborated with the Islamic Republic
state. Although they became advocates of Islam, the regime did not spare any group or
individual in the opposition. As a result, even these collaborators soon became the subject
of political persecution, following the elimination of other Marxist and Muslim
15

Max Weber. 1949. Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe, Ill: Freepress.

16

Ibid., p. 90.

17

A major Marxist organization founded in 1941. See chapter 5 for more details.
A Marxist organization that split from the original Organization of Iranian Fadaee Guerillas a few months
into the revolution. See chapter 5 for more details.
18
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organizations. Anyone caught with written material that questioned Islam, the Islamic
Republic government, or any member of the government, especially Ayatollah Khomeini,
was immediately arrested and subject to execution.
While both Marxists and Muslims played a major role in organizing the opposition, the
influence of Muslims on Marxists during the revolution has not been thoroughly
examined. This is especially true of the influence of Islam on Iranian Marxists. Due to the
nature and outcome of the revolution, study of Marxist organizations and their role during
the revolution has been neglected. The most interesting part of their involvement was in
providing ideological support for the new Islamic government. They were instrumental in
creating a political ideology that gravitated more and more toward Islam. Some Marxists
despite an ideological conflict with Islam both in realms of theology and more
importantly polity, were able to make the necessary adjustments to concur with Islam.
For this topic, therefore, the author has examined publications produced by some Marxist
organizations and groups during the two years of upheaval (1978-1980).
Using Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a
constructionist methodology, this dissertation sets out to explain those variables active in
the conversion of Marxists to Islam in Iran. The contentious politics between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and leftist organizations has gone through ebbs and flows, but has
always remained antagonistic. Many Iranian Marxists, to this day, are in a state of shock
in observing the establishment, and consequently the perseverance, of the Islamic
Republic. At first glance into any Marxist organization’s literature, one would be
convinced that Muslims had stolen the revolution and, contrary to its true nature, dubbed
it an Islamic revolution.

8

Reading Iranian Marxist literature reveals an unconvincing duality: Marxists did
all the work yet Muslims took the credit; the masses were secular yet the outcome was
religious. Marxist literature is replete with this contradiction. How could a revolution as
such, result in an Islamic Republic? The anomaly of the intention of the revolution and its
consequence became the subject of many Marxist publications.
Except for Marxist literature, I was not able to find serious research referring to
Marxist political activity and the outcome of the revolution. The more I researched and
the more I traveled to Iran, the more strongly I saw the need for new thoughts and ideas
related to Islam and Marxism. It seemed that Marxism as a Western idea should be
entirely out of place in Iran, especially if it did not take into consideration Shi’a Islam as
it relates to Iranian history. What would Iranians say to a ruthless criticism of Islam, as
put forth by Marx? Marxist critique is not only anti-Islam and anti-traditional Islam, it is
also a Western or non-Islamic concept.
The question for me was no longer how Marxists and Marxism influenced the
Islamic revolution or participating Muslims. Rather, it became how Marxists were
influenced by Islam and Muslims in a struggle against a despotic regime. It was not
Muslims who used Marxism as a political tool, but Marxists who used Islam to seek
popular support. The contention here is that Marxists were too immersed in Islam to
recognize that they were deterred from criticizing Islam in a ruthless critique that Marx
would have approved of. Marxists contributed to creating an Islamic republic without
even realizing their role in doing so.

9

Research Design
For years Iranian Marxists have been entangled in an unending discussion on how
to interact with the Islamic Republic of Iran. To this day they have not been able to agree
on any specific political strategy. A major point of conflict has been whether they should
accommodate with the Islamic regime, or try to overthrow the regime through a
revolution. To this end, discourse often revolves around whether collaboration with the
Islamic Republic government is a possibility. Deep rifts among Marxists have persisted
for close to three decades with no concrete results. I will try to show the deep Islamic
roots that exist within the purview of Iranian Marxists and that as a consequence, there
persists lack of a critical view of Islam. This is in part what has caused their theoretical
stagnation. Any Marxist organization contemplating political power and state building
would have to seriously consider Islamic culture within Iranian society. This research
uses the sociology of knowledge to examine the ideas of Iranian Marxists, specifically as
they relate to the ideas of Islam and those of the Iranian Muslim movement.
I decided to study the question of Marxists and their collaboration with the
Islamic regime using a collection of primary sources that was uniquely at my disposal.
Once I got a hold of the collection, I had to decipher the material related to Marxists
converting and collaborating with Islam and Muslims. Simple political allegiance was
insufficient; to agree with an Islamic government on political issues does not demonstrate
the pervasiveness of Islam. It may only indicate a short-term coalition. There had to have
been more to the use of Islam by Marxists. These sources would not reveal much about
the fundamentals of Islamic belief in all aspects of life, that is, in all socialization
processes. Studying the question of how Marxists shifted their ideology to adhere to

10

Islam was the original intention of this research. However, while researching the question
at hand, I came across a deeper, more profound adaptation of ideology by the Marxists –
a cultural or contextual adaptation.19 To gather data illustrating both kinds of adaptation –
ideological and contextual – both primary and secondary sources belonging to Marxists
were examined.
For a depiction of socialization through Islam that would include all Iranian
Marxists, I had to gather data from many sources. I read biographies written by Marxists,
memoirs, and material pertaining to how the Islamic ethos related to struggle, e.g.,
martyrdom. Through these sources I realized, for the first time, the depth of Islamic belief
in the construction of the social world of every Iranian, including Marxists. It became
clear to me that in order to get to the depths of Islam within Iranian Marxism, I had to
study not just literature but behavior, socialization processes, and more importantly
culture-specific beliefs. For this purpose I used a constructionist method, Karl
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge.
Constructionist sociology sets the stage by asking questions such as: Who creates
the social and political definitions? Where do ideas come from? What are the
circumstances that give rise to certain actions? This method of questioning does not take
anything for granted. Meaning is not inherent in the act; it must be constructed. There is,
therefore, a never-ending skepticism toward determinism. Set against positivist
sociology, that which measures the ‘out there-ness’ of the causes of social phenomena,
constructionism begins and ends through the ‘in here-ness’ of the social issue. Thus the
causes for creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran can be found in the Islamism of the
19

These ideas became clear to me through conversations with Dr. Mesbahi; Associate professor of
International Relations at Florida International University. He demonstrated the significance of the culture
of Islam within Iranian Marxists through our discussions, which he dubbed “Contextual Islam.”
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Iranian population. By the same argument, the reasons behind Marxists converting to
Islam before and after the 1979 revolution are to be found within Marxists themselves.
The question of how Iran ended up with an Islamic republic as a consequence of the
revolution can be answered by Marxists; all they need to do is look inside and observe the
intensity and depth of Islamic belief within themselves. Through a constructionist
argument, the religion of Islam can be treated as an independent variable. Here Islam
generates, creates, struggles, and makes definitions and moral judgments.
Using Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a method to study the roots of
Islam within Iranian Marxism requires the demonstration of Islamic belief as background.
Marxist leaders were brought up as Muslims and were active in Islamic groups. These are
related to the depth of Islamic belief within Iranian Marxism and within Marxist
individuals. Several factors proved important in understanding the extent of Islamic belief
among Marxists. To begin with there was their upbringing, how they were socialized into
the world through an Islamic understanding of the world. Through socialization, language
is constructed. Hence their prevailing terminology, even political terminology, was
Islamic. Islamic concepts such as martyrdom (shahid) were key ingredients used by
Marxists and Muslims alike in terms of resistance and fighting against the oppressors.
Furthermore, gender relations among Marxist groups adhered to the same Islamic ways
of gender separation normative in Islamic upbringing. Islamic traditions were so tightly
adhered to that often Marxists did not need to convert to Islam; it was their only way of
life, the only world they knew. The adaptation of Islam to the political life of Marxists
was both strategic and tactical. It was strategic in Islam’s non-separation of religion and
state, which Marxists never questioned, and tactical in acknowledging an Islamic
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government as a viable anti-imperialist revolutionary alternative. The latter made many
Marxists change their orthodox Marxist belief system entirely.
Included in this dissertation is a brief history of the events related to instances of
Marxist-Muslim cooperation. It begins in 1920, with the cooperation of Marxists and
Muslims against the central government in Iran, and against the Russian and British
forces. Later, in the 1960s, following the uprising in the city of Qom, the Marxist and
Muslim struggle entered a new era in fighting against the Shah. The early 1970s saw the
inception of armed struggle as a new stage in opposing and later overthrowing the Shah’s
regime. This led to the 1979 revolution, which was the culmination of the involvement of
Muslims and Marxists in the political setting.
Political discourse in Iran is usually studied and portrayed with Muslims
(especially Shariati and the Mojahedin) using Marxism. In this dissertation, however, the
idea is reversed. Although the author does not claim that this is the only study of Marxists
becoming Muslims, it is certainly rare to find such an argument in Iranian political
writing. The primary literature referred to in this dissertation is specifically used to
address the question of how and why Marxists became Muslims. Once the Islamic regime
announced the opposition groups to be subversive and anti-revolutionary, their books and
all written material were banned. As a result books were destroyed and an attempt was
made to erase a piece of history from the minds of Iranians.
In the summer of 2003, I became privy to a large collection of primary sources. They
were put at my disposal by a close friend, someone I grew up with in Iran. Our
discussions about Iranian Marxists and their shortcomings over the years led this person
to believe that reading some primary sources would help me gain perspective on the
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entire process of the 1979 revolution. These materials were books and booklets, flyers,
and political newspapers banned by the Islamic regime following the political purges of
all opposition groups in 1981-1982. The books were mainly by the Tudeh Party of Iran.
Topics covered a variety of subjects. They were mostly on Islam and the new Islamic
Republic of Iran, and how Marxists should or should not work and collaborate with the
regime. At that time I had no plans to include the material in any form of writing or
academic research.
Although 24 years had gone by, the topics and subjects depicted in the material
still seemed alive and fresh. Many of them had later fomented splits, political positions,
and events that had grave effects on the outcome of the revolution and the groups
themselves. There was a rich history in every topic mentioned. My familiarity with the
history of Marxist organizations in Iran during the revolution helped me sort out events
and groups. This collection became the material that would enable me to dissect what had
actually occurred during the revolution. With a few exceptions, almost all of the material
consisted of primary sources, invaluable for a sociologist. They were views and political
positions on specific events and personalities of the revolution. During the period of the
formation of the new state, many groups became involved in intense political discussions
to determine its future. The magnitude of this process made political actors scrutinize
every political position and idea put forth by all group and parties, making groups delve
into their ideology more than ever before. They either adhered to Islam and an Islamic
regime or distanced themselves from it altogether.
Originally my research was to include an exclusive study of major Marxist
organizations, demonstrate their adherence to Islam, especially to the Islamic Republic
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government in Iran. Once the collection of material was discovered, I looked for specific
references made by Marxists about collaborating with the Islamic regime. There were
particular events that would require Marxists’ attention; addressing these events would
indicate to others the degree to which they deviated from Marxism. The direction of my
initial research was to investigate Marxists’ perception of ideological affinity with Islam
and Muslims. The task of investigating a more profound use of Islam by Marxists came
later as I was finishing analysis of the primary sources. This is the point at which the idea
of contextual Islam became a viable subject for investigation.20
Prior to finding this collection of materials, there were seldom primary sources
available to those who lived abroad. This was especially true two years after the
revolution, when all such books were banned. The collection presented an opportunity for
me to reanalyze what had been originally analyzed by the original actors. Prior to reading
the material, my only sources of information on the events of the revolution and the
groups involved were materials published abroad. These sources included idiosyncratic
interpretations of the views and events in Iran. As a result, the reader lacked an
opportunity for objective interpretation and analysis. Finding this collection, therefore,
was an exciting discovery, whether or not the materials would be used in a paper.
Naturally, I read the collection in quest of the sophisticated methodology through
which Marxists rationalized working with an Islamic regime. Despite my original
intentions, I detected not only a tactical, short-term collaboration with the Islamic regime,
but a deep conversion to Islam by actors who, according to their professed ideology,
should have been more critical. The ease with which some Marxist groups justified a
20
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political collaboration with Muslims required a deeper understanding of the culture. The
search for political and short-term acceptance of Islam led me to investigate the
fundamentals of such an ideological conversion. Collaboration with an Islamic regime
could indicate substantial Islamic belief and ideas within the ranks of Marxists and that
was what I set out to find out.

Description of Sources
The primary sources used to depict Marxist adoption of and conversion to Islam
are actual flyers, pamphlets, books, and papers published by the Tudeh Party (hezb-e
tudeh Iran), Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaeean Majority and Minority (sazman-e
cherik-ha-ye fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran), Paykar (sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-eh
tabagheye kargar), Organization of Iranian Peoples Mojahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e
khalgh-e Iran), the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari), as well as
Marxist and Muslim individuals. These were the groups most active during the
revolution. Secondary sources are books written in Persian about Iran and the 1979
revolution in Iran, in addition to books written by non-Iranian authors after the
revolution.
The primary sources came from a collection of literature buried in the yard of an
old house in a remote village of 30 to 40 families, a long drive from the capital city,
Tehran. At the time of my travel in 2003, the last 10 kilometers were not paved and
consisted only of a dirt road that led to the village. It is hidden in a valley in a
mountainous region in northern Iran. There we found the books and booklets untouched –
the way the owner had left them close to 20 years before. The owner of the books had put
the books in three layers of plastic bags and then in gunnysacks, and had buried them in
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the front yard of a house. We dug up the gunnysacks and carried the bags into the house.
The material had remained intact. This was a collection of books, flyers, pamphlets,
hand-written books, and papers, mostly of Marxist groups. The entire collection consisted
of about 300 to 320 pieces. It was mainly the owner’s political activity during the
revolution that had motivated her to stash the collection in a safe place. These were the
“banned books worth saving” according to the owner.21 It should be made clear that such
material was available to any researcher at the time. What made it special to me was a
chance to study and examine fresh and first-hand primary sources.
The owner of the collection had hidden them in fear of getting caught by the
Islamic regime, which might have caused my contact a long-term prison sentence or even
execution. The collection had to either be destroyed or hidden in a very safe place. For
almost two years after the revolution, some groups’ publications were still in circulation
among leftists and Marxists in Iran. This person’s duties in the organization consisted of
keeping a copy of each publication. The 300+ books, booklets, and pamphlets were
“probably one-tenth of the entire collection,” the owner had told me. Most of the books
were burned or thrown into lakes, rivers, and wells. The stashed-away collection was
handpicked as qualitatively the most important items.
I was trusted with the materials not only because of the owner’s long relationship
with me, but perhaps more importantly, because I would be able to utilize the collection
and contribute toward writing a piece of history usually not the subject of social scientific
research. We had engaged in long on-going discussions on the role of Marxists during the
revolution. My contention was that some Marxist groups played a major role in the
stabilization of the new Islamic regime although it was ironic for Marxists to collaborate
21
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fully with an Islamic government. As a Marxist who had participated in the process of the
revolution, the owner did not share my view on this irony. Along with many others they
were avid supporters with years of experience and political know-how – mainly
underground for several years. My informant was in charge of particular workers’ unions
after the revolution. These unions were pronounced illegal and later scattered. Later this
person was in charge of distributing the group’s written material, which also became
labeled anti-revolutionary by the Islamic regime. This person was arrested and
incarcerated three times for short periods of time. This had great impact in giving up the
overt political life. Sharing the hidden collection seemed to relieve this person of historic
responsibility. I feel as though, said my contact, “I’m liberating myself.”
The owner insisted that the Marxists’ approach was the only rational way to
interact with an Islamic government and that an Islamic state was almost inevitable.
According to this person my absence in Iran during the revolution did not allow me to
have a correct view of events. The disclosure of the collection of materials was to prove
this person’s point that it was a rational decision for Marxists to become defenders of
Islam and that reading this collection would give me a better idea of the events of the
revolution. By reading the material, I was informed, I “would be able to put my
delusional views in perspective.”
Due to a history of despotic conditions, most Iranian opposition groups opted for
very small booklets, hence extremely small print (reading some of the material required a
magnifying glass.) This would make for written materials more convenient to transport
and easily concealed.22 Some of the publications could fit in one’s shoes, socks, hats,
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sleeves, within the linings of jackets or pants, even some body parts. Although the Tudeh
Party tried to print its work consistently the same size, it was always a matter of
availability of paper, ink, and other requirements. The official political organ of the party,
“Mardom” (people), was consistent in color but varied in size. It averaged 40 to 80 pages
of small print. The more controversial topics were collected in occasional publications
labeled “Masa’el-e Emrooz” (Current Affairs) under various names, such as
“Donya,”(World) “Nameye Mardom,”(People’s Letter) and “Zamime-ye
Mardom.”(Appendix to ‘People’) These were printed in larger size booklets.
Publications of the Liberation and Equality Group were very small – 4 by 6
inches. They had no cover and no table of contents. They usually consisted of one topic
addressed on the front page. They invariably started by calling “comrades” [Marxists]
and “brothers and sisters” [Muslims] to action. Publications of other groups, such as The
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (minority) and (majority) were also
among this collection. However, since the majority-minority split occurred more than a
year after the revolution, the subjects covered had less to do with Islam and the new
Islamic regime and more to do with their own intra-organizational discussions over the
split. Both organizations printed their political newspaper under the same name, Kaar
(labor). The distinction was the two words, aghalliyat (minority) and aksariyat (majority)
in their name on top of the front cover.
Among the items in this collection was a very small booklet belonging to a third
group that split from the Fadaee Guerillas. This 88-page publication was published under
the title, mosahebe ba Ashraf-e Dehghani (An Interview with Ashraf Dehghani). Ashraf
Dehghani was one of the leaders of this third group, which went under the name of
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Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas, eliminating the word ‘organization’ from their name.
Their argument revolved around the question of the legitimacy of the new Islamic
regime. They labeled the new regime as despotic from the very first weeks of the
revolution and refused to recognize the Islamic regime as a legitimate political body.
Ideologically speaking, this group distinguished itself as the opposite of what the Tudeh
Party was trying to achieve – a comprehensive collaboration with the new political body.
This group was anomalous among Marxists, most of whom recognized the legitimacy of
an Islamic regime from its very inception. Within the content of their political writing,
the defense, justification, and rationalization of an Islamic ideology was sparse; however,
their emphasis on martyrdom as a requirement of revolutionary authenticity persisted.
The ability to review these materials was invaluable. The person allowing me
access had trusted me in two ways: first, that I would not reveal her identity and second,
that I would put the material to good use. We had grown up together so trusting me was
not a problem. What this person was more concerned about was how I would use the
collection for political or academic purposes.
The reader should bear in mind that at the time of the revolution, such materials
published by political groups, Marxist and Muslim, were not banned. Two to three years
after the revolution, however, all political publications were pronounced ‘anti-revolution’
and ‘anti-Islamic,’ hence illegal. During this period, 1980-1982, when political
persecution and oppression of the opposition was at its peak, most books and other
written materials were destroyed. The fear of imprisonment, torture, or possible execution
left little room for risk-taking; hence books were seldom preserved. I was able to retrieve
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the materials only because they had been buried in this particular village. According to
the owner, “they were too valuable a treasure to destroy.”
Once I had the more than 300 books and booklets at my disposal, I eagerly started
the process of reading almost the entire collection in the next few weeks. I began by
reading the titles and later the contents. Most of the materials were in an official book
format; I assumed their publisher to have been the same organization that printed the
material. There were no chapters, rather topics spoken about by the chairman of the party
or group, or they were responses to certain other Marxist or Muslim groups.
I first separated the books by organization. Within the collection were a number
of books from almost all the Iranian Marxist groups, but most of the material belonged to
the Tudeh Party. They covered many topics that these organizations had written about
during the years of the revolution such as the role of Marxists in the revolution, why
Marxists trusted Muslims, why Marxists would collaborate with an Islamic government,
why Muslims should trust Marxists who do not believe in religion and God, and the
nature of the relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic regime.
I remained in the village for another three days reading as much of the material as
possible. With no distractions, no television, no telephone, I was able to not only read but
also discuss every issue with the owner of the collection. We then headed back to Tehran
with the entire collection in the trunk of the car. The owner of the collection was still
apprehensive about traveling with the books. Although 24 years had gone by, I could still
detect this person’s anxiety. We took the books home and I began reading all I could for
the next few weeks. It was after this period that I contemplated writing about the contents
of this interesting collection. Finding it was the main reason I chose the topic at hand.
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With my annual visit to Iran drawing to a close, I needed to decide how to take all
these items back to the states. Simply putting them in bags or suitcases was not a viable
option as airport security is very tight in Iran, and bags and suitcases are thoroughly
searched at several checkpoints. Although these materials were no longer banned, it was
not a good idea to risk getting caught with so many of them. Books with titles from
Marxist organizations would make any security officer want to take a second look. We
thought of scanning every page and e-mailing the material, but that was too arduous of a
task and pages usually came out distorted and unreadable. Finally, a family member
suggested mailing the most important books and booklets, the ones the author absolutely
needed, via DHL. This international company, which luckily had an office in Tehran,
hardly checked the contents. Close to 70 books and booklets were shipped, and I
handwrote the remaining useful material and quotations in a notebook.
The literature represented an amalgam of many subjects, but all were related to
either the revolution or activities before the revolution. Some 80 percent of the collection
consisted of the Tudeh Party’s political organs and booklets. These became my main
sources. After reading most of the material, I began to select those I thought would help
in examining and refining my contention. My initial idea was to show the irony of Iranian
Marxists’ conversion into Islam. It was therefore based on ideological conversion only;
how some Marxists collaborated with Muslims in stabilizing an Islamic state and how
they justified it by providing ideas of legitimation. I culled the material based on the
views put forth by some Marxists, especially the Tudeh Party, on how to cooperate with
the nascent Islamic government. Tudeh’s defense of Muslim clerics and the Islamic state
was an irrevocable position held by the party. They perceived the clerics and Muslim
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activists as anti-imperialist and in collaboration did all they could to solidify an Islamic
political entity. This was even true, as we shall read, in forming the forces of repression,
the Revolutionary Guards (sepah-e pasdaran). Thus all material selected was related to
the main argument of this dissertation: What the Tudeh Party thought of Muslim clerics,
Muslim activists, anti-capitalist ideas of Islam, necessities of forming an anti-capitalist
Islamic state, legitimating the Islamic forces of suppression, viewing groups in opposition
as anti-revolutionary, and most importantly the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as a
revolutionary leader. Since most of the sources were repetitious in their arguments, only a
handful is included here. These materials all pertain to the subject of the Islamic state and
Marxists – those that illustrate the author’s argument of demonstrating the relationship
between Marxist groups and Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Procedure for Analysis
The selection of the literature to use for this dissertation was related to its content
and organization. I chose materials put forth by groups, Marxist or otherwise, that
included an analysis of the revolution, Islam, and cooperation with Muslims. Initially it
had been curiosity about the types of documents that were banned after the revolution
that generated interest.
Prior to finding these sources, most of what I had read about the revolution had been
secondary sources published by Marxist and Muslim groups. The possibility of finding
primary sources, especially from the immediate post-revolutionary era, was remote. The
collection described in the previous section allowed for reviewing pertinent material
firsthand. Most of the material belonging to the Tudeh Party consisted of published
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question-and-answer sessions by the party. Many controversial questions were asked, and
Nour-al Din Kianuri, the head of the Party at the time, responded to them.
After reviewing the available data, I decided to adopt a pattern suggested by the writings.
This pattern pointed to four categories of selection. First, the materials were separated by
organization. Second, Marxist organizations were chosen as they pertained to the subject
at hand, how they perceived Islam and the Islamic state. Third, organizations that mostly
spoke about the proximity of Islam and Marxism were selected. Fourth, a pattern of
defending political Islam, vis-à-vis theological Islam, was sought. The contents of these
pamphlets and books relate to the topic of this dissertation in that they mainly show the
political and ideological conversion of Marxists into Islam. In this collection, contextual
Islam is not mentioned since the material merely deals with ideology and perception of
political power in relation to some Marxists. The content from the books is directly
translated without analysis. Most of the content is straightforward and speaks to the issue
at hand.
The research is therefore descriptive, using existing publications to interpret what
was put forth to justify certain political practices. I also made use of dditional direct
sources that were published legally and illegally during the turbulent times of the
revolution. This period includes one year before and one year after the takeover of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (1978-1980). Some of the documents can be found in the
archives and on the websites of the relevant organizations.
Since this type of content analysis of existing material has not been performed by
other researchers, the available secondary literature is very limited. Most such literature
was banned well into the mid 1990s. Prior to that, banned documents were not in the
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public domain, denying researchers access to them. Consequently such documents not
only constitute the literature review for this dissertation, they may also be recognized as a
review of literature pertaining to the Iranian revolution. All of the writings are in Persian.
The author translated them, at times seeking second opinions from translators in Iran.
The question was what made a Marxist-Muslim conversion possible for some
Marxists? How were Marxists convinced that political adaptation to Islam would bring
about a socialist or social democratic government? In addition to the collection found in
Iran, I have used secondary sources to demonstrate a consistency in the usage of Islamic
belief among certain Marxists. While the primary sources used here can clarify some
questions related to political positions on Islam and the Islamic regime held by some
Marxists, they would not give the reader a wider scope of events vis-à-vis a history of
Marxists and Islam in the Iranian movement. Use of the primary sources alone would not
clarify the rich history of Marxists and Islam; it would seem abstract and lacking in
historical context since they could shed light only on a short period of Marxist activity
and political position. It was necessary, therefore, to use other sources to provide the
socio-historical content.
For this purpose I have used mainly sources written by Iranian Marxist and nonMarxist analysts and social theorists. Their material was more often than not published in
Persian. A small number are also available in English, Ervand Abrahamian’s23 work, for
example. These secondary sources have helped in examining the events and personalities
influencing Marxists through Islam. Furthermore, since the primary sources used here are
only those of Marxists, they do not mention Islamic literature and Muslims as actors.
23
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This dissertation uses the sociology of knowledge to understand Marxists vis-àvis Islam; therefore, an analysis of Islam within Iran is necessary. To this end, the
writings of some prominent Muslim theorists are included. In addition, to demonstrate the
influence of Muslim political activity on Marxists, a brief history of Muslim political
activity is necessary. In the collection of Marxists’ primary sources, contextual Islam is
not depicted nor is it a matter of concern. Since, I have attempted to clarify contextual
Islam through a brief history, which also includes acts, beliefs, latent values, and
terminology.
Chapter four, where the main objective is to demonstrate ideological conversion
of Marxists into Muslims, uses mostly primary sources to show the clear deviation taken
by Iranian Marxists. These materials demonstrate how some Marxists abandoned their
skepticism of religion, and more significantly, supported a state that used religiosity to
stabilize an otherwise precarious regime. The primary sources are only sparsely referred
to throughout the other chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
Internalization, then, implies that the objective facticity of the social world becomes a
subjective facticity as well. The individual encounters the institutions as data of the
objective world outsided himself, but they are now data of his own consciousness as well
Peter L. Berger

Marx: Ideology, false consciousness, economic system/superstructure
To better understand why it is important to examine the irony of Iranian Marxists
becoming Muslims, it is necessary to review Marx’s ideas on religion and the role of
religion as false consciousness, alienation, and an opiate for the masses. Marx uses
religion as a dependent variable, as a symptom of a world that suffers alienation. In Iran,
however, and for the purposes of this paper, religion is dealt with as an independent
variable, an important social factor that generated certain behavior among Marxists in
Iran. An essential point of Marx’s sociology of knowledge is that ideas may work to
repress a class, as does religion. The failure of Iranian Marxists to contemplate this
concept is the foundation of the irony of Marxists adhering to Islam in Iran.
For Marx, false consciousness is that which confirms human servitude, rather than
emancipating the species’ essence. False consciousness hinders the universal class of the
proletariat in its liberating and developmental role and leads the bourgeoisie to
misleadingly impose its sectarian outlook as a universally valid view. The superstructure
of illusion deters class emancipatory activities by obscuring both the role of reason and
its objective in the historical process.
In The German Ideology, Marx puts forth the fullest treatment of his materialist
conception of history. He states that ideas have no existence independent of physical
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reality. He rejects Hegel’s notion that ideas determine experience in favor of a materialist
view that experience determines ideas:
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the
language or real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to
mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality,
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their
conceptions, ideas, etc.—real active men, as they are conditioned by definite
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to
these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.24
Marx argues that the essence of individuals is determined by the material economic
conditions—“what they produce and how they produce”—in which they live out their
very existence.25
This fundamental part of Marxist analysis gives priority to the material aspect of
human experience over ideal aspects of that existence. Marx can be understood as
emphasizing the economic component of social experience as the decisive element, the
relationship between economic institutions and other social institutions. Art, religion,
science and law, for example, are captured in this model of structure and superstructure.
They are derived and supported by the underlying economic structure. The superstructure
includes political parties and institutions, prevailing morality, and different aspects of
culture, namely religion. As sets of ideas, these play a role in determining action. In
Marx’s thoughts ideas can play a significant role. They are important as ideologies and at
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times explain the actions of men. These ideas have important effects through religion or
propaganda.26
Directly related to religion, Marx puts special emphasis on consciousness, the
idea that humanity is a knowing species. It is not merely knowing, but knowing in
relation to the material world and acting upon the material world. Consciousness is
awareness of humans in their actual life process. Being conscious and productive are
essentially the same. Marx claims that it is necessary to distinguish between true and
false consciousness. False consciousness accepts the nature of the world uncritically. It
supports, validates, and perpetuates the system of exploitation and oppression. Religion,
like other forms of ideology, can in certain contexts be a vehicle for false consciousness.
Marx’s discussion of religion in the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ is
visible in this quotation:
Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering
and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature,
the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of a soulless situation. It is the opium
of the people.27
This quotation seems to indicate a duality in Marx’s thought about religion. It is both an
expression of alienation and a perpetuation of alienation, thus false consciousness. Marx
does not see religion as necessary within society, or as part of human nature. As an
instrument of alienation, it is only necessary when alienation exits. Alienation is a
symptom of the exploitation of one class by another, and when this exploitation ends, the
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need for religion also comes to an end. The duality that is intrinsic to the beginning of
religion is a false duality.
Religion as an illusion plays a dual role in false consciousness. On the one hand,
religion creates an illusory form of happiness, and it makes those who accept it willing to
accept the existing conditions of their world. It also plays an ideological role in creating
false consciousness. As religion is part of the superstructure, representing the ruling
economic class of a given society, it validates and justifies that economic structure.
Further, religion is related to politics ideologically, and it is controlled and used by the
ruling class to placate the ruled majority.
The ruthless criticism of religion by Marx does not leave the adherent any room
for an unbiased view of religiosity. Marxists must address the question of religion
critically. The reason Iranian Marxists did not criticize religion and Islam is two-fold.
First, they lived in a culture permeated by Islam. Second, during the revolution many
Marxist groups viewed Islam and an Islamic government as a truly revolutionary
alternative. It is my contention that Islamic upbringing and socialization processes, which
create contextual Islam, are interconnected with the acceptance of political Islam as an
alternative form of revolution. To demonstrate the interconnection of contextual Islam
and political Islam, the author will use the sociology of knowledge as a method to
articulate and extrapolate an analysis of Islamic beliefs among Marxists in Iran. This
method is used to examine the conditions that gave rise to Islamic ideas that allowed
them to compete with and prevail over other philosophical ideas, such as Marxism.
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Marxism, Religion and Relations of Production
According to Karl Marx, productive forces develop gradually and steadily, while
relations of production are comparatively fixed at any given stage.
This produces the possibility and reality of a growing time lag between the stage
of development of productive forces and the relations of production or classstructure of a given society. The irresistible growth of the productive forces then
bursts through the integument of the relations of production which have become a
fetter on the productive forces.28
The Shah’s modernization process was forced on Iranians from the top down, having
created no real infrastructure to speak of. Productive forces were precarious, sporadic and
irregular; they were absent in terms of creating any meaningful social force.
Infrastructure was not built, and a solid capitalist class was not formed. By the time the
Shah was overthrown, Iran had only 26 miles of highway; schooling was lacking, and
unemployment was rampant among rural-to-urban migrants. A few hospitals and some
clinics existed, but these were mostly concentrated in the capital city of Tehran. The only
economic resource that allowed for the Shah’s caricature of modernization was the vast
surplus of oil, especially in the 1970s. The capitalist Iranian state-monopoly that took
shape had the form of a narrow skyscraper, lacking any solid foundation in the form of
relatively broad, modern, private capitalist, and petty bourgeois social structures.
The social relations that had been implanted from above proved not to act as an
agent of change.29 The Shah’s agrarian reform forced a significant number of peasants off
their land and into the cities looking for work. Unlike in some Latin American countries,
the state did not and could not act to build a viable infrastructure. The peasant migrant
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was faced with the unavailability of jobs in the cities and became marginalized. 30 The
marginalized migrant was disconnected from his peasant background and could not forge
new social bonds. His way of life was:
uncertain, [he was] no longer a peasant, but not yet an experienced worker;
already an urban resident, while retaining a rural psychology…what grew up was
not a proletarian but a traditionalist consciousness, since the established
proletariat was overwhelmed by new arrivals from the villages. Dissatisfaction
grew even more rapidly among the traditionalist and semi-traditionalist layers.31
The marginal first-generation urban migrants became the main opposition force,
who gave their fundamental and unconditional support to an Islamic authority. They
transferred their long-established belief system of Islam, with its patriarchal and
traditional values, into the cities, creating the basis for one of the strongest Islamic mass
movements in the Middle East. This created a fertile ground and became the seeds of the
Iranian revolution. In a peculiar way, the Shah helped build the same social force that
would years later produce his overthrow. Salvation came with Islam. Mosques became
the only place where it was possible to criticize the Shah’s regime.
The Iranian Marxists fought hard to create a viable social alternative but were not
able to create the social bonds in their organizational efforts, unable even in their
vernacular to make the necessary connection to the masses. In Iran, contrary to what
Marx argued, relations of production could not compensate for the time lag because the
development was not the development Marx had in mind. If the process of modern
development had been a real capitalist development, and a revolutionary proletariat had
30
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been established. According to Marxist thought the Iranian revolution might have
rejected religion as an alternative superstructure. The Shah’s simulated modernization
(development), however, did not eliminate religion; rather, it strengthened Islamic ideas
and values. It did not follow Marx’s ideas and Marx’s ideas on an underdeveloped
economy did not help understand what was in fact happening.

Scheler and Mannheim on the Sociology of Knowledge
Sociology of knowledge investigates the interconnections between categories of
thought, knowledge claims, and social reality – Seinsverbundenheit, as Mannheim puts it,
the existential connectedness of thought. Karl Marx was a pioneer in this field of study,
with his theory that under certain historical conditions, economic realities determine the
ideological ‘superstructure’ by way of socioeconomic processes. This concept remains a
central issue in the sociology of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge, however, owes
its decisive development to the work of Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim. According to
Scheler, who first introduced the term Wissenssoziologie (sociology of knowledge), this
method emerges as an analysis of the regularities of those social processes and structures
that pertain to intellectual life and to modes of knowing. Karl Mannheim extended the
idea as a theory of the existential connectedness of thought. His sociology of knowledge
is concerned with intellectual and spiritual structures that inevitably take different forms
in different social historical settings.
Max Scheler extended the Marxist notion of substructure by identifying different
real factors, which, he believed, conditioned thought in different historical periods and in
various social and cultural systems in specific ways. These real factors have sometimes
been regarded as institutionalized instinctive forces, and as representing an ahistorical
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concept of substructure. What limited Scheler’s ideas was his insistence on the eternal
life of ideas and values, which, however, was not helpful to explain social and cultural
change. His ideas were developed further by Karl Mannheim.
Like Scheler, Mannheim extended the concept of substructure, suggesting that
biological factors, psychological elements, and spiritual phenomena might take the place
of primary economic relations in the substructure, but he did not believe that scientific
and technical knowledge could be subjected to sociological analysis. He thought that the
sociology of knowledge was destined to play a major role in intellectual and political life,
especially in periods of crisis and conflict, by examining sociologically the conditions
that gave rise to competing ideas, political philosophies, ideologies, and diverse cultural
products. In his view, the sociology of knowledge technique could call intellectuals to
their passion of striving for synthesis, and change their relationship to groups,
organizations, and parties contending in society, giving them distance and objectivity.
The religion of Islam gave social and political protection to Iranians, and in turn
the people gave that protection to clerics and Muslim organizers. They protected Islam.
The protection given to Islam, by the people, by the Marxists, or even by the Shah is what
Karl Mannheim would discover in Iranian life, using his sociology of knowledge method.
Such methodology would dissect and demonstrate the ubiquity and intensity of Islamic
belief. From its very beginning, dating back to 1920, Marxism was influenced by Islam.
Once researchers study the trajectory of the Marxist movement, its modes of thought
would be understood as a part of that history. A principal thesis of the sociology of
knowledge is that there are modes of thought that cannot be sufficiently understood as
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long as their social origins are not clear.32 Iranian Marxists were not conscious of the
social origins of Islam within their ethnic interpretations of Marxism. It is indeed true that
Marxist organizations were theorizing about the sociopolitical conditions in Iran.
Nevertheless it would be false to deduce that all the ideas and sentiments that motivated
the organizations had their origin in Marxism alone and can be adequately explained
solely on the basis of their own life-experiences.
Further, according to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge as a method seeks to
comprehend thought in the concrete setting of its historical-social situation, out of which
individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges.33 Thus, it was not
Marxist groups in general, or even isolated individuals within these groups, who analyzed
and did the thinking about a revolution but rather certain groups who had developed a
particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations
characterizing their common position. It is incorrect to say that these groups were not a
product of their historical social conditioning. Rather, it is more correct to insist that they
participated in thinking further than what others had thought before them. Every group,
whether Marxist or Muslim, was therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact
of growing up in a specific society. On the one hand, they found ready-made situations;
on the other, they realized that in those situations there were appropriate patterns of
thought and conduct.
The social conditioning through Islam involved an internalization of the Islamic
ethos even in the political realm generating a total acceptance of political Islam. It would
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make sense for Marxists to agree with Muslims on particular ideological points, on
specific political affairs leading to a tactical unity to defeat the enemy. However, given
the wide separation between the two schools of thought in constructing ideal societies
and the states that run them, it would be ironic, if not contradictory to collaborate in total
ideology. Peter L. Berger’s ‘sacred canopy’ proves useful to help explain how this
separation of ideologies is bridged. The sacred canopy is the set of beliefs that permeate a
particular culture. These set of beliefs, in the case of Iran, stem from Islamic ideology.

Peter L. Berger and the Sacred Canopy
Peter L. Berger calls the prevalence and the penetration of a social phenomenon
such as religion a ‘sacred canopy.’ 34 That is, certain beliefs (in this case, Islam) become
so prevalent and the taken-for-granted that all activities are filtered, recognized, and
managed through them. In the case of Iran, the argument is that Islamic behavior was not
only perpetuated by Muslims, who were influenced through Islam directly, but fostered
by Marxists as well. For instance, while Marxists had set their ideological guidelines,
they were not able to shed critical Islamic beliefs such as martyrdom. The Islamic belief
in martyrdom became the canopy that hovered over all thought and all activity.
Voluntarily sacrificing one’s life for an ultimate cause was a precondition for achieving a
better society in both Iranian Muslim and Marxist thinking. Martyrdom, in fact,
guaranteed future success.
This belief regarding death is somewhat contrary to what Berger posed. Relating
to death, Berger wrote:
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Witnessing the death of others and anticipating his own death, the individual is
strongly propelled to question the ad hoc cognitive and normative operating
procedures of his “normal” life in society. Death presents society with a
formidable problem, not only because of its obvious threat to the continuity of
human relationships, but because it threatens the basic assumptions of order on
which society rests.35
The Islamic canopy operated differently. Iranian Muslims and Marxists did not
perceive the idea of death as disorder creating anomie. Dying for the cause contributed to
an entirely new order. In fact, martyrdom, and certainly a culture that thrives on the
notion of martyrdom, moves forward by the idea of sacrificial death. Contrary to Berger’s
idea, death is encouraged in such a case. The word ‘fadaee’ (in Persian), used by both
Marxists and Muslims at different times in the Iranian political movement, actually
means ‘one who sacrifices one’s life for the cause.’ The most important idea that brought
Muslims and Marxists together, especially during the years prior to the 1979 revolution,
was the idea of martyrdom. To sacrifice one’s life for the cause, to become a fadaee, was
the ultimate method not only to fight the Shah’s dictatorship but also to prove the
authenticity of a revolutionary organization. Martyrdom, modesty, and patriarchal beliefs
were the contextual Islamic ethos within the Iranian culture; Marxists were no exception.
Marxists implemented the idea of martyrdom within their political struggle as one
ultimate measure of a genuine and authentic revolutionary. Although no Marxist justified
martyrdom with an Islamic rationale on the surface, the enthusiasm with which it was
welcomed, without a doubt, was related to Islamic values. The culture of Shi’a Islam—
contextual Islam, rationalized and further reinforced martyrdom as the unit of
measurement for an Iranian revolutionary.
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Once the political and the parliamentarian methods of the Tudeh Party36 and the
National Front37 proved useless, it was time for a more serious fight, one that did not play
by the established legal rules. Armed struggle was the method, but martyrdom was the
engine that pushed revolutionaries forward, the midwife that gave birth to an entirely new
movement. Martyrdom became the challenge of an authentic revolutionary. When the
Tudeh Party and its tactics of legal-constitutional activity in fighting the Shah were
gradually undermined, the question became a matter of who was more revolutionary in
fighting the Shah’s regime. Martyrdom, as generated by the Shi’a culture of Iran, was
taken for granted by theorists as the unit by which a true revolutionary was measured.
Generally, and consistent with Berger’s notion of a sacred canopy, Islam creates
meaning. It is what tells people how to behave and presents a worldview that has answers
for all human problems.38 Islam thus became an organizing linchpin with a network of
clergy. Through Islam they were able to resist and oppose inside and outside oppressors,
to mobilize people and start revolutions.39
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman in their book, The Social Construction of
Reality, articulate three aspects of social life that explain the social construction of
reality: that society is a human product, that society is an objective reality, and that man
is a social product. They use Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology to understand human
culture and reality as it exists. They ask, how does culture present itself to us so as to
36
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appear real? How is it possible that different groups of people can accept utterly different
kinds of reality? For them reality is defined as “a quality of appertaining to phenomena
that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volitions.”40 Thus reality is
that which appears as independent of our own will or choosing. Reality is something that
exists outside of our will; it is there, outside of us, available to everyone. Berger and
Luckmann’s definition implies that we do not choose reality; it is imposed upon us.
Culture becomes reality for us apart from any intentional act on our part – a force of its
own. We learn how to think and feel as we are programmed into a culture through
socialization. Thus culture appears natural and real to us because it is intrinsic to the way
we exist. It is not the individual that creates reality but rather the culture; it is a social
construction and not an individual opinion.
There are three phases to the construction of social reality, according to Berger
and Luckmann. First is ‘externalization’– the ongoing outpouring of human beings into
the world, both in their physical and mental activity.41 The way in which we create and
externalize this new world is through culture. Culture has two primary attributes. It is
transmitted through time, and it produces meaning. Both elements are important, but the
production of meaning is what makes culture potent. Culture produces human quality.
Participants within a context are guided to believe, value, think, and feel in specific ways.
The next step is ‘objectivation’– to make something an object that had not been
one. It is what makes meaning real. Without assigning meaning, human action and
interaction would be impossible. Once meaning has been objectified, it takes on the
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characteristics of facticity – meanings become facts. Meanwhile, through our upbringing
we get stories about the world, which work as legitimations – stories that give the social
and power relationships a cognitive and moral basis. Social worlds need legitimation
because humans are constantly in search of meaning.
The third process is ‘internalization.’ The word socialization means the
internalization of a society’s culture, and is related to the very beginning stages of the
process. It is important for four reasons. First, during these beginning years, a child is
completely dependent upon his or her parents. All that the child needs to survive comes
from the primary caregivers. Second, this period of time is the most emotionally charged
that an individual will experience. Because our strongest memories are the ones that are
emotionally charged, events, explanations, and language are imprinted securely upon the
brain and are most readily recalled. Third, the self is produced through primary
socialization. Humans are not born with a self. We acquire it through language-learning
and role-taking. We come to know the crucial roles, status positions, values, beliefs,
interpretive schemes, ideas, concepts, and all that function in the place of instinct during
this time. Finally, during socialization, there are no competing worlds. Therefore, there is
no problem of identification because there are no significant other worlds from which to
choose. There are no competing voices, no options; we do not have a choice in the truths
and realities we are given.
One of the functions of legitimation is to make the socially constructed world
appear natural and not the result of human agency. And no knowledge, according to
Berger and Luckmann, does this as well as religion. There are four benefits of using
religion as legitimation in the construction of reality. First, human institutions are seen as
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manifestations of the underlying structure of the universe. Second, religion defines
disorder as evil. Through order-making, we impose order on geography by creating state
and national boundaries; we impose order by defining endless varieties of human
behavior by classifying them as, for example, male or female. Third, religion permits
individuals to feel an ultimate sense of rightness. Fourth, religion provides integration for
marginal situations. There is no circumstance or experience for which religion does not
provide a framework of meaning. Everything is brought under an umbrella.
Internalization of religious beliefs does not take place only in church or mosque or
synagogue; it is found in the most intricate parts of social relations.
Thomas Luckmann, in his book, The Invisible Religion,42 presents a significant
argument in deconstruction of the association between religion and religious institutions.
He suggests that this association, and the empirical decline of attendance at these public
institutions, led sociologists in the 1960s to assume a progressive decline in religion and
the advance of secularization. Sociologists, according to Luckmann, saw churches as
‘islands of religion (or irrationality)’ in an increasingly secularized world.43 But, he says,
religion is not coextensive with its institutional form, but has a much wider basis in
society. It is ‘the conditions under which “transcendent,” superordinated and “integrated”
structures are made socially objective.’44 That is, religion is the general condition that
locates the individual in society. Secularization, the separation between religion and
everyday life, was more visible when Luckmann wrote this piece. Not many sociologists
believe secularization to be as forceful today. Luckmann suggested that while institutions
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are an example of religious behavior, they do not constitute the whole religion. In fact,
religion as a system of meaning is necessarily social, though not institutional in origin.45
Individuals are born into societies that have constructed sacred worldviews. These
worldviews are then passed on to children through processes of socialization, and become
the basis through which the individual becomes a person both on a social and individual
level. This is very similar to Berger and Luckmann’s analysis of internalization—the
worldview that is perceived as objective becomes the basis for individual subjective
action in the world.

Max Weber’s Causality and Probability
Weber’s notion of causality can be helpful to further explain the historical
intersection of practicing Iranian Marxists with Islamic beliefs and concepts. Max Weber
did not share the view that the social sciences are unable to construct general causal
explanations of historical events or societal development.46 Weber created a middle realm
between the generating of abstract laws characteristic of the natural sciences and the
accumulation of historically specific facts that some believed must guide the social
sciences. He thought of the determination of causality as an attempt to establish the
probability that a series of actions or events are related. His notion of causality is very
different from the traditional scientific usage, which sees it as the positing of permanent
and necessary relationships between variables. While in natural science, (X) temperature
above 100 degrees centigrade will cause (Y) water to boil, in social science, social
relationships are not carried out with that fixed and singular causal ‘elegance.’ Thus
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sociologists cannot say with the same degree of certainty that an increase in education
among a population, for example, will result in fewer children. Sociologists can,
however, set out to determine the set of factors that, when taken together, have a causal
correlation with a particular outcome. Using ideal types, the sociologist can develop
general arguments that establish a probable relationship between a combination of causes
(e.g. Islamic upbringing, belief in martyrdom) and a particular consequence (Marxists
becoming Muslims).
According to Weber, developments in the intellectual, psychological, political,
and religious spheres have relative autonomy even though they may all mutually
influence one another. There is no pre-established harmony between the content of an
idea and the material interests of those who become its advocates, i.e., a causal
relationship. Weber’s intense interest in social change made him work to create an
interpretive system different from that of Marx. He attempted to show that the relations
between systems of ideas and social structures were diverse. He believed that causal
connections went in two directions, rather than just from the economic (productive)
system to the superstructure. In the case of Iranian society, the different variables
involved in making Marxists behave as Muslims—upbringing, a fighting ideal, tyranny,
the struggle against a tyrant, martyrdom, and a race for a revolutionary authenticity—
historically induced Marxists to become Muslims.

Marx on Religion
Religion is not just about belief. There is also a social dimension of acceptance
and support from a community of believers. Placing oneself in such a community
provides a clear social identity. This social identity may take place on a micro level—
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emotional support, and also on a macro level—political affiliation. Karl Marx’s historical
materialism has focused on the macro level—the role of economic and social power
relations. The key idea for Marx is that ideologies are systems of ideas that, although they
may be false, nonetheless appear as appealing and correct. Ideologies function as a real
historical force in determining how individuals and groups see themselves and the world.
Ideologies are products of the interaction of previous beliefs with changing social and
psychological circumstances. They provide answers for various social and political needs,
while simultaneously constraining individual perception and action, by systematically
misrepresenting true social relations and possibilities.47
According to Marx, social systems are characterized by three major properties:
economic, ideological, and political. Their economic function is related to reproduction
of human material life through the production and distribution of goods. The institutions
through which this ongoing reproduction is achieved are called the ‘economic base’ of
society. This economic base in turn functionally determines the social relations of
production’ as specific structures of ownership, power and control over productive
forces, and the social division of labor through which material production and
distribution are organized.
The ideological function that especially addresses the contextual belief system is
concerned with the mental reproduction of human life through the production and
distribution of ideas. These are the ideas through which people come to identify
themselves and to make sense of the world they live in; they are fundamental in
answering questions related to belief about society, nature, identity, morals, ethics, and
priorities. People are not born with these ideas; the ideas have to be constantly produced
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and distributed through institutions. Finally, the political function is concerned with
overall social integration through dispute regulation, adjudication, law and defense,
ultimately grounded in the legitimate use of coercion and violence.
According to Marxian thought, the social belief system and its ideas are
programmed into each new generation through moral education prior to any significant
development of the individual’s critical thinking system. From this point on, according to
Marx, the life process of the exploited masses is constructed towards continuous and
active development of such ideas. This takes place without the opportunity for any sort of
examination or critique. According to Maurice Godelier:
For the installation and maintenance in power of part of society (the male sex, an
estate, a caste or class), repression is less effective than adherence, and physical or
psychological violence counts for less than intellectual conviction, which brings
with it acquiescence, if not the co-operation, of the dominated.48
Therefore, religious ideas and practices are integral to the production relations of the
economic base and do not merely reflect or endorse such relations. According to Marxist
thought, however, just as capitalism will outlive its usefulness as a force for progress in
human life and will threaten to destroy the very conditions that make human life possible,
so will religious ideas. They serve predominantly to obstruct true perceptions, rationalize
exploitative social relations, and nurture false hope.
Anti-theological thinkers, like Marx, address religion as a human construct
without the need for a supernatural or transcendental other. This allows for the
examination of the role played by religion as a social human artifact, and the nature of
religion as an institution.
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The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their
real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their conditions is a call
to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The criticism of religion is,
therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of tears of which religion is the
halo.49
Marxist analysis of religion has been challenged by some social scientists as overemphasizing the negative aspects of religion and ignoring its potentially revolutionary
aspects. This approach sees Marx viewing religion purely as an ideological instrument by
which the ruling class prevents the working class from either realizing that they are being
exploited or from acting against the structures that enable that exploitation.
The rise of Islam in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran during the 1979
revolution, is a specific example of this rationale. Islam, especially in the last decades,
has been frequently associated with challenges to totalitarian authority and despots in the
Middle East. The rise of Islamism in the realm of politics can also be seen as a response
to neo-colonialism. It has functioned as a movement frequently challenging, rather than
validating, economic relations. In this light, Islam in the Middle East has some
similarities with Liberation Theology in Lating American. Catholic Liberation Theology
in Latin America has provided a voice for the poor under totalitarian dictatorships.
Adherents of Liberation Theology, as distinct from the typical practice of the Catholic
Church, which traditionally defended state authority, have generated challenges to
governmental policies. Both these religious movements can be seen as challenging
political power rather than legitimating it.
The answers given by these two religious protest movements should be seen by
Marxists to be a form of illusion. Although they act against political oppression, their
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answer will not ultimately resolve the problem, which is essentially economic. It should
have been obvious to Marxists who followed Marx more seriously that despite Islam’s
claim as a revolutionary movement, it was not directed toward fundamentally challenging
and changing the economic system. They might question some forms of the
superstructure, changing the individuals in power, changing the political structure from
monarchy to parliamentarian, but they do not critique the capitalist system. In Marxist
terms, they are a form of false consciousness buttressing capitalism.
According to Marx, religion is desired, sought after, and practiced by a majority
of the population, but the majority cannot see what is behind the religion and in the desire
to believe in it. Religion is something that people hold onto in order to fulfill a certain
desire. Religion is used by the rulers to suppress the population, but it suppresses people
in an unseen form. In the Iranian setting, Marx’s ideas on religion would have to be
inverted to fully grasp the role of religion. During the reign of the Shah, there was an
emphasis on religion as a way of life, determining social relations, and also as a protest
movement. While the Shah would emphasize modernization people insisted on an Islamic
ethos. Despite Marx’s analysis, when it comes to the specific period of the Shah (the
ruler) and the masses (the oppressed), it was the oppressed who insisted on religiosity and
Islam, and not the ruler. In the latter parts of the twentieth century in Iran, religion came
from the bottom, not the top.

Martyrdom and Metaphysical Idealism
As an ex-Hegelian, Marx equated metaphysical idealism with religion. Marx
observed that idealism in belief—Marxists believing in martyrdom, for example—leads
to metaphysical idealism, which leads to ‘theological prejudice.’ The logic of Marx’s
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view is not hard to comprehend. Any theory that takes the problem of knowledge
seriously enough to distinguish between the self as object and the self as knower or
subject, is potentially idealist, because it is only as an ideal that the two can consciously
become one. It concludes by giving more importance to the theoretical ‘copies of reality’
than to reality itself.
The basis for criticism of religion, according to Marx, is that man makes religion,
religion does not make man. In other words, religion is the self-consciousness and selffeeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again.
For Iranian Marxists to adhere to Marx’s criticism of religion, they would have
had to undertake a thorough critique of Islam. Yet, contrary to what Marx argues, the
significance and prestige of Islam in the process of modernization did not diminish but
rather increased. As Marx argued, the criticism of religion
…disillusions man so that he may think, act, and fashion his own reality as a man
who has lost his illusions and regained his reason; so that he may revolve about
himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun about which man
revolves so long as he does not revolve about himself…It is the task of history
therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this
world...Thus criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism of earth,
criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into
criticism of politics.50
Marxists in Iran did not criticize the religiosity of the masses and religious leaders
because they held the same values. This revolution was not a criticism of the past; it was
to welcome the past. It left no room for criticism of the traditions and the illusions created
by religion. In fact, Marxists were thinking of ways to interact with the masses through
more religion, not less. In many ways Marx was both used and confused by Iranian
Marxists.
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For Marx, a successful revolution would mean emancipation from Islam,
especially in the political realm. However, Iranian Marxists would not even analyze or
begin to critique Islam and its permeating social roots. Marxist affinity with Islam was
maintained in Iran through politics and thus through the culture. It is now, more than
ever, the language of political discourse.
In the next chapter the reader will become familiar with the concept of contextual
Islam and what it meant as a political background for Marxists. Contextual Islam,
ubiquitous in everyday social relations was significantly present in the practices, ideas
and ideologies. It especially influenced many Marxist groups in the realms of politics in
formation of the state.

49

CHAPTER THREE

CONTEXTUAL ISLAM AND POLITICAL ISLAM
Sacred is that sphere of life derived from social life that incorporates all the so called
higher elements of life, such as reason, morality, science, sociality, conceptualizations,
and the soul; distinguished from and opposed to the profane sphere of life.
Durkheim
Following Mesbahi’s ideas regarding contextual Islam we can see that it acts as a
‘sacred canopy’ in Iran. It is the penetration of the Islamic ethos and Islamic belief. At the
taken-for-granted level it filters, recognizes, and manages all social activities. In this
dissertation I refer to two types of Islam, Islamic political ideology and Islamic belief in
everyday-life. They are distinct in that they contain qualitatively distinct forces. Islam as
political ideology is substantially different from Islam as a value system – the Islam that
permeates life and comes from within. Political ideology is more tangible, observable,
and measurable. One can research Islamic political ideology by mere examination of
written material and spoken words. It is apparent and empirically measured. However,
contextual Islam, which saturates beliefs, mannerisms, attitudes, gender roles, and
generally all aspects of social relationships, is more difficult to examine. Belief systems
are latent within socialization processes and not often expressed at a conscious level.
Therefore, they survive, transferred from one generation to the next, without criticism. It
is the prevalence of such a belief system that Mesbahi referred to as contextual Islam.
Karl Marx perceived religion as an agent of social control and a realm of life in
which the individual immerses him/herself in the supernatural, in illusions, thereby
giving the individual false hope. From his perspective, it is a distortion of a person’s
being, because society is distorted. Religion is the heart of a heartless world, the
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painkiller (opium) of the suffering masses in the world. Religious delusions function to
throw a veil over the irrationalities of the systems of production.51 For Marxists, religion
should be questioned and analyzed thoroughly, especially when attempting to convey the
message to the masses. Iranian Marxists, however, have failed to address the question of
religion, both in the culture of Iran and in matters of the state. They abandoned their
skepticism about Islam, distanced themselves from a critique of religion, and were unable
to create a political atmosphere in which religion was discussed and questioned.
Who, if not the Marxists, should question religion and religiosity? How important
was it to generate the discourse that delved into the depth of religion and Islamic belief?
Furthermore, how important was it for Marxists to be able to separate religion and the
state? The separation of these two entities involves hundreds of years of history.
Certainly Marxists had to be aware that as alienating, illusive, and vague as religion is, in
the hands of the state it could be an even more powerful instrument. To be sure, it is not
the intention of this researcher to hold Marxists accountable for deep-seated Islamism in
Iran. Iranian Marxists are the product of the same environment and Islamic ethic,
behavior and belief as all Iranians; Islam is as much a part of their lives as it is for any
other Iranian. But as self-conscious leaders, why have Marxists taken a non-skeptical
view of religion throughout their political life? More concretely, could Marxists ever
have questioned Islam and Islamic views in Iran? The answers to these questions are
complicated and require serious research. Marxist groups are an important part of the
Iranian political movement and one needs to investigate whether they ever had the
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opportunity to confront Islamic belief. How did the prevalence of Islam allow Marxists to
become a significant political weight in the politics of Iran?
Even those who opposed the Islamic Republic government failed to further
examine the role of Islam as a belief system. They looked to destroy the regime but never
questioned its ideology, the same force that has been responsible in keeping the Islamic
Republic in power 28 years after the revolution. Marxists tacitly accepted Islam, even
though Marxism treats religion as an ideology that alienates the masses. This has been
true both contextually, within the culture as a sacred canopy, and as political ideology –
organizations and groups that strategically and tactically have collaborated with Islamic
groups and the Islamic state.
Many Marxist groups argue that the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained in
power only through suppression, control, imprisonment, and torture of its political
opponents. What they neglect to realize is that for almost three decades, the Islamic
Republic has used Islamic belief to its advantage at a social level to create a hegemonic
ideology52. Much of its authority stems from its adherence to Islamic ideology. The
Islamic Republic of Iran came to power through virtual nation-wide consensus. Millions
of Iranians greeted Ayatollah Khomeini at the airport in Tehran when he first set foot
back in the country. The Islamic Republic is not a coincidence, not an anomaly. It is the
high degree of correlation between what people believe and what their government
represents that has kept the Islamic Republic in control of the state.
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The author contends that Islamic belief so thoroughly permeated Iranian society
and culture that Marxists could not have been aware of the depth of Islamism within
themselves and the masses of Iranians. In fact, Marxists had little choice but to submit to
Islam, either contextually, because of their socialization into an Islamic culture, or
ideologically, because Islam was too powerful a political force to counter, hence the
notion of Marxists becoming Muslims. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there
were three components that made the irony of Marxists becoming Muslims unnoticeable.
The three components of this “tripartite complex”, according to Mesbahi, included:
“first , the contextual Islam, the pervasive Shi’a culture and socialization, especially
with central figures of Shi’a Islam, Imam Ali and more specifically Imam Hussein, and
the story of the martyrs of Karabala which acted as the visible and invisible sacred
context, second, the ideological Islam, Islam as a potent and competing anti-Shah and
anti imperialist revolutionary ideology, and third, the ruling Islam, Islam as the
unavoidable political reality of the prevailing power structure ruling and controlling
Iran immediately after the revolution.”53
According to Mesbahi, Marxists:
“had been raised, like millions of other Iranians, with the first, almost as their social
and emotive oxygen, had to intellectually compete and respond to the second , and finally
had to make a political choice and adopt a survival strategy in dealing with the reality of
the third”. The saga of Marxists dealing with Islam thus took place in a complex
environment imbued with variations of Islam in its cultural, ideological and governing
manifestations.”54
This chapter examines both the prevalence of Islam in the culture of Marxists and
in the political ideology of resistance, which lent itself to the formation of an Islamic
state. Islam prevailed in political resistance, fighting the Shah’s tyranny, mobilization of
the people, and more importantly, the ability of Muslims (clerics) to organize a state – all
of which Iranian Marxists failed to achieve. As a result, Marxists had to follow in the
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footsteps of Muslims in these major realms of political life, mainly due to the legacy of
resistance left by Muslims in the Iranian political movement. Marxists converted to and
accepted Islam in three areas: 1) radicalism and resistance, 2) martyrdom, and 3)
formation of an Islamic state under the notion of Shi’a Islam’s authority of the Jurist
(velayat-e faghih).
In these three areas, Marxists were so profoundly influenced that their conversion
to Islam was seamless. A resistance movement established by Islamic ideology, the
notion of martyrdom as instrumental to achieving liberation, and the formation of a state
based on an Islamic ethos prevailed in all aspects of political life. Marxists observed and
learned from the sacred canopy of Islam; their political learning had come from Islamic
ideology. These three major criteria determined the power relations among all those
involved in political thought, life, and activity.

Islam: Resistance and Revolution
According to John Esposito, a leading expert on Islam, during the Iranian revolution,
Shi’a Islam
proved to be an influential and powerful tool with deep native roots. It was able to
organize a common goal for political-religious leadership for the common
historical identities and beliefs and values. It also generated an ideological
structure, and through this structure gave meaning and legitimacy to an oppressed
and oppressor movement. To an extent where a variety of groups were able to join
in, clerics like Khomeini, Mottahari, Taleghani, and Beheshti, in cooperation with
more secular and non-cleric figures, created reformist and revolutionary
ideologies.55
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According to Sadegh Zibakalam, a leading Iranian observer,56 Muslim leaders
were able to speak the people’s language in demanding what the Shah had neglected to
achieve. People’s expectations, demands, social hopes, and political wishes materialized
through Islam. People who were neglected, oppressed, and exploited under the forces of
despotism were able to use religion to demonstrate their discontent.57 Zibakalam views
the 1979 revolution as a victory that was mainly led by Muslim intellectuals with Islamic
expertise. He claims that their usage of Islam created a massive revolution. According to
many Marxist organizations, including the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee
Guerillas (OIPFG)58 and the Tudeh Party,59 it was the Marxists who did most of the
organizing and agitating, especially during the years prior to the revolution. Marxists
claimed that during the revolution Muslim clerics had deceitfully stolen the revolution
and labeled it ‘Islamic.’60
Who did the organizing during the revolution and what underlying reasons caused
Marxists to become Muslims or use Islam as an ideology? The argument is that a history
of the transformation of Marxists into Muslims made this conversion of ideology so
unobstructed and effortless that it seemed almost natural. The seamless usage of Islam by
Marxists is precisely why research on this issue has been virtually nonexistent. While it
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may seem controversial and ironic to both ideologies, this adaptation of Islam by
Marxists has not been the subject of many papers or books.
Islam, as claimed by many of the researchers, gave rise to the revolution in 1979.
This claim is not limited to Muslims alone. Among the researchers are leftists and
Marxists who have reached the same conclusion. Islam, so deeply rooted in Iran, was
significant in determining not only the consequences of revolution but also the path it
followed. According to Skocpol:
In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was made—but not everyone will note, by any of
the modern revolutionary parties on the Iranian scene. Not by Islamic guerillas or
by the Marxist guerillas, or by the communist Tudeh Party, or by the secularliberal National Front. Instead it was made through a set of cultural and
organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal
enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah. … No
innovative revolutionary propaganda retailed to the masses overnight, in the midst
of a societal crisis, can serve this purpose. But a worldview and a set of social
practices long in place can sustain a deliberate revolutionary movement. …
All sectors of Iranian society were coalescing under the rubrics of Shi’a Islam,
following Khomeini. After the Shah definitively broke with the clergy, the
political center of gravity shifted toward firm political opposition, and later,
revolution.61
In this light, there is consistency between her view and what took place during the
1979 revolution in Iran. Acceptance of Shi’a methods and vision—radicalism, martyrdom
(shahadat), and Shi’a Islam’s idea of authority of jurist (velayat-e faghih)—was clearly
noticeable among Marxist organizations.
Some Marxist organizations toned down their analyses of a social-political
revolution, deliberately overlooking their irreconcilable differences with religion and
religious political alternatives. To conform to the religion of Islam is especially an
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anomaly for Marxists since Islamic ideology does not separate itself from the state and
state-run institutions. Skocpol believes this ideology deliberately made the revolution:
Revolutions are not made deliberately by revolutionaries or mass-based
movements. … [But] if ever there has been a revolution deliberately made by a
mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the old order, the Iranian
revolution against the Shah surely is it.62
According to Skocpol, ideologies reveal through action the practical strategies that
revolutionary leaders follow as they act to bring about outcomes. In Iran the ideology of
Islam functioned as guidance for revolutionary leaders.
The strong roots of Islam and Islamic culture in Iran are hardly a mystery to
anyone familiar with Iranian culture. The role and significance of Islamic ethics in social
and political movements are as profound in organizations as they are in individuals in
Iran. Islamic ethics can also be observed in non-Islamic or secular organizations. For
example, gender relations established within Marxist groups attest to this lifestyle of
patriarchy, which in Iran, in addition to the enduring influence of native culture, also
stems from Islamic ideology.63
Forrest Colburn refers to an intellectual culture as a prevailing paradigm: the
Islamic values, expectations, phraseology, iconography, and implicit rules that expressed
and shaped collective intentions and behavior in the Iranian revolution. Like other
authors, he believes that Islam as a belief system and Muslims as organizers were better
prepared to lead the masses:
Several factors explain the success of Islam as a revolutionary force where
Marxism-Leninism had failed. The clerics in Iran had a wider and more effective
organizational base than the Marxists from which to mobilize popular opposition
to the Shah. And Islam had a resonance and legitimacy with the entire population
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that Marxism-Leninism could only aspire to have. Finally, the moral authority of
Islam protected the clerics from the kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier
by secular organizations.64
Islam’s moral authority did not make a difference to the way the Shah perceived his
enemies. He nonetheless thought that the Muslims, in cooperation with the Marxists, had
conspired to topple his regime. He dubbed the Iranian political movement prior to the
1979 revolution as the ‘black and red conspiracy,’ the ‘infiltration of communists into
Muslim ranks,’ ‘Marxist-Muslims,’ and many other combinations of names.65
Condescending intentions in these names notwithstanding, the proximity of
Marxists and Muslims in theory and practice was undoubtedly present. Almost one year
prior to the February 1979 revolution, an article written in the state-sponsored newspaper,
Ettela’at, on December 25, 1977, accused Ayatollah Khomeini of treason and resistance
against progress and women’s liberation: “The red and black reactionaries have
recognized him [Khomeini] as the most appropriate person to fight against the Iranian
revolution66 [referring to the Shah’s ‘white revolution’].” It further accused Khomeini of
being the main figure in trying to establish a “colonial plan devised by the red and
lack.”67 The article referred to the conspiracy of Islamic movements in the Middle East,
coordinated with communists led by the Soviet Union.
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The Shah’s efforts to connect the two political movements never ceased. It was
brought to the public’s attention even after his Prime Minister, Jamshid Amouzegar,68
was ousted and replaced by Ja’far Sharif-Emami.69 In a special meeting in the parliament,
Sharif-Emami spoke about the same conspiracy. Evidently, he perceived Marxists as the
perpetrators and Muslims as the victims. To fight against the government through
violence is not the Iranian people’s way of doing things. And if people
were all good Muslims, they would not fight their government, so obviously
someone else is responsible. Documents have shown that Marxists were the main
cause, but they realized that it is not possible to do it alone. So they recognized
that under these conditions, they could achieve their goals through religion. They
infiltrated the religious ranks. Slogans chanted by the people (on different
religious occasions) testified to these communist directives. From what we have
observed, the slogans were completely Marxist.70
Marxists would rationalize their collaboration with Muslims only in the context of
politics. This connection between Marxists and Muslims, including their motives and the
extent of their cooperation, manipulation, and sincere camaraderie, remain a largely
unexamined social phenomenon. To many Muslims, the notion of cooperation and/or
manipulation by Marxists is intolerable and offensive. Emaddedin Baghi, an Iranian
social scientist, believes that Marxists practiced an “arrogant manipulation” on Muslims.
He states:
Marxists think of themselves as the only vanguard of anti-imperialist struggle in
the world. They monopolize any struggle against oppression and imperialism.
They think of any religious or non-Marxist force as bourgeois, petite bourgeois, or
68
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feudalist. They believe that religious groups would not be able to lead people’s
anti-imperialist struggles, and because they [Muslims] lack essential
understanding of imperialism, they end up in conciliation with imperialism.71
Baghi’s statement contains an element of truth. What is more important is
whether in the case of Iran, the above statement was true. On the contrary, however, it
was Iranian Marxists who were doing most of the converting. This alteration enabled the
Marxists’ monopolization, as he calls it, of the resistance movements. It also explains the
Marxist justification of the viability of Islamic belief. The intellectual arrogance referred
to by Baghi was wishful thinking on the part of Marxists. It also became a trap that led
Marxists to immerse themselves in contextual Islam.

Islamic Resistance and Radicalism
Organizations such as the Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e Eslam) had long ago started an
Islamic resistance movement, going back to the time of the Shah’s father, Reza Shah.
They were the first organized group of Muslims to gather some popularity through their
actions. In 1945, Mojtaba Navvab Safavi founded Fadaeean of Islam. He wrote a small
pamphlet under the title Religion and Vengeance, (din va entegham), attacking the nonreligious and promising them an Islamic revenge. He was referring to Reza Shah’s attack
on Islam and religion; the Shah was putting pressure on religious institutions and
individuals to shed their lives of religious activity and belief. Fadaeean, to prove their
serious belief in what they claimed, assassinated Ahmad Kasravi, a prominent secular
writer of the time.72 They protested women entering the bazaar and mosques without
proper Islamic cover. They protested against Hazhir, the Prime Minister; they attacked
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liquor stores, and they made a point of traveling to Palestine to fight against Israel.73 In
1948, Prime Minister Hazhir’s parliament denounced Islam as the official religion of
Iran. This political act may have caused his death. Ironically, the assassin, a member of
the Fadaeean of Islam, was the same person who had earlier been exonerated by Hajir’s
government for assassinating Kasravi.74 In 1950, the Shah, despite his own tendencies,
appointed General Haj Ali Razmara to calm the growing discontent. But before Razmara
could begin to control a movement that would give rise to strong nationalist sentiment, he
was assassinated.75
An important Muslim group that continued its role in the opposition leading the
revolution was the Council of Islamic Alliance (shora-ye ettehadi-ye eslami). This group
did not recognize the legitimacy of the Shah’s government and began its political
opposition by refuting three major actions:
1. Eliminating the religiosity of representatives
2. Taking an oath on ketab-e asemani (divine book) and not the Koran
3. Giving women the right to vote and be elected to the parliament76
They disagreed with these actions because they represented the Shah’s effort to
dispose of religion in his government. This was a verbal struggle, but there were other
activities carried out by this group. On January 21, 1964, several young followers of the
committee followed through with the plan to assassinate Prime Minister Hassan Ali
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Mansour. The Shah’s government took this as a serious blow, and many important
figures among the clergy were arrested or executed; Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to
Turkey. The Alliance carried on sporadic activities from 1964 to 1970, but was not able
to gather more popularity. According to Pahlavan:
Since the 1960s, leftist guerilla thought and armed struggle had won over all opposition
groups and large sectors of nationalists, and even religious people showed interest and
were attracted to it…under these conditions, the Council of Islamic Alliance became
vulnerable and lost its practitioners. Important figures of the Alliance started working
with the Mojahedin (Muslim guerrilla group) and defected from the Alliance.77
But activities of radical clerics and Muslims did not cease, and they continued their
political provocation. Their activities, with the aid of Marxist guerillas, were setting the
stage to overthrow the Shah.
The Shah’s regime began a consensus-building program with the implementation
of a referendum on land reform under the guise of a “white revolution.” Its emphasis was
land reform, and its main amendments were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Annulment of landlord-serf relations
Nationalization of all forestland
The sale of state-owned factories to finance the land reform
Profit sharing for workers in the manufacturing sector
Election reform
Compulsory education [in rural areas] through an ‘education army’

Khomeini’s response to the referendum was swift and direct; he called it anticonstitutional. As a result, the clergy’s resistance shifted into a new phase. In
Khomeini’s telegram to the Prime Minister Amir Alam on October 18, 1962, he pointed
to the unconstitutionality of the mandates. He added that the people of Iran would surely
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resist such laws and would not remain quiet.78 Several days later, in a more provocative
letter directly to the Shah, Khomeini addressed Alam’s endeavors as subversive. He
mentioned that Alam had continued to act against the constitution and had taken
measures, through his thugs, to censor the media.
“Mr. Alam has openly proclaimed his differences with the Koran and the
constitution. … [He] thinks that by changing the name of the Koran to the Divine
Book he can pronounce it as unofficial and replace it with any other holy book
such as Avesta [the book of Zoroaster] or the Bible. On behalf of the Iranian
people, I shall ask you not to trust such people whose sycophant behavior has put
the blame on you for their anti-constitution and anti-religious acts.”79
Several days earlier, however, before Khomeini’s letter, the Shah had paid a visit
to the city of Qom. After the prayer and the Islamic ritual, he made a vehement speech
about the religious opposition:
Some ignorant and backward people whose brain has not developed yet always stand in
the way of progress. The black reactionary [Muslim] does not understand, and for a
thousand years his brain has not developed. He thinks that life is to be spent somehow
finding some money to live on and some food to eat and a place to sleep. …Well, living
on the dole no longer exists [referring to khums and zakat]. In the new six-step laws, we
have thought of everyone. But who will oppose such law? Black reactionaries, the
ignorant who are dense and malicious. The destructive reds are obvious, and
coincidentally, I hold less of a grudge against them. He [the communist] openly says that
I want to give the country to foreigners [Soviets]; there is no deception and lying on his
part… they are forthcoming with what they believe in.80
After the military raid and the killing of several of the clergy in Qom, Khomeini
sent the Shah several harsh messages. But during his speech on the anniversary of
original Islamic Martyrs of Shi’a Islam (in the incident of Karbala), Khomeini gave his
sharpest criticism yet:
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We can conclude that they are aiming at the fundamentals, that they disagree with
foundations of Islam and clerics, and that they do not want this foundation to
exist. Israel does not want Islamic clerics in this country. Israel does not want this
country to have scientists, and Israel suppresses our clerical school through its
black mercenaries. They suppress us, and they suppress you the people. They
want to take over your economy, to destroy your commerce and agriculture, and
to confiscate your riches. Israel, through its mercenaries, wants to destroy what
stands in their way. The Koran is in their way and must be destroyed, the clergy
are in the way and must be eliminated, our schools and other centers of science
are barriers and must be destroyed, and if other clerics are later in the way, they
too will also be killed, thrown from the rooftops, breaking their arms and legs. In
order for Israel to reach its interests, the Iranian government has violated us to
help the Israeli plan.81
The Islamic movement specifically, and the Iranian resistance movement in general, was
not the same after the suppression in the summer of 1963. It became more organized and
more radicalized. The new generation of Muslims was learning from other Third World
movements and implementing their ideas. Even nationalists were now more active and
radical.
The guerilla movements, both Marxist and Muslim, resulted from a long tradition
of political culture of resistance, especially in the 1960s. Their armed opposition
radicalized the Iranian opposition. The political activity against the Shah from 1963 to
1979 became more obvious with the role of many guerilla movements in opening up and
forcing a political culture to the surface. The prelude to the adaptation of an Islamic
ideology by Marxists was noticeable within this movement. Many Marxists did follow
the Islamic traditions rooted in the culture by pursuing politics advocated by Muslim
clerics who later founded the Islamic Republic. Some organizations consciously toned
down their Marxist rhetoric in favor of Islam.82 They thought their Marxist analysis of a
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complete revolution would revive itself in the shrouds of Islamic concepts. This
ideological change occurred only in some Marxist organizations and to address political
issues that demonstrated, for example, the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic
government.
It was during this period that the activities of radical clerics and Muslim activists
in general constructed the political discourse for years to come. The uprisings instigated
and organized by prominent clerics strongly contributed to the future events during the
1979 revolution. Almost all those who played a role in opposition to the Shah took on
important political positions after the revolution. The organizers of movements during the
1960s were the leaders of the revolution in 1979. Their resistance began mainly as a
consequence to the Shah’s White Revolution.
By July 1978, the Shah felt the effervescence of serious opposition; he stated that
there would be democracy and political freedom in Iran as in European countries:
We will have freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of
press…patriotic people and those who yearn to see their country progress will
opine. …Others too will be able to express their views. …Of course in a
democracy, people will vote and we will accept their votes.83
These were mere words and therefore not very appealing to a population that was
already furious about his dictatorship. At this juncture, the question that concerned
Iranians was just how his regime would be toppled. In effect, the Shah’s deeds had
rendered his words useless and were causing more anger. While he spoke of democracy,
he was holding thousands of political activists in his prisons. He also added thousands of
new members to his notorious secret police, the SAVAK.
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The strength of Islam as a mobilizing force should be added to these underlying
causes. The Shah’s political repression is precisely what the clerics capitalized on. In
explaining ideas that brought people together, many authors took Islam and Islamic
culture into account. Thus, in their analysis, Islam played the most fundamental role in
the 1979 revolution, and in fact was the most important underlying reason.84 According
to these authors, revolution occurred because the Shah neglected to show respect for this
national religion and the clerics. As a result, all uprisings, strikes, riots, and similar
activities were conducted only to construct an Islamic alternative. According to Amid
Zanjani, an Iranian political theorist:
The only cause, as the first and main cause that gave rise to revolution from birth
to victory, is the Shah’s actions against Islam. He saw the life of his regime,
gathering foreign support, and establishment of his despotism contingent upon the
suppression of Islam.85
Zanjani perceived Islam as the main threat to the Shah. Therefore, the Shah’s antiIslamic policies would work to eliminate ideas that questioned his policies. When the
Shah began his fight against Islam, he thought that eliminating Islam would save his
regime, resolve domestic and foreign conflicts, and guarantee the life of his empire. And
since the Islamic country and population were dependent on clerics and supporters of
Islam, he was faced with cleric resistors who spoke the Islamic language, reflecting the
demands of Muslim Iranians.86
Muslims utilizing an Islamic ideology toppled the Shah’s regime. It is especially
logical since true Muslims would resist and fight against any secular despot. Iranian
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political theorist, Manoochehr Mohammadi’s analysis holds more accountability for
Islam as a motive and ideology. He presents a conservative and religion-centric view.
Mohammadi states that
the lack of attention paid to dominant Islamic values and indifference to the
demands of religious leaders provoked religious emotions in Iran… These
included excessive freedoms, lack of discipline, corruption and prostitution, lack
of respect to public [women’s] modesty, Bahais and Zionists occupying key
positions in the government, changing Islamic history, control of the economy by
Bahais like Sabet Pasal and Zionist Elghanian, backward moves, and the
encouragement of Iranian history before Islam. 87
Through their political struggle, Muslims dubbed the Shah the despot and the
United States a foreign force that imposed its culture and faithless secular ideas on Iran.
Just as the Muslims, Marxists viewed the Shah’s regime and all its institutions as a
puppet of the United States imperialism that maintained a dependent capitalist economy.
It was the Muslims who initially introduced armed struggle by assassinating prominent
figures in the Shah’s regime. Following that lead, Marxists eventually started armed
struggle against the Shah in Siahkal.88 Although Muslims started their struggle as a
protest movement, it eventually became a movement that demanded the overthrow of the
Shah’s regime. Therefore, it was both Muslims and Marxists who advocated a revolution
(Islamic or social-democratic) as the only viable solution. Both schools of thought
advocated nationalism. It was the most important duty of a revolutionary to defend Iran
in the face of foreign aggressors or imperialists.
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Both Marxists and Muslims were socialized into learning how an Islamic
resistance movement develops as an adamant opposition to the Shah’s regime especially
after the 1963 uprising. Islamic activity by clerics and non-clerics permeated Iranian
society after Khomeini declared his opposition against the Shah. Even the National
Front,89 a somewhat secular nationalist movement, was influenced by these activities.
Led by Muslims, the Liberation Movement split from the National Front. Furthermore,
the Mojahedin,90 an armed Islamic group, was born into Iranian political life as a result.
The new Marxist guerilla movement, and even some Tudeh Party members, were heavily
influenced and were learning from Muslim political activity. By the late 1960s and early
1970s, a new radical political movement had been established.

Martyrdom
Marxists adopted the same ethics of Islam as advocated by Muslims. They
believed in simplicity and modesty in attitude, behavior, and clothing. Accumulation of
wealth was looked down upon since it connoted worldly possessions and greed. Marxists
insisted on clothing that demonstrated modesty and a humble personality. Colorful
clothing and music, especially the Western type, was denigrating to both groups. It was
these similarities, set in an Islamic society that helped lead the Marxists to accept Islam
as a sociopolitical background.
Muslims set the stage for a political struggle through several criteria. Consistent
with the founders of Islam, they believed martyrdom to be a required sacrifice to achieve
an ideal society. It was also a necessary method to fight against the enemy. Marxists too,
89

See chapter 6 for details on the National Front (jebhe-ye melli) and Liberation Movement (nehzat-e
azadi).

90

See chapter 6

68

perceived martyrdom as a positive notion of ultimate sacrifice for the ultimate cause.
Each martyr opened another window toward the new egalitarian society. Martyrdom
demonstrated to the masses the Marxists’ commitment to their cause. A voluntary death
might under certain circumstances be considered heroic. The distinction between suicide
and martyrdom is in the eye of the beholder. According to Arthur Droge and James
Tabor, there are five characteristics of deaths distinguished as martyrdom:
1. They reflect situations of opposition and persecution.
2. The choice to die, which these individuals make, is viewed by the authors as
necessary, noble, and heroic.
3. These individuals are often eager to die; indeed, in several cases they end up
directly killing themselves.
4. There is often the idea of vicarious benefit resulting from their suffering and
death.
5. The expectation of vindication and reward beyond death, more often than not,
is a prime motivation for the choice of death. 91
The Muslim ideal of martyrdom originated in a warrior culture. The ideal is one of active
struggle (otherwise known as jihad) in which the will to die in the way of God is decisive.
It is also significant that those who die in shipwrecks, childbirth, or illness may enjoy the
rewards of the martyrs in paradise.
During the latter parts of the nineteenth century up to the 1980s, colonialism and
foreign invasions in the Middle East gave rise to an entirely new understanding of
martyrdom. The political events of recent decades have led to a resurgence of the ideal of
actually dying as part of the struggle in the way of God. Contemporary justifications of
martyrdom that do not necessarily rely on the luxuries of the otherworld are espoused by
some non-Muslims. It is not only the Iranian Marxists who rationalized martyrdom, but
also Palestinians and Sri Lankan Marxists, to name but two of the other examples. The
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Koran is absolutely clear on the Muslim’s duty to struggle in the service of God, and on
the rewards enjoyed by those slain in the course of that struggle. According to the Koran
“those slain in the way of God, He will not send their work astray. He will guide them,
and dispose their minds aright, and He will admit them to Paradise, that He has made
known to them”.92 While in Christianity, it is the martyr’s death rather than his fighting
that carries the ultimate religious significance, with Islam the opposite is true. Those who
fight “in the way of God” have a special status beyond the promise of Paradise. They are
“mightier in rank with God.”93 Their sins will be forgiven;94 whether slain or victorious
they will receive a vast reward.95 The one certain reward associated with martyrdom is
eternal life: “Do not say of those slain in God’s way that they are dead; they are living,
only you do not perceive.”96
A martyr is a person who chooses to suffer or die rather than give up his faith or
principles; a person who is tortured or killed because of his beliefs; a person who suffers
a long period of great pain or misery for his/her cause. Christian history is filled with
officially proclaimed saints who tolerated persecution and died willingly for their faith –
St. Stephen, John the Baptist, and most importantly, Christ himself. Just about the only
warrior who became a martyr in Christianity is Joan of Arc. She killed and was willing to
be killed to defend her God.

92

Koran, Chapter 47, verses 4-6.

93

Ibid., 9:20.

94

Ibid., 61:12.

95

Ibid., 4:74.

96

Ibid., 2:`154.

70

In Jewish tradition there are also people who die for their faith. In the Masada
event in the first century, Jewish Zealots decided to kill each other rather than face
capture by the Romans. Like Muslims, Zealots interpreted important events in the
founding period of their religion as precedents for their tactics and to mean also that
“those who died in this struggle secured their places in paradise.”97
In Islam, the definition of shaheed (martyr) also includes several types of death.
The word shaheed is usually used to describe everyone from innocent children killed in
war to gunmen who open fire in a crowded marketplace. Martyrdom is a powerful
concept in the modern Muslim world, one that summons the earliest days of Islam’s
turbulent history in the seventh century, when followers of Muhammad died defending
their faith.
To seal one’s belief through one’s death was the main characteristic shared by
Muslims and Marxists. Martyrdom was advocated by prominent clerics and intellectuals
as a measure of resistance. Ayatollah Mottahari, a prominent cleric who was assassinated
only several months after the revolution said on reviving martyrdom, that we cannot
“separate ourselves from the martyrs [in Karbala] when the right moment comes.” 98 Both
Mottahari and Shariati99 opposed any mode of identification with the well-known battle
of Karbala and martyrdom that did not simultaneously create a sense of heroism, sacrifice
and activist commitment to control one’s destiny. Mottahari argued that those who truly
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believed in the martyred Imam Hussein and followed his path with sacrifice were
themselves martyrs. He clearly extended the sacred Shi’a history into contemporary
politics. He believed in Islamic activism and harshly criticized passive Islam. If Muslims
wanted to do the right thing, they would have to “refer back to our past and to our
historical records.”100 This meant the history of Karbala and the struggle Hussein led
against Mu’awiya’s army.
Perhaps the most concise and articulate statement of the significance of a martyr
was given by Ayatollah Taleghani. He was a radical cleric who persevered in his struggle
against the Shah, and died early after the revolution on September 10, 1979. He often
preached in continuance of the revolutionary movement and claimed that death or any
hardship should not be feared by those who struggle to change the direction of history.
He referred to the Koran in defense of martyrdom:
With a soul invigorated by light and energy, and with a vision penetrating and
perceptive [the Koran] removes the barrier of the martyr’s death from their path,
and removes the word of their death from their tongue. [So we] consider the
martyrs so alive and lofty that their spirit is life-giving and uplifting for the earthy
creatures, and their dead body, unwashed and unshrouded, gives blessings to the
wretched, their gravesite the site of pilgrimage for the living hearts, the boiling of
their blood giving life to dead bloods.101
In Iran, martyrdom is a powerful weapon that is directed toward the West, the
occupier, the invader, the oppressor (tyrant), and is shared by all those who believe in the
struggle against the national enemy. Few places on earth revere death and martyrdom as
intensely as Iran. This is partially due to the fact that Shi’a Islam was founded on the
memory of Hussein’s death in the battle of Karbala. During the Muslim celebration
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known as Ashura, Shi’as use the commemoration of Hussein’s martyrdom to dedicate
themselves to the memories of the martyrs of their recent history.
Martyrdom became a notion that gave birth to an authentic and genuine Muslim
revolutionary.102 It became instrumental. By the late 1960s a true revolutionary was a
revolutionary who gave his/her life for the ultimate cause. A martyr withstood torture to
the point of death without uttering a word. Despite the Tudeh Party’s refraining from the
idea of martyrdom for decades, the new Marxists had to welcome death and martyrdom.
Ultimately Marxists learned that without adhering to martyrdom they would not be a true
political alternative in the eyes of the Iranian masses. The death of a Marxist
revolutionary not only proved to the masses the seriousness of his/her devotion but also
mobilized the masses.

Karbala and the Inception of Shi’a Islam
Consider the event that gave rise to this belief in Shi’a Islam, which started with
the death of two prominent Imams in the latter part of the seventh century. The concept
began with a conflict between two movements which later became known as Shi’as and
Sunnis. The former were followers of prophet Mohammad and his blood descendents,
and the latter were followers of prophet Mohammad and his political descendents. After
the death of Ali, Mohammad’s cousin and son in law, Ali’s elder son Hassan took over as
a caliph. Ali’s rule had been controversial, and he had been passed over for succession
three times in a row. Hassan’s takeover, although for a short period, involved constant
conflict against Muawiya, a member of the rival Umayyed clan. Hassan’s rule lasted only
six months. However, it was his brother Hussein who had defied Yazid, Muawiya’s son,
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and challenged his political power. Hussein and 71 members of his family were martyred
in Karbala, located in southern Iraq, on the 10th day of the Arabic month of Muharram in
the year 680.
The killing of Hussein and the other members of his family became a symbolic
turning point in the Shi’a religion. It was introduced into Shi’(ism) as the notion of freely
and passionately giving one’s life in the path of God. Currently, Shi’a Muslims (13
percent of all Muslims) around the world commemorate the event by mourning and selfinflicted wounds to feel compassion with the original martyrs of Islam. The followers of
Mu’awiya, on the other hand, became the Sunnis, and although the conflict was over who
would succeed prophet Mohammad, the Karbala event is conspicuously one of the events
that marked the split between Sunnis and Shi’as.
Shi’ism became consolidated, especially with the death of Hussein. According to
Seyyed Hussein Nasr, a well-known authority on Islam, Shi’ism continued as a protest
movement of increasing political significance “but did not gain political power over any
extensive area of the Islamic world until the Safavids conquered Persia [Iran] in 1501 and
established a twelve-Imam Shi’ism as the official state religion.”103 For Iranians (or
Shi’as in general), Ali symbolized a political activism to mend social injustices for the
masses of poor people (mostaz’afin). The fact that Hussein fought to his death instilled in
Shi’as the firm belief of suffering and martyrdom. In the twentieth century, especially
during the 1979 revolution, he became a symbol of political resistance, revolution, and
final hope. Shi’as consider visiting his tomb in Karbala second in importance only to the
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Hajj in Mecca. Ashura mourning sessions are regularly held in Iran to remember Hussein
and his family’s death and suffering, and to promote the reverence of martyrdom.
During the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini recalled the importance of martyrs and
mourning sessions, remembering martyrs for his audience of clerics. In his speech on
June 20, 1982, he said:
These mourning sessions have developed young men and youths who voluntarily
go to the war fronts seeking martyrdom and feel unhappy if they don’t achieve it.
These Ashura mourning gatherings develop such mothers who urge their sons to
go to the war fronts and if they do not return, the mothers wish they had more
sons to send or say we have other sons to send to the war fronts.104
Shi’as identify with the death of Hussein and his struggle against Muawiya and
his troops. His martyrdom has influenced nearly all that happens in the social-political
world. According to Davis, it even influences how they perceive cheerfulness and having
fun.105 The Shi’a leader, Khomeini, decreed that good Shi’as should not decorate their
homes lavishly. He believed that Muslims have to pay constant homage to Hussein’s
suffering at Karbala. According to Khomeini, “an Islamic regime must be serious in
every aspect of life…there is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun or enjoyment in
whatever is serious.”106 In the cities of Iran, public spaces promote religious values and
remembering martyrs. Streets and alleys are named after martyrs, and artists use public
spaces to draw murals of these martyrs. In a mystical way, this is how some Iranian
Shi’as transcend themselves to feel the suffering endured by Hussein and his family and
supporters.
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In her book, Intellectual Trends in Twentieth Century Iran, Negin Nabavi
demonstrated the deep roots of Islamic belief in Iran. She stated that the discourse of
“authentic culture” gained “prevalence in response to a combination of ‘third-worldism’
and the movement of counterculture predominant in the West.”107 The more the Shah’s
regime glorified the ideas of Westernization and cherished Western culture, the more
leftist intellectuals, including Marxists, became interested in the authentic culture of
martyrdom, somber behavior, and modesty. As Nabavi points out:
If Islam and its values became prevalent in the 1970s, it was for their worldly
potentials. Religion and mysticism were old notions that, if interpreted in a new
light, could bring about the change that other ideologies had failed to achieve. It is
no wonder then that once the first manifestations of a religious opposition to the
regime began, secular progressive intellectuals did not question the meaning of
this rhetoric. Instead, they gave it their full backing.108
The urgency of giving one’s life for the cause, martyrdom, became so prevalent
that even participating Marxists wrote extensively on how such action could lead to
adventurism. The Tudeh Party, which wanted nothing to do with the idea of death and
martyrdom, persistently criticized the method and claimed it was adventuristic. Their
constant criticism of sacrificing one’s life and refutation of martyrdom contributed to
their lack of acceptance by the people. Even among the leaders of main Marxist
organizations, members and sympathizers warned about the potential consequences of
martyrdom. They warned that armed struggle does not mean getting killed for the cause.
But a shift in such a deep-rooted principle was almost impossible. Even Marxists such as
Bizhan Jazani, who was tortured and later executed by the SAVAK, was apprehensive
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about the idea of martyrdom as mere sacrifice of blood. His warnings to his comrades
follow:
To ignore the objective conditions which are relevant to the growth of the
revolutionary movement; to consider the role of the vanguard out of its context,
and to peddle the notion that the sensational sacrifice of some elements of the
vanguard will immediately (or in a short time) attract the support of the masses, or
even encourage their active participation in the struggle, is adventuristic. Such
conceptions about armed struggle should be replaced by a Marxist understanding
of the dynamics of society and of the revolutionary movement in general. …Too
much emphasis on the role of the “Fadaee,” resorting to constant invocations of
“Martyrdom” to offset the absence of a mass movement, and the belief that the
sacrifice of blood is sufficient for the start of the revolution are aspects of
adventurism.109
Adventurism it might have been, but for that historical period, martyrdom was the
driving force behind a serious struggle against a dictator who had stifled all methods of
dissent for a frustrated opposition. In addition, it provided Marxists and Muslims with a
method of struggle that refused to play according to the rules of a punitive political
system. Martyrdom became the ultimate proof of invincibility. The individuals who did
not fear being punished were strange phenomena that not even SAVAK torturers could
fathom.
As argued previously, the notion of martyrdom became a unit to measure
authenticity among Marxists and Muslims. Muslim groups and organizations within the
opposition rejected the Shah’s modernization process and were willing to give up their
lives for maintaining Islamic values intact. They opposed modernization, adhering to
traditional Islamic values. Major Muslim organizations made essential changes in Iranian
political history. These organizations contributed significantly to setting the political
discourse in Iran. A fundamental manifestation of a revolutionary was to become a
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martyr. Who could be more serious and authentic in fighting the Shah’s tyranny? In the
eyes of the Iranians, martyrdom finally gave birth to Marxists as serious revolutionaries.
Decades of skepticism about Marxists in Iran ended with Marxists becoming martyrs.
Ironically, martyrdom helped Marxists prove their authenticity. Only when they gave
their lives for the first time in the Siahkal region, while fighting the Shah’s army, did the
population consider them real revolutionaries.

Marxists Using Islamic Ideology to Defend a Revolutionary Line
Iranian Marxists found the idea of martyrdom, although metaphysical,110 a
practice that challenged the false consciousness of the masses. In effect they used
religion, what Marx considered false consciousness, to exterminate an alternate false
consciousness. Indisputably, even Marxists who believe in the idea of martyrdom do not
believe in the afterlife and the story of angels awaiting them. The concept of martyrdom,
however, has become a belief system for many Marxists. Moreover, in their literature,
martyrdom is often referred to as a necessary condition for achieving an ideal society.
Here are two examples of such usage, but from different perspectives.
Khosro Golsorkhi111 and Karamat Daneshian,112 were two Marxist revolutionaries
who were tried by the Shah’s military court and later executed by the Shah’s military.
Both Golsorkhi and Daneshian believed in the concept of sacrificing self, despite their
adherence to Marxism. These two individuals represented the two types of Marxism that
110
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developed in Iran. For Golsorkhi, Islam was ideological. It was an ideology that
encouraged a struggle against the oppressor. For Daneshian however, Islam was
contextual, it is in the way he was raised and socialized: his belief in martyrdom for him
guaranteed a brighter future.
For Golsorkhi, a socialist economy could be represented by an Islamic state. He
claimed that “in a socialist economy, Islam is acceptable as a superstructure.”113 His
defense in court, while he was being prosecuted for conspiring to assassinate the Shah
and his family, conveyed one of the most interesting ways Marxists adapted Islamic
values contrary to their own.
During his defense, he mentioned Ali (the first Imam of Shi’a Islam) as the ‘first
socialist’ and Hussein (the third Imam of Shi’a Islam) as ‘the greatest martyr of the
people of the Middle East.’ He gave an intricate description of why he, as a Marxist,
believed in continuing the line of Ali and his son Hussein as two martyrs who gave their
lives for the oppressed. In his speech on the similarities between Marxism and Islam,
Golsorkhi, conveyed the depth of Islamic belief in martyrdom among Marxist
intellectuals. His synthesis of Islam and Marxism was one of a kind, yet highly
acceptable in the Iranian resistance culture. On January 8, 1974, Keyhan, a statesponsored newspaper, wrote:
Khosro Golsorkhi, defendant in row two, for his last defense, after reciting a
poem, defended the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. He dubbed himself as a
follower of the school of Marx and said several words on the conditions of Iran.
The main judge warned the defendant to speak only in his own defense and that
he was not permitted to say anything outside of that context. After the warning,
the defendant handed his [written] defense to the court’s secretary. 114
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This was Keyhan’s description of Golsorkhi’s defense. However, the interesting
details were not mentioned. The entire defense, which lasted only several minutes, spoke
volumes on how Marxism developed within the Iranian opposition. Golsorkhi began by
citing a saying from Imam Hussein: ‘Ennammal Hayat, va Aghidatto-Jahad’ (Life is
nothing but a struggle for your belief).
I will begin my talk with a quotation from Hussein, the great martyr of the people
of the Middle East. I, a Marxist-Leninist, have found, for the first time, social
justice in the school of Islam and then reached socialism. In this court, I am not
bargaining for my life or even my life span. I am but a drop in the great struggle
of the Iranian people. A people to whom belong Mazdaks, Maziars, Babaks,
Yaghoob Leith Saffaris, Amoughlus, Pasyans, Mirza Koochaks, Aranis,
Roozbehs, and Vartans.115 Yes, I am not bargaining for my life, because I am the
child of a fighting people.
He was interrupted by a state official calling him a liar; undaunted, he continued:
The real Islam in Iran has always played its part in liberation movements.
Behbahanis and Khiabanis are genuine examples. Today, too, the real Islam is
contributing to liberation movements in Iran. When Marx says, in a class society,
wealth is accumulated on one side and poverty, hunger, and misery on the other,
whilst the producer of wealth is the poor, and Ali116 says, a castle will not be built
unless thousands become poor, we cannot deny that there are great similarities.
This is the juncture of history in which we can claim Ali to be the world’s first
socialist. The life of Hussein117 represents our current life conditions, willing to
give our life for our oppressed people being tried in court. He was among a
minority. And Yazid118 had the throne [sic], soldiers, and power. He [Hussein]
stood and became a martyr. Yazid occupied a part of history, but what prevailed
in history was the path of Hussein. This is how, in a real Marxist society, Islam is
explicable as a superstructure. And we too approve of such Islam, the Islam of
Hussein.119
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The common struggle for Muslims and Marxists was indeed the opposition to
modernization and an imperialist culture. Golsorkhi spoke about censorship in Iran. Such
censorship, he claimed, was not found anywhere else in the world:
This is how a mummified culture, which is the consequence of comprador
bourgeois production relations in Iran, stifles progressive books and thoughts with
its censorship…what must be dictated to the people of Iran is the souvenir of
American imperialist culture.120
At this point of his defense, the military judge warned Golsorkhi that his
statements were irrelevant. Golsorkhi, upset about the accusation, responded that he
would say nothing in his own defense, and if not allowed to state what he believed in,
would rather take his seat and say nothing. Not allowed to continue, he took his seat.
The other defendant, who was executed after being sentenced by the same court,
was Karamat Daneshian. His defense statement was not like Golsorkhi’s and adhered to a
very secular Marxist course. He included no words about Islam in his defense. The
objection of this defendant, however, had the same tone against the Shah and
imperialism. His examples of those international organizations resisting similar
oppressive political conditions were nonreligious as well. His defense is included here to
depict the difference between secular Marxist thought and Islamic Marxist thought.
During his defense, he was constantly interrupted by the judge and the state attorney. He
spoke of injustice throughout the world because, as he put it, there was unannounced
martial law in Iran:
Military courts automatically approve their own legitimacy. …millions of people
in the armed forces, without having an active role in society or production, are
busy in a useless game. The budget spent on the purchase and maintenance of this
military power is as useless as the game itself… [interrupted, he continued] such
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force has no other purpose than the suppression of people’s voice of liberation.
The shootings of farmers, peasants, and people’s fighters [political resistors] are
their principle duty. Revolutions have shown that even the mightiest of powers
will fall. All revolutionaries, plus the people, have always fought against class
differences. Successes achieved by the oppressed in this path have proven people
victorious. Liberated people, social movements on their way to liberation,
reverberates the news of shedding poverty, corruption and injustice in the world.
Such worldwide victories also affect the Iranian movement. In addition, the
commencement of any movement is contingent upon its local conditions. If you
think that with the arrest of a small group—torture, imprisonment, and
execution—you can claim victory and put an end to all resistance…[interrupted,
continued] Observing the resistance throughout the world you cannot conclude
your triumph. Despite the prosperity reached by two-thirds of the world
population, remember the heroic people of Vietnam and how they caused
American imperialism to flee like a dog with its tail between its
legs…[interrupted and he was not allowed to continue].
He submitted his written defense to the secretary of the court and took his seat.
Sentenced to death, five days later, both Golsorkhi and Daneshian had another chance to
defend themselves.121
Golsorkhi, in his second defense, kept his Islamic Marxist ideas consistent and
claimed that he was being tried because he believed in Marxist thought and that he was
sentenced to death by a military court. Reiterating his Islamic beliefs while remaining a
Marxist, he said: “I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I respect the Shari’a laws of Islam. I
believe that nowhere in the world, in dependent countries and colonies, can a nationalist
government exist unless it is built upon a Marxist infrastructure.” Daneshian, in his
second defense, had even stronger words for the court:
During the first mistrial, and its fascist order, you did not hear my entire defense
or the defense of my friend Golsorkhi. But my defense is nothing but defending
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the rights of oppressed and poverty-stricken masses and attacking the enemy of
the people. If you do not fear people’s resistance, you do not believe in the death
of the ruling class in Iran. History has shown this reality and will again…our
belief in the victory of the Iranian people’s movement and all class societies in the
world is our greatest power. I should add that the ruling classes have never liked
Marxism.122
In Daneshian’s will, there are some contextual Islamic undertones about death and
martyrdom, the metaphysics of how a martyr would guarantee a better future;
Death is our most modest gift to the people. Each death is a small window closing
on nihilism. And each death is a panel of mystery closing on lies, corruption,
poverty, and hunger. Thus, a window will open that lets in the light of life. Let us
sacrifice our life for this light – this light.
[signed by Daneshian as] People’s Fadaee, Karamat Daneshian; February 8, 1974.
No Marxist in Iran has entered a life of political struggle without, sometime or another,
reasoning with the statement above. The word Fadaee, (one who is willing to sacrifice
his/her life for a cause) is used by both Marxists and Muslims to refer to the nature of
their struggle. The concept has strong roots in Islam and comes directly from the notion
of martyrdom. There is first an acceptance of one’s sacrificial life and death. This gives
meaning to the cause and its progress. To live a life of Fadaee is to live selflessly. To give
your life for the cause is to sacrifice the ultimate human possession, one’s life for the
ultimate reason. A famous Marxist song popularized by Marxist Fadaeean claims that in
the path of people, if one life is given, thousands will rise. It maintains that to become a
Fadaee and to give your life for the cause is not in vain. According to Muslims, Islam’s
martyrs, Ali, Hussein, and Abbass (the brother of Imam Hussein, a great martyr of
Karbala), made clear before their deaths that this would guarantee a brighter future. It
would demonstrate to nonbelievers the nobility of their cause, Islam. A culture of giving
life for the cause is part of tradition in Iran. According to Shi’a belief, the imitation of the
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fate of Hussein, the ultimate Martyr of Islam, instantly opens the gates of paradise.123
Marxists too, have taken this idea for granted. They have come to believe in it as a
scientific method of entering the political struggle in a metaphysical manner. The nonscientific method of martyrdom related to victory, and its inconsistency with the
scientific methodology of Marxism is a clear contradiction.

Formation of State and Islam
In their overriding concern with opposition to the Shah, Iranian Marxists did not
plan on the formation of a state that represented their social and political ideas. In this
realm of polity, Muslims were far ahead in the game of state building. Muslims did not
get a chance to practice their art of organizing a state until the revolution of 1979, but
they had contemplated the possibilities decades before.
In March of 1950, a member of the Fadaeean of Islam, Khalil Tahmasbi,
assassinated the newly appointed Prime Minister, Razmara. Eliminating Razmara created
a political atmosphere that contributed to the rise of Mosaddegh’s government. It was
under such an environment that the necessity for the existence of a group such as
Fadaeean of Islam was questioned. Why just a resistance movement if an Islamic republic
is possible. The assassination of Razmara was agreed upon by both Ayatollah Kashani
and the National Front (the group Mosaddegh belonged to), indicating its close
relationship with Muslims. Fadaeean of Islam insisted on an Islamic republic, and for the
first time the issue of an Islamic state was presented. However, Mosaddegh and
Ayatollah Kashani disagreed. Mosaddegh had responded to their request for an Islamic
republic: “Won’t the gentlemen leave an Islamic ruling to another government and
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request it from an Islamic government? My Government will not last forever.”124 It was
these events that made the Fadaeean of Islam less significant, to the point where their
own leader, Navab Safavi, after being released from prison said, “We will begin a period
of decline (fetrat), because the fight between Mosaddegh and the Shah is not over Islam
but over power [government], but I have an Islamic contention. And while problems are
not settled, I will remain quiet.125 In effect, Mosaddegh’s government de-prioritized the
necessity of building an Islamic state.
According to Katouzian, Safavi’s silence was not indicative of neutrality. His silence
only signified the Fadaeean of Islam’s disapproval of Mosaddegh’s government and
hence, condoned the Shah’s return to power.126 Although they did believe in
establishment of an Islamic government they never reached their objective. In 1955, five
members of the group, including Safavi himself, were arrested and executed for an
attempt to assassinate the Shah’s new Prime Minister, Hossein Ala.
Despite Fadaeean of Islam’s radical acts and rejection of the secularization of Iran, the
main reason for their temporary popularity, they never developed a sophisticated
ideology, much less a concrete program for an Islamic government. Their priority was to
instill Islamic belief from the bottom and not through the state. According to Safavi’s
writings, the first principle in their ideology claimed that:
For many years there has been a curtain drawn over Islamic truth and
illumination, and it has prevented the shedding of Islamic light on the hearts of
children of Islam and Islamic nations in the world. Islam is a religion of practice
and action. Superstition has covered the real character of Islam and the fault
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belongs to religious clerics. …Therefore, to achieve real Islam we must take
superstition, sectarianism, and dark thoughts away from Islam, for Islam is a
religion of worship and human salvation.127
It did not however, mean that an Islamic state was not preferable. Among the
principal beliefs of the Fadaeean was that religion should not be kept separate from
politics. They criticized clerics who avoided the realm of politics and believed that the
clerics had helped develop a spirit of indifference and apathy among Muslims.
Khoshniyyat wrote, “Fadaeean of Islam tried to break the frozen atmosphere of the
clerical school in Qom and replace clerics’ apathy and indifference with protest and
struggle.”128
Among their plans, although less pronounced in their literature, was to establish an
Islamic government. They believed that living according to Islam was contingent upon an
Islamic state and that Islamic rulers must use their power in executing two central laws of
malzoomat va monkerat (obligations and prohibitions). This, in fact, was as far as the
Fadaeean of Islam went with politics and their program for political power. Their intent
was simply to forbid and control certain items such as women’s clothing and alcohol.
They had, for example, never mentioned velayat-e faghih (authority of jurists) and its role
within an Islamic state.
Many members of the Council of Islamic Alliance occupied important positions
within the government of the Islamic Republic. Many considered the Council as one of
the most powerful institutions in relation to political expertise in state-building. The
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Council was essentially a closed, organized group seeking power, expanding Islamic
values, and condemning any revision.129
In his article, Hamid Enayat offers a summary of how clerics in this alliance were
able to take on state power. It is historicist and rational, and worth mentioning because it
demonstrates the level of preparedness by the clerics to take control of the state. He
claims that among the reasons behind the cleric’s success was
their political experience. By participating in sporadic political movements, such
as the Tobacco Uprising in 1892, the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, the
National and the Oil Movement in 1952, and the 1963 uprising, they gathered lots
of experience. In all of these events, intellectual groups pushed aside the clergy
after succeeding. But the clergy consequently learned from all of this, and by
arming themselves with such experience from the very beginning, they prevented
the liberals and radicals from defeating them once again.130
Among the groups of clerics, according to Abrahamian, Ayatollah Khomeini’s group was
the most political and most radical. Most of the members of this group had been
Khomeini’s pupils. In his first work in 1945, Discovering Secrets (Kashfol-asrar),
Khomeini alluded to not getting involved in changing or overthrowing the state.131 But
later, in the 1960s, he revised his views and insisted on the involvement of the clerics in
politics and economics by organizing an Islamic state. Because “the rule of Islam is the
rule of law,” he claimed, “those who know the law and even beyond that, theologians,
meaning clerics, must be responsible for it [the Islamic state].” It would be they “who are
to protect all matters related to executing, running the bureaucracy and planning in the
country.”132 He advocated heavy involvement in politics by the clerics, but he was careful
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about misinterpreting what an Islamic government exactly meant. The following, which
Khomeini wrote in his book, Authority of the Jurist: Islamic Rule, (velayat-e faghih:
hokoomat-e eslami) is quoted in Abrahamian. He stated what Islamic Jurisprudence
literally means pertaining to constitutionality and law. Islamic ruling is neither tyrannical
nor absolute; rather, it is ‘constitutional.’133
Of course not constitutional [read contingent], meaning its contemporary usage is
determined by the vote of the majority. Constitutional [read contingent], in the
sense that rulers in their executing of laws are contingent upon what has been
determined by the Holy Koran and the Tradition of Mohammad. This culmination
of conditions is the same as Islamic laws that have to be implemented and
executed.134
Khomeini’s analysis or directives on why clerics must be involved in politics and
policy making became a guideline during the revolution. Many of Khomeini’s pupils
were prominent clerics: Montazeri, Khalkhali, Rafsanjani, Khamenei, Mottahari, who
became powerful figures after the revolution. Their involvement in state-making, staterunning, and state-ruling is hardly imaginable without Khomeini’s interpretations of
velayat-e faghih.
Khomeini made clear his interpretation of Islamic ruling long before the revolution. The
Islamic government, he wrote, “is the rule of the Divine Law upon people.”135
Consequently there is no legislative body in the Islamic government. The supreme leader
of authority in an ‘Islamic Republic’ is qualified by virtue of two characteristics:
knowledge of the Divine Law and justice. Any other kind of knowledge, sacred or
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secular, is irrelevant. By virtue of the knowledge of the Divine Law, “the jurists have
authority over the rulers.”136 In his writing Khomeini reiterates the role of the supreme
leader and claims that due to the jurist’s indisputable authority, all other positions of
power fall directly under him. The jurist is knowledgeable in all Islamic laws and he is
the most just.
If rulers are Muslims they ought to obey the jurists. They have to ask the jurists
about the [Islamic] laws and regulations, and then act accordingly. Thus the true
rulers are the jurists themselves, and the government ought to be officially given
to them, not to those who because of their ignorance of the [Divine] Law have to
obey the jurists.137
On the other hand, Marxists in Iran were merely involved in the art of resistance
and not what would have to be done after the revolution – literally the morning after the
revolution. Muslims were obviously thinking not only about resistance but also how to
build a state that would answer to the necessities of an oil-rich developing capitalist
economy and keep Islamic faith ever present. The Islamic state would also be able to
address issues of nationalism and patriotic fervor. Nationalism, advocated by the new
Islamic Republic, captured the attention of Iranians in defending their country against the
Iraqi invasion of Iran. While the government mobilized masses of Iranians with the aid of
Islamic belief,138 their political rhetoric was nationalist. Many Marxist groups and
individuals, e.g., the Tudeh Party and Fadaeean (majority), volunteered to fight for the
country with a nationalist ideology.
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The Muslim preparedness in taking control of state power was another reason
which eased the conversion of Marxists into Islam. Muslims, especially cleric leaders,
had concrete plans on taking over the state. They had considered the idea dating back to
the early 1960s. During the 1979 revolution, it was only Muslims who pushed for statebuilding. This was while Marxists were involved in perpetual in-fighting. Marxists’
political conversion into Islam, especially during the years of the revolution, was strongly
tied to the Muslim takeover of the state. In many ways Marxists thought of the Islamic
Republic as a stepping stone to socialism, and at times very close to a socialist − noncapitalist − state.
The three areas of resistance, martyrdom, and state-building constructed the
sacred canopy for the Iranian political movement. It was contextual Islam that Marxists
learned from. Their conversion to Islam makes sense in the context of power relations. In
the face of a despotic regime, who had the power to set the stage for an ultimate struggle?
What was the hegemonic force in the realm of Iranian politics? In all three categories,
Islamic ideology and ethos prevailed, obligating Marxists to convert.
In the next chapter I will examine how contextual Islam and the ideology of Islam
became a possibility for Marxists. Through methods developed in the sociology of
knowledge, I will demonstrate how Islamic belief is present in particular Iranian Marxist
organizations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MARXISTS WHO BECAME MUSLIMS DURING THE 1979 REVOLUTION
Contrary to resentful sophistry and interpretation, our party’s support of this
thought[Khomeini’s] does not indicate disagreement with democracy or betraying
toward principles of civilization…our party does not believe that Khomeini or his true
believers are taking Iran through the gates of the Middle Ages
Kianuri, Chairman of the Tudeh Party
In preceding chapters the reader became familiar with contextual Islam, the
prevalence of Islam within Marxist and non Marxist groups and Islamic ethics as the
sacred canopy. In this chapter specific Marxist organizations that converted to an Islamic
ideology and approved of an Islamic republic will be examined. Many of their leaders
and members were born into an Islamic culture which helped shape their thoughts and
ideas. Their agents of socialization were imbued with Islamic belief and philosophy.
What are the consequences of being born into this background of Islamic belief? Will it
transcend in to the realms of politics and political movements? It was not only Muslim
leaders of the opposition who were raised and socialized through Islam. Their Marxist
counterparts went through very similar socialization processes and internalized similar
Islamic beliefs. Islamic perspective was the hegemonic way of analyzing all that existed.
In addition to the contextual Islamic ethos there is the ideological acceptance of
the philosophy of Islam. The ideological convergence was a more specific method
through which Marxists were becoming Muslims. This type of convergence occurred
during the 1979 revolution. The most significant part of a Marxist discourse in accepting
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the ideology of Islam was put forth by the Tudeh Party and groups that joined the Tudeh
Party later. Among them were the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerrillas
(majority)139 and the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari). These
three organizations specifically wrote and spoke about the acceptance of Islam as a
liberating ideology. In this chapter some of their written material is examined. Through
their writing one can comprehend how Marxists were able to rationalize Islam as an
ideology that would mobilize Iran’s oppressed. As Maziar Behrooz claims, “never before
in the history of communism in Iran, and very rarely in other parts of the world, has a
Marxist organization collaborated so closely with the state in the suppression of other
Marxist groups.”140

Tudeh Party and the New Islamic Republic
Most of the material used in this chapter is selected from the Tudeh Party’s organs
and publications during and after the revolution. Their publications are used as primary
sources and have been translated by the author. For the entire decade of the 1980s into
the mid-1990s these publications were banned. Most of the material can now be found in
the archives of the pertaining organization’s website. The written material is related to the
Tudeh Party’s Chairman, Nour al-din Kianuri141, who was a prominent member and the
spokesperson for the Tudeh Party during the revolution. He was one of the executive
committee members of the Tudeh Party. He fled Iran and resided mostly in East Germany
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until 1979. During the revolution he went back to Iran and became the main
spokesperson for the Party during the years of the revolution. He was appointed as party
spokesman to convince both Muslims and Marxists the Party line of becoming close
affiliates of the Islamic Republic. He remained a key figure even after being incarcerated
by the Islamic Republic. His Islamic affiliation goes back to his grandfather, Ayatollah
Fazlollah Nuri, who was a prominent clergy during the social turmoil of the 1906
Constitutional Revolution. Initially Ayatollah Nuri supported the revolutionaries but later
turned against them. He was later executed by the revolutionaries.
For most Marxists working with an Islamic government was questionable, while
for some Muslims the nature of a Marxist organization such as the Tudeh Party working
in collusion with the Islamic government was an anomaly. The Tudeh Party’s acceptance
of Islam was an ideological anomaly for Marxists and Muslims. Marxists were doubtful
because the newly established Islamic government was practicing its suppression through
religion. Muslims did not want to believe the Tudeh leadership because they did not want
to share political power with atheist, nonbelievers, koffar. They were Soviet-controlled
communists who questioned Islam, according to Muslims. Skeptics of both sides were
questioning the Tudeh leadership. Some of their discussions were meant to deliberately
debunk the party’s support, affiliation, and cooperation with either the left or the right,
Marxist or Muslim. The Tudeh Party was accused by both religious Muslims and Marxist
organizations to be conforming to the opposite side. Same controversy pertained to
various smaller groups that incorporated a measure of Marxism into their Islamic
ideology, e.g., Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari).
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The following piece appeared in Donya142, in July 1979. At the time, an Islamic
Republic government had been established but still called the Provisional Islamic
Republic. There was no presidential position, but Bazargan, as Prime Minister, was head
of the state. His government lasted for 275 days. The author is a prominent figure of the
Tudeh Party, Ehsan Tabari, a sociologist and a prolific writer within the party who
ardently defended the Islamic way of the revolution.
In the recent years, he argued, the Tudeh Party had put forth the slogan of
“destruction of the anti-democratic and anti-nationalist regime of the Shah”143 before all
other organizations. According to Tabari, their party was the one to “approve with
perseverance, the struggle of Khomeini’s line against what he [Khomeini] called taghoot
[referring to an idol that was worshipped in Mecca before the advent of Islam also
denoting evil and corruption]”144 Tabari later explained the reasons his party supported
Islamic resistance and more specifically, Khomeini’s line:
Contrary to resentful sophistry and interpretation, our party’s support of this
thought [Khomeini’s] does not indicate disagreement with democracy or
betraying toward principles of civilization…our party does not believe that
Khomeini or his true believers are taking Iran through the gates of the Middle
Ages. Furthermore, contrary to what our opposition claims, we have not dissolved
into or converged with Khomeini’s line, or from ‘fear’ of being pronounced
‘illegal.’ Our politics toward our allies are not the politics of dissolution, but
politics of ‘alliance and criticism.’145
Alliances may have been at the bases of Iranian politics at the time, but as
demonstrated later in this section, criticism of their Muslim allies did not really steer the
Tudeh Party. Tabari later took a more conservative and functionalist approach by
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indicting the ‘ultra leftists’ who disagreed with the Tudeh Party. He claimed that their
intentions are less important than are the consequences of their actions. The result of their
actions of opposing the Islamic line is to defend the United States and antirevolutionaries. Historically, he claimed, “It has not been intentions that matter rather the
resulting consequences that are fomented by taking positions.”146 Thus he used the
popular metaphor, “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”147
Tabari’s definition of alliance and equal partners can also be interpreted in a different
manner. In this case, according to the Tudeh Party, an Islamic force was the only force
that could provide leadership to stabilize a revolutionary Iran. Most Marxist groups
believed that it was not so much of an alliance but rather a submission that the Tudeh
Party was conciliatory toward the Islamic regime. In the same article, addressing liberals
and leftists, Tabari explained which group belonged to which side. Reviewing different
ideas of liberals, and ‘ultra leftists’ in the opposition, he stated:
[an] anti-revolution[ary] (the operatives of imperialism and of the toppled regime)
is not too hopeful for revival, [he] looks upon this line [liberals] with a minimum
of desire, but hopes that supporters of this line (liberals, social democrats, and
super leftist elements) will defeat Khomeini’s relentless line. This line uses the
name of Mossadegh, the nationalist prime minister of Iran, in opposition to the
great dignity of Khomeini. This line resents us because we voted for an Islamic
Republic and Khomeini…We have repeated this ten times, we demand a union of
all forces, from liberal bourgeoisie to nationalist to the most leftist along with the
religious fighters, however, led by Imam Khomeini.148
For the Tudeh Party it was not difficult to differentiate positions in regards to the
Islamic Republic government. However, the problem was how to explain their policies to
the masses. How was it that a Marxist organization became an advocate of Islam and
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further defended the Islamic government more fanatically than the Muslims? This had to
be explained especially to their supporters, and to other leftist and specifically Marxist
organizations. The party spent most of its time clarifying its views on the necessity of an
alliance with the Islamic Republic for supporters and Marxist and Muslim groups who
were skeptical about Tudeh Party’s sincerity. It must be noted that not only the Tudeh
Party, but the Organization of People’s Fadaeean-OIPF (majority)149, and the Liberation
and Equality Group were also having to defend—in their writings—how and why to
support Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic Republic.

Tudeh and Islamic Jurisprudence
By defending the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the leaders of the
Tudeh Party isolated themselves from other Marxist groups. They abandoned other
groups and organizations to demonstrate their faith in the Islamic Republic. Their
perception of other groups within the opposition shows their devout following to the
government. By this time the Tudeh Party had not only dominated the political arena, but
had also found a strong great ally. Leaders in the Tudeh Party were confident about their
policies toward the new Islamic government. Kianuri announced his party’s support for
all whose actions and thoughts were in accordance with their program. He claimed:
We believe that other than our party,the most steadfast and determined position
belongs to true believers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s thoughts on the fight against
imperialism, the reactionary regime of the Shah, and the struggle for people’s
democratic rights and for democratic freedoms. We believe, given today’s
conditions, that these groups are the closest allies to the Tudeh Party.150
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Kianuri and the Tudeh Party agreed about what he called, mistakes, made by
groups in the opposition, especially when it came to supporting the new Islamic
government. He clarified those mistakes made by Fadaeean (Minority) and responded
that, “The biggest tactical mistake made by OIPFG is their incorrect and severely
negative position on the referendum [to recognized the Islamic Republic], and for not
voting for an Islamic Republic.”151 He explained how failure to vote for an Islamic
Republic was comparable to taking sides with Shapur Bakhtiar152, imperialism, and other
reactionary groups. The question of a referendum was brought up repeatedly in different
settings by the Tudeh Party. But accepting an Islamic referendum was a controversial
decision made on the part of the Tudeh Party. For a considerable number of Iranians,
from the left or the right, a vote for a referendum that recognized an Islamic constitution
by a Marxist-Leninist party had raised some suspicions. During this period, nine months
after the revolution, the new state’s official Islamization program was focused on
establishing an Islamic government, and one of the first things to be accomplished was
the writing of an Islamic constitution. This was a necessary step for Khomeini and his
supporters. The idea of velayat-e-faghih (Islamic jurisprudence) would place Ayatollah
Khomeini as marja-e-taghlid (source of emulation) at the head of the new government. It
was established in articles 5 and 107 of the new constitution153 which placed the power in
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the hands of the clergy.154 For the Tudeh Party, however, this was a victory for their party
line. Thus Kianuri’s thoughts on whether voting for an Islamic constitution would be in
conflict with Marxist lines of the party was obvious: “I have to bluntly admit,” he said,
“that Imam Khomeini’s role in steering the revolution to its original path has been very,
very, positive and decisive.” He affirmed that this is why the Tudeh Party “seriously
supports Imam Khomeini.”155
For a Marxist group, power held by an Islamic state and Islamic law should raise serious
questions. But the Tudeh Party was persistent about accepting Islamic authority and
velayat-e-faghih. The Tudeh Party claimed it had already clarified its position:
We believe that velayat-e-faghih, while Imam Khomeini is still living, will not
damage the revolution. However, it will create a problem in times after Khomeini,
and we have to discuss it [whether anyone else is able to take over Khomeini’s
role as the supreme leader] then. We believe that for this period, the role of Imam
Khomeini as a leader of our revolution is very significant and considerable. So we
believe that for now, by criticizing the negative and emphasizing the positive
parts of the new constitution, without venturing into the question of velayat-efaghih, we must vote positively for the new constitution.156
Another point of contention among groups and even the Islamic state was Khomeini’s
extent of authority, called marja-e taghlid (source of emulation). The question of ultimate
authority, the power to be the final decision-maker given to Khomeini was still being
debated among secular and religious intellectuals in Iran.
A majority of people observing the strong tendencies of the Tudeh Party toward
Islam still found this puzzling. How could the Tudeh Party accept an Islamic
154
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jurisprudence and constitution led by clerics to be progressive? Kianuri, representing his
party, addressed the question and reiterated the universality and significance of
Khomeini, and how their party recognized his leadership right away. He stated, “From
the beginning, we recognized that within Ayatollah Khomeini’s inclinations, which are
absolutely within a religious framework, there are progressive elements.”157 All true
progressive forces in the world with these same inclinations, he claimed, “have supported
the progressive politics of Ayatollah Khomeini.”158
The inclusion of political Islam and more specifically, Khomeini’s line of thought
(and that of his followers) was essential for the Tudeh Party. For them, Islamic belief was
a force that revolution and a post-revolutionary government could not do without. In a
‘popular front’ advocated by the Tudeh Party, a mere union of the left was impossible. In
their theoretical publication, prerequisites of a popular front were delineated. 159 In the
‘United Popular Front,’ (jebhe-ye mottahed-e khalgh) those political groups, parties,
organizations, and such can join only if they accept the constitution of an Islamic
Republic, or if they agree to join under the leadership of Imam Khomeini. To stress the
line on a popular front, Kianuri pointed out the political polarization including whether
other organizations such as the OIPFG (Minority) and OIPM (Mojahedin) could join. He
stated that:
Those who want to join must specify their program and announce whether they
want to organize an armed insurgency against the current regime and its
constitution—which they call reactionary—or do they plan on working in the
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framework of democracy, whose outlines have been recognized by the [new]
constitution?”160
At this point in the conflict between some of the Marxist organizations and the Tudeh
party creating a united popular front had become a contentious subject often referred to
by Kianuri. In a later discussion, he addressed the popularity of Islam and stated that 90
percent of the population supports the Line of Imam and without considering the popular
ideas, he said, “We will have found a mini popular front.”161 But fitting the notion of an
Islamic Republic and the rare possibility to fit Muslims in a front framed by Marxists
would create a problem. In addition to Iranian Marxists, they were other forces that the
Tudeh Party had to immediately address. Among them were the Soviets. The Tudeh
Party’s collaboration with the clergy was based on theoretical borrowing from the Soviet
Union as part of a close relationship between the party and the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. Although there were some differences within the Tudeh Party and the
Soviets, they were united on general strategy, according to Behrooz.162 However, the
acceptance of Islam by the Tudeh Party was even more profound than mere Soviet
policy. They became advocates of Islam and even its teachings and principles.
More than one year into the revolution, the Tudeh Party’s support of Islam was not
waning but became more unyielding. In theoretical organs of the party, verses of the
Koran were used to explain various sociopolitical problems. The usage of Koranic verses
was questioned, given the party’s belief in materialist philosophy. Those who could not
make sense of Tudeh Party’s defense of Islam were convinced that the Party was trying
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to create a hybrid belief system consisting of Islam and Marxism. Supporters of the
Tudeh were inquiring whether they are trying to mix Islam with Marxism-Leninism and
construct a new religion. The suggestion was denied by the party and Kianuri once again
referred to the Muslim majority in Iran and claims that we need to adhere to Islam
because the majority of people want us to. He denied a hybrid belief system and insisted
that they are not trying to deceive people.
It is in no way like that. We must deal with Islam since it’s an ideology of a great
majority of our population. In a society where we are trying to make fundamental
changes, we cannot forego 97 or 98 percent of the people’s ideology and world
view…our cooperation is a sociopolitical one, not ideological.”163

Tudeh Party after the Revolution
Almost two years after the revolution, when a more stable government was in
place, ideas had become more concrete and more specific. Intense political polarization
had the country divided. This held true internally and externally for both the government
and its supporters and those in opposition. The Islamic Republic government suppressed
the opposition while stabilizing itself. Most Marxist and Islamic groups of the opposition
were actively continuing their anti-regime activities. However, two major organizations,
the Tudeh party and Fadaeean (Majority), became more persistent in their support for the
Islamic Republic. Central to the political discourse at the time was the continued
skepticism about Marxist support for an Islamic regime. It was often labeled as deceptive
by critics of the left and right, Marxists and Muslims. Those aware of the ideological
conflict between Islam and Marxism were skeptical:
The support of Islam and the Line of Imam by the Tudeh party and the OIPF
(Majority) is a deception. Today the party supports Khomeini because people are
supporting him. This is a deception because they have seen the fate of OIPFG
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[Minority] and OIPM [Mojahedin].164 Otherwise, the Tudeh party supports a
communist system. Is an Islamic republic a step toward communism that would
persuade your party to support it?”165
At this stage the Tudeh Party was quite content that their support for Islamic
Republic has been firmly established. They knew that the nature of such inquiry meant
two things: First, that this party and ally groups support Khomeini and Islamic Republic,
and that the Mojahedin and Fadaeean do not—and are in trouble for it.”166 Furthermore,
responding to the same concern, the Party spokesman explained that it was absolutely not
the case, that the Party genuinely supported the Islamic state and there was nothing
dubious about it:
We are not deceiving anyone. If we wanted to deceive, we would altogether put
aside scientific socialism and become like the Ranjbaran Party167 which was ultracommunist until recently and has put all that aside and speaks of Islam only. Or
like these Muslim Maoists who have now joined the Majles [referring to
Paykar]…This [an Islamic Republic] is not a path through which we must travel
to get to socialism…we fought to establish an Islamic Republic because we see
forces within it that fight against misery.168
The Tudeh Party even acknowledged that the government has sent its overzealous
supporters to beat up party members and cadre and to close down their offices. Their
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support for the Islamic regime, however, did not wane. “They [Basijis]169 sentenced party
members who supported Islam to death, and even carried their execution on the spot. But
as long as we believe, based on our own principles, that the Islamic government is antiimperialist … we will continue to support it.170
Ironically, this is a period in which almost all party offices of the OIPF (Majority)
and the Tudeh party were invaded and their members arrested. Summary executions of
some members were carried out almost immediately. This would usually be sufficient
reason for any group to question ‘revolutionary’ incentives. Tudeh Party’s response was
still conciliatory while they addressed the killings. Kianuri, in his response even
compared acts of the revolutionary guards to Shah’s secret police SAVAK. In
Kermanshah, a city in Kurdistan:
They [revolutionary guards] arrested a party member who supported the Line of
Imam and executed him within 30 minutes. …They violated our constitutional
freedoms. There is no reason to invade our offices. There is no reason to make
false accusations of the party. These things are commonly practiced by the
SAVAK. They burn our offices, but we will not hold the Islamic Republic
accountable. … But they have not said one word about why such invasion and
plunder has taken place.”171
Like Job in the bible, the Tudeh Party’s patience had been put to the test. And like Job,
despite all that had been endured by party members and supporters, they still believed. In
their analysis of the Line of Imam and why they supported the Line of Imam, the Tudeh
Party constantly used Khomeini’s statements against American imperialism while
defending oppressed classes. On the other hand, they never mentioned the statements
Khomeini made about socialist countries and communism. Khomeini had always spoken
169
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about the Soviets as another oppressive force, especially emphasizing their secular and
atheist beliefs. However, the Tudeh Party addressed the question of the Soviets very
diplomatically without getting into whether the Soviet Union is detested by Khomeini.
Knowing too well Khomeini’s position on communism and especially the Soviets it was
possible that the party deliberately refrained from addressing the question since the
followers of Line of Imam were too antagonistic toward the Soviet Union. Despite the
content of the question and its serious allegation made to catch the Tudeh Party at being
too conciliatory, Kianuri diplomatically answers: “This is real simple. Our cooperation
with other forces is based on our common points and not our differences.”172
According to some authors, the Tudeh Party’s support of an Islamic Republic is
only an extension of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. There is a political
consistency, correlation, according to Behrooz:
The cornerstone of the Tudeh strategy was the theory of a non-capitalist path of
development…developing countries under the revolutionary leadership of noncommunist elements—but with close Soviet collaboration—could either bypass
capitalism or put strict limitations on it, and eventually cross over to socialism.”173
There seem to be some issues, despite the Soviet policy of non-capitalist
development and the Tudeh party’s adherence to that, which remain inexplicable. To
ensure the development of a non-capitalist path, economies and economic developments
are at stake. So why is an insistence on Islam the point of the Tudeh party’s conformism?
Why the need to emphasize that 98 percent of the population in Iran is Muslim? The
Tudeh party never mentions working with, or agreeing with, any prominent secular
individual in the government. In fact, most of those who controlled and directed the

172

Ibid. p. 42.

173

Maziar Behrooz, p. 127.

104

economy were secular and non-clerics. Non-capitalist development is related to the
economy—the infrastructure—and not to any religion-superstructure, prevalent or
otherwise.
Regarding a capitalist production system in Iran, almost none of the economic
structures left by the Shah were changed. Indeed, American firms had to flee but were
quickly replaced by Japanese, German, French, South Korean, and other capitalist
partners in the global economy. Surely, neither the Soviets nor the Tudeh Party thought
of the United States as the only industrial capitalist (imperialist) country. Furthermore,
the Islamic Republic never claimed an anti-capitalist or non-capitalist economy. And
even according to some Islamic Republic leaders, this revolution had nothing to do with
the economy. Maybe it is the Tudeh party’s definition of a non-capitalist economy that’s
confusing. Because if the following is their definition, put forth by the most sophisticated
party leader, other party members could not have generated anything more complex.
Kianuri describes the non-capitalist path of development in his own strange tautology.
“The non-capitalist path has one characteristic, and that is, it separates from normal
capitalist development and takes a different path, which means not allowing the
unchecked development of capitalism.”174
The Islamic non-capitalist path should be obvious at any given moment during an
examination of the religion. One should be able to read, for example, the Koran or
Hadith, written on Muhammad’s life experiences, and realize Islam’s non-capitalist
nature. Therefore, for the Tudeh party, this should not have been a problem even before
the revolution. But let’s examine some of what they wrote a few years prior to 1979 in
their theoretical publication, Donya.
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Tudeh Party before the Revolution
Early to mid-1970s was a period of a more secular (non-Islamist) period of
opposition. Islamic groups were active but certainly no particular organization held
power over other groups. A publication of the Tudeh Party in the summer of 1975,
addressed some of the most imperative issues for Iranian opposition. In one such
publication, many sociopolitical concerns were mentioned. It included articles on the
Soviet Union, political discussion with the Fadaee guerillas, the Shah’s military, betrayals
by Maoism, and a few poems.
In these publications, usually 60 to 70 pages long, an Islamic belief system or
philosophy was never mentioned.175 Nor was there any mention of an Islamic movement
as a significant weight within the opposition, even though there were many of these
publications, small and large, underground or openly active. In this period, a few years
prior to the 1979 revolution, more secular allies were mentioned. Forces addressed as
potential allies, although with their own weaknesses,176 were seldom given the
importance of alliance. One need only review a few of these publications to see that the
party was more concerned with whom they could not work toward a revolutionary
program rather than who they could fit into a ‘United Front,’ which became their main
concern after the revolution. On different occasions, however, some clerics were referred
to as those who were arrested by the Shah’s secret police. The following paragraph
depicts the general opposition, according to the Tudeh party:
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Aggressive suppression of the SAVAK demonstrates the intensity of political
tyranny. …Attacking mosques and arresting people of faith, collecting books by
progressive writers, and even seizing religious books has become part of everyday
life in Iran. Prisons are filled with political prisoners. Waves of arrests have risen
among workers, students, clergy, artists, writers, officers, and soldiers.”177
In an analysis of how the Shah rationalized and justified his dictatorship, the
clerics were mentioned, although under a different light and quite controversially. This
time they are mentioned as part of the opposition, but with a conservative, rather than a
progressive position. Clerics, according to this article, opposed the Shah’s policies of
land reform, not from a revolutionary perspective but from a reactionary view. The article
states that the “open opposition by large landowners and clerics dependent on landowning aristocracy against the land reform program was used by the Shah to establish the
foundation of his individual dictatorship.”178 Ironically, the Mojahedin is mentioned on a
deviating but positive note. The Tudeh Party repeatedly condemned the new urban
guerilla movement that had recently prevailed in Iran and rendered Tudeh followers as
incorrect for praising them. However, the Mojahedin were still perceived as sincere and a
reflection of people’s anger:
A point worth mentioning is the movement among the religious groups. These
groups that are fighting under the name of People’s Mojahedin have great antiimperialist and anti-regime sentiments and also a great respect for Marxism. They
fight against reactionaries who try to invoke anti-communist sentiments among
religious people. Their struggle, although we reject their methods, is sincere and
fits within the context of the religious movement’s fight against imperialism and
the regime.179
In another organ of the party, effort was made to dissociate Islam from the East
and put the East in a socioeconomic context rather than a religious context. This concept
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in itself may remind the reader of “orientalist” thought. Orientalists—those who have
studied the East, vis-à-vis the west—have found a strong correlation between Islam, nondevelopment, and historical stagnation.180 While the idea put forth in this publication may
be considerably insightful, it takes away from the Tudeh party’s consistency about Iran
and Islam in Iran, particularly after the revolution. So let us examine this inconsistency.
An article in Donya entitled “Some Current and Acute Problems of Artistic Life in Iran,”
says:
A confusing point that has worked its way into the media in the past ten years is
the supposed dichotomy between Eastern civilization and Western civilization. To
say that we must not be “westoxicated”181 and should have Eastern civilization
originality, and not equate the meaning of westoxication with bourgeois
civilization and equate Eastern originality with religious belief and Islam, are
issues that despite good intentions of the authors, are arbitrary and will not resolve
social and historical problems. Yes, capitalism and socialism are opposite of each
other, but we cannot put West and East or Western civilization and Eastern
civilization on opposite sides of each other.182
The author tries to separate Islam from the East, in this case, Iran. There lies quite
a difference between the ideas contained in this statement compared to what the Tudeh
party claimed about the nature of Iranian revolution in 1979. In their publications after
the 1979 revolution, the Islam and Islamic movement seems to be an inevitable and
irrefutable feature of Iranian culture. Furthermore, not even during the revolution, that is
the period before February 1979, was their analysis of revolution deeply related to Islam.
In fact, they seemed to have made every effort to detach Islam from Iran, especially from
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a political movement in Iran. But as we examine the Tudeh party’s literature during and
after the revolution, particularly Islam and Islamic ethics, a few points become clear.

Islamic Republic’s Denunciation of the Tudeh Party
More than a year into the revolution there was much pressure on the Tudeh Party
to explain its paradoxical alliance with the new Islamic government. Inquiries were made
by Muslim and Marxist revolutionaries questioning Tudeh Party’s incentives. And
despite the Islamic state distancing itself from the Tudeh Party, Kianuri was relentless in
his party’s solidarity with Muslims. The question was, “Why has the party not responded
to the Islamic Republic newspaper? The paper has denounced the Tudeh party’s politics
at the moment when the party has shown its alliance with the newly formed Islamic
Republic government.”183
Kianuri responded, by explaining how things usually become clear later for all
who originally doubt some social explanations of sociopolitical phenomenon. For
example it was the communists, he says, “who originally used the word ‘imperialism’ to
depict how imperialism plunders and oppresses.”184 After a few decades, imperialism is
being used by almost all who have acceded to the correct analysis of what imperialism
really means.” According to Kianuri, “those who denounce our politics have crass
intentions at heart. Anyone serious about this revolution could not possibly question our
politics and our close relations with the government of the Islamic republic.” Ironically,
this is precisely the period in which the Tudeh party’s offices were being attacked and
looted. Despite this, Kianuri offer his explanation:
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One must really understand that the sincere support of the Tudeh party and the
true Iranian revolution, meaning the Line of Imam (emphasis in original text),
has frustrated the enemies of the Line of Imam. It has also flustered those who are
pretentiously in support of the Line of Imam, however, in opposition in deed. It
has aroused their people in such way that they act destructively against the Tudeh
party and its support for such genuine inclination.185
In order to demonstrate the party’s fidelity to the Islamic Republic, he went on to
explain how this may have been an anomaly and that such writing is not within the
integrity of a serious and responsible newspaper like the Islamic Republic. He explains
that “they have accused us of many things, but our party never did and never will take
steps to exacerbate the conflict between our president186 and the Majles187 or the conflict
between the president and the clerics.”188 Later, he reads a quotation from Ranjbar.189
They (Ranjbaran) claim that the Tudeh Party paints itself with ideologies that do not
belong to us:
What does this mean? This means that the Tudeh party accepts an ideology, like
an Islamic ideology, and pretends that they are Muslims. Then they penetrate
within the clergy and create a harmony between those who get their commands
from the Russian superpower and those who have accepted the prevalent social
ideas—neoMuslims of Tudeh—or Tudeh members wearing the clergy turban.190
The convergence of ideologies during this period was an idea that was written
about in almost all organs of political organizations. Other groups were inquiring about
Tudeh Party’s political positions on many different issues concerning Islam and the
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Islamic Republic. For instance, what was the party’s position on the takeover of the
American embassy and hostage taking? This was especially important since some groups
at the time claimed that the hostage taking feeds the bellicose wing of American
politicians. Also the war against Iraq had started and Marxist groups were divided on
defending their country, hence the Islamic Republic government. This position would
cause them not to participate in the war and condemn it as a result. Furthermore the war
in Kurdistan had become a crucial topic. Many Kurdish and non-Kurdish groups,
especially Marxist, were fighting for an independent Kurdistan. Also, what did the party
think about the Mojahedin? The Mojahedin, according to many followers of Islam, had
deviated from Islam. The Tudeh Party, defending the Islamic government had to take a
position on all those who opposed it, namely the Mojahedin. What should the party have
done about them? Did the Mojahedin stand in the way of Islamic democracy and side
with the liberals?
At the same time there is an intensifying conflict developing between the
President Banisadr and the clergy, and the Tudeh Party had to clarify and take a position
about this conflict too. What is the Tudeh Party’s position?191
The content of the questions above address many of the conflicts that persisted
after the revolution. But further, they depict an important point about the political
disposition of several political players at the time. There is a clear indication that these
questions undoubtedly meant to delineate and recognize both allies and enemies of the
Islamic Republic. On the one hand, these questions connoted a trust toward the Tudeh
Party soliciting political resolutions. On the other hand, however, Muslim supporters of
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the Islamic Republic government voiced their distrustful sentiments toward the (liberal)
president and other Muslims such as the Mojahedin. Kianuri, keen on judging friend from
foe, did not abandon recognition of the party as being in union with the Islamic Republic.
He responded in an effort to clarify party’s sincerity in collusion with the Islamic
Republic and rejected conspiracy theories generated to accuse the Tudeh party of having
a hidden agenda. In one particular public conference he began sarcastically with
conspiratorial ideas:
The Tudeh party has invaded all of Iran, the Tudeh party controls the Line of
Imam, and truthfully, it was the Tudeh party that organized the Line of Imam
originally. Also, the majority of the members in Majles and the party of the
Islamic Republic are really Tudeh clerics. …Cleric(ism) and Tudeh(ism) drink
from the same spring; they are two heads of the same dragon, two horses pulling
the same wagon, the same union of black and red [referring to the Shah’s notion
of the union between Muslims and Marxists] and the same classical colonial
interests of Russia and Britain.192
Kianuri, quotes further from supporters of the Shah abroad. The source of the
union between “black” and “red” is reflected in the ideas of Ayatollah Kianuri and
comrade Beheshti.193 Therefore, he concludes, the Tudeh party’s principle in “defense of
the Line of Imam Khomeini, in support of anti-imperialist and populist Lines of
Khomeini, has been correct and indestructible.”194 So to summarize and give convincing
response to the original complex question of who is on what side of revolutions and what
is to be done with deviant Muslims like the Mojahedin, he concludes with some of
Khomeini’s statements: “We must all unite and gather the same forces that fought against
the Shah, and we must seriously revise our thinking systems in order to refute those who
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critique us.”195 Union and revision may have been viable reasons for these Marxists to
cooperate politically with the new Islamic government and to modify ideology in
adherence to Islam. We can further explore such complication by examining some of the
more relevant ideas put forth by the Tudeh party and their new allies, OIPF (Majority).
The Tudeh Party and the Fadaeean (majority) were working with the government
as the conflict between the government and other organizations intensified. Given the
suppression of the forces in the opposition many were questioning Tudeh Party’s
incentives to work with the Islamic government. In a gathering headed by the Tudeh
Party someone in the audience asked why the Tudeh party participated in last Friday’s
march while flyers for the march were distributed by the Party of the Islamic Republic?
What the question really indicated was how are Marxists being organized by Muslims?
Kianuri’s answer is more political and rational than philosophical and organizational. He
points out the common enemy, imperialism, and claims that to defeat the common enemy
his party will work with anyone supporting the cause. The march, he stated, “was to
declare support for the Imam [Khomeini], and support Imam Khomeini for us is to
support his ideas of anti-imperialism and his popular positions.”196 Tudeh’s argument
revolved around the notion that their party’s cooperation with the regime was in fighting
the conspiring enemies. They claimed that they were currently “defending the
government of the Islamic Republic against conspiracies and pressures from imperialism,
from conspiracies of anti-revolutionaries.”197
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Tudeh-Majority Alliance
Did the Tudeh party have strategic plans with the Islamic Republic? Were they
looking to give up their socialist agenda or empowering the working class for an Islamic
regime? They had previously stated that their support for the Islamic Republic is a
strategic support. Did it mean that they were principally against the leadership of the
working class? Kianuri representing the party responded confidently that:
we said that our cooperation with Muslims is due to fundamental social upheavals. This
is a strategic cooperation, meaning we will work together to the point when socialism is
constructed. …This implies a sincere cooperation of supporters of scientific socialism
with supporters of Islam and Line of Imam, and that between them and us, so far as social
problems related to constructing socialism is concerned, there are no antagonistic
(unsolvable) contradictions.198
As the Tudeh party declared itself closer to Islam and the Islamic Republic, they
distanced themselves from some of the Marxists. Following a significant division and a
subsequent split within the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (OIPFG),
one sector, which later called themselves aksariat (majority), made clear distinctions
between anti-regime attitudes versus attitudes supportive of the regime. The Majority,
which took the latter position, drew gradually closer as a result and eventually merged
with the Tudeh Party. Tudeh leaders and supporters were quite content with the new
collaboration with the majority. The Tudeh Party’s position on the split within the OIPFG
was clarified by Kianuri in a question/answer session. He not only answers the question
but also articulates the main difference between the two groups involved in the division:
We think it is to the organization’s (Majority) advantage because any time a
deviant group splits from a popular organization, it makes the organization
stronger. It helps to revise and correct the organization’s lines. This group of
minorities, we think, is politically deviant, and as far as political struggle,
adventurist. And their leaving the OIPFG is a big help for this organization to side
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with us. It speeds up the process. This way, OIPFG [Majority] will reach a perfect
revolutionary line.199
The majority of the members and supporters of OIPFG united with the Tudeh
party and eventually merged on ideological grounds. They dropped the word ‘guerilla’
from the name of the organization and calling themselves the Organization of Iranian
People’s Fadaeean (Majority). On March, 1981, they officially recognized the Tudeh
Party as a workers party and the Soviets a revolutionary socialist state.200 Contrary to the
position held by the OIPFG (Minority) that the Islamic regime was a dependent state and
that it must be overthrown, the Majority believed the Islamic Republic regime to be antiimperialist. They believed that the Islamic Republic’s political independence and antiimperialist position were signs of the regime’s revolutionary character.201 Two major
Marxist organizations siding with the Islamic regime dealt a heavy blow to the entire
Fadaee organization and other Marxist groups in Iran. According to Behrooz:
The Majority-Tudeh alliance offered its knowledge of the opposition, thereby
helping the state uproot it. In the case of the Majority, its leadership initially declared its
loyalty to the IRI’s constitution and declared the opposition movements (Mojahedin,
Kurdish movement and other Fadaiyan [sic] factions) counter-revolutionary, offering this
guidance to its supporters in August 1981: ‘the organization’s supporters must be aware
of their duties in this critical situation. Uncovering the policies of he counter-revolution
in the work-place, in the family, and in any place where the masses are present is one of
your most important duties.202
As a result, however, political lines of demarcation were more easily drawn.
Precarious and vague notions of whether the Fadaee organization supports the Tudeh
Party, hence the regime, were no longer topics of discussion within the group. For the
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Tudeh Party and OIPF (Majority) Marxists who did not side with them in defense of the
Islamic Republic had betrayed the revolution. Thus the Tudeh Party was now a party
working hand in hand with a reppressive regime. On the other hand, Tudeh party and
OIPFG (Majority), who declared that all those against the Islamic Republic were to be
considered as siding with imperialism were against all other groups in the opposition.
That included other noncompliant Marxists and individuals from the former regime, in
addition to liberals. For instance when the Iranian Communist League203 attacked the city
of Amol, the Majority, proud of its partnership with the regime claimed that their
organization along with the Tudeh Party of Iran:
From the very early moments of the attack by counter-revolutionary intruders,
participated, shoulder to shoulder with the people, the Basiji, and the security
forces, in their suppression and defeat. Two of our comrades and Tudeh members
were wounded…and are in hospital at the time.204
Conflict between the new Islamic Republic government and the nonconformist
organizations and individuals was rapidly growing. As Marxist organizations, the Tudeh
Party and the Fadaeean (Majority) were pressed to determine the class-base of the Islamic
Republic.205 In order to defend the Soviet thought of support for petite bourgeois and
anti-imperialist government Tudeh Party had to insist on the Islamic regime to be of a
petite-bourgeois background. Therefore, they had to address the relationship between
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Khomeini and petite-bourgeoisie, and why the party recognized him as representing the
petite bourgeoisie. Kianuri referred to most clerics as those who belong to small and
medium petite-bourgeoisie. He claimed, that “these clerics hardly come from a big petitebourgeois background.”206
As far as the Tudeh Party was concerned the Islamic regime was a liberating and
anti-authoritarian force. They put Iranian clerics on par with the liberation theology of
Latin America. Kianuri stated that such a revolutionary religious wave has only risen
recently, and if we are to analyze it correctly, we must say that in
Iran it has achieved and has expanded to its highest form, but it is not only an
Iranian phenomenon. Such a revolutionary religious wave has existed in Latin
America for years. There, too, lower ranks of the Catholic Church are in solidarity
with the workers, and in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, they are fighting
against dictators. Their solidarity is very significant. In Northern Ireland, a
considerable number of Catholics defend people’s revolutionary struggle against
capitalists who are mostly Protestant. If you can recall, the Pope, [John Paul II]
while visiting Latin America, warned the Catholic Church against getting
involved in political struggle.207
Therefore, he concluded, since Khomeini’s line is among the revolutionary line
defending the people, the party also supports Khomeini.
By advocating Islam and defending the Islamic government Tudeh found itself
constantly explaining why and how the regime was suppressing the opposition. A
notorious cleric responsible for most of the executions of the anti-government groups was
Hojjat-ol eslam Sadegh Khlakhali. 208 The Tudeh Party had to explain how they would
support and individual like Khalkhali. What was the party’s incentive to support
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Khalkhali? In an article in the political organ of the OIPFG (Minority) the Tudeh party
was questioned on how they would support Khalkhali. Because he was a zealous Muslim
who made sure an ‘anti-revolutionary’ opposition does not exist. Furthermore, he was
among the parliamentary candidates the Tudeh party voted for. How did the Tudeh party
justify voting for a person who had executed (or ordered the execution of) two of the
party’s members? Interestingly, Kianuri treated Khalkhali like a party member in his
answer. Initially he compared Khalkhali to members of the Chinese Communist Party
such as Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Mao Zedong. He further said that while they
were initially recognized as revolutionaries around the world, now they were looked upon
as those who betrayed the Chinese revolution.209 Later, Kianuri mentions Trotsky as
one who was not trusted by Lenin but was assigned the most important
revolutionary position by Lenin, the Minister of War. And again, after the
revolution, Trotsky betrayed the party. Can we say that Lenin made a mistake?
No, we can never say that. At the time, Trotsky’s expertise on organizing was
incredibly important for the revolution. Furthermore, Lenin was aware of his
[Trotsky] weaknesses. Regarding Trotsky, he said, “He does not understand
Marxism.” And after a complete betrayal, Trotsky was kicked out of the party.210
The Tudeh Party later addressed Khalkhali specifically and even paid tribute to his
actions. They believed that although he may have made some grave mistakes he still with
the revolution and has done great service for the people of Iran. According to Kianuri:
Khalkhali is on the same side as the revolution and has served his duties well in
annihilating criminals and servants of the previous regime. We said we would
vote for him because, as the revolution’s state attorney, he accomplished a great
deal. He executed several hundred pawns of imperialism with utmost bravery.
…We believe that Khalkhali has made a serious mistake,211 and we wish he had
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not. But mistakes made in Kurdistan and even more serious mistakes in the future
cannot refute his great service for the revolution.212
Given the controversial relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic
Republic, its members were faced with some aggression on behalf of the more fanatic
supporters of the Islamic regime. They were attacked and beaten at times not knowing
how and whether to defend themselves. They wanted to know how party members and
supporters should act in the face of differences with some of the government supporters.
The Fadaeean (Majority) were facing the same types of attacks and aggressions by the
supporters of the Islamic Republic. They too, were Marxists who had conciliated with the
regime because they held the Islamic regime as petite-bourgeois and, therefore, a
progressive and anti-imperialist state. For Fadaeean (Majority) this meant that the
regime’s attacks against the Tudeh and their own members were not so important.
While the party had told its supporters to defend the country and the Islamic regime,
Basiji forces did not much care for Marxists and the non-believers. Kianuri, tried to
placate the party’s supporters by giving an example. He read the following paragraph
from a flyer by OIPFG (Majority) in Kurdistan:
By forming organized groups, go to revolutionary guards and announce your
desire to suppress anti-revolutionaries. By forming groups, help the transportation
of martyrs and the wounded. … Explain to the people the necessity of working
with the revolutionary guards.213
He explained that the flyer was important because his party was not the one that
wrote it. The flyer belonged to the OIPFG (Majority). “This shows that there are other
organizations that agree with our line,” he explains214. Here he compares Marxists and
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Muslims and states, “Our revolutionary Muslims approve of this line of thinking, and
Marxists really defend our revolution, but there are some problems with their policies.”215
The “so-called Marxists,” he said, have made some mistakes which had really made his
party work harder. The crime committed by a group named Paykar216 “against the
Mojahedin, is a great historical crime in splitting Marxist forces and Islamic forces. This
is creating a false Marxism in the guise of Maoism. It was blackmailing the only true
Muslim force of the time.”217
Faced with relentless suppression of the opposition by the Islamic government,
the Tudeh Party found itself constantly having to justify its support for the regime. How
did the party justify the suppression and what was the reason behind Tudeh party’s
silence when it came to protesting the regime’s authoritarianism? They adhered to the
anti-imperialist slogan and claimed that there is general agreement with the foreign policy
put forth by the Islamic state. Foreign policy of the Islamic Republic revolved around the
idea of anti-Americanism and interpreted by some Marxists to mean anti-imperialism.
Anti-imperialism seemed to set the guidelines for the party. For example, according to
the Tudeh Party:
If Ayatollah Beheshti states that our foreign policy includes an anti-imperialist,
anti-American tendency, we completely agree…and when Mister Dr. Beheshti
states that we respect social freedoms to the point where a political organization
has not conspired against the Islamic Republic, and is free to continue its
activities within the context of the law, naturally we agree with that and condone
it.218
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The Tudeh party and OIPF (Majority) were not the only organizations inviting
the population and more specifically the Marxist groups to rally around Islam. Another
group, a close affiliate of the Tudeh Party and OIPF’s (Majority) close ally was the
Liberation and Equality Group. They too, defended Islamic ideology and the Islamic
Republic government. The following section includes some of their writings, especially
during and after the revolution.

The Liberation and Equality Group
Another group, not comparable to Tudeh party in size, was a newly organized
group called the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari). From their
political line and ideology, a similar tone as the Tudeh party prevails. They seem to write
with less maturity, however, and seem more concerned with grass-root activities during
and after the revolution. They also address the Muslim population and emphasize the
necessity to unite with Muslims. In a booklet distributed just one week before the
revolution, they call on the Muslims for solidarity and reiterate the revolutionary and
progressive nature of Islam and seem a bit apologetic about Marxism. Addressing
“revolutionary Muslims”, they wrote:
In the name of Iranian communism, we are speaking to you, our natural allies.
Yes, we recognize ourselves as your natural allies. …You believe that in order to
establish social justice, one must use progressive and revolutionary laws and
values of Islam, and we believe that in order to achieve this goal, while we respect
Islam as a belief and faith of a majority of the population, we must use the latest
scientific achievements. And this is in no contradiction with Islamic progressive
and revolutionary values, especially of Shi’a religion. Our alliance is an objective
reality and despite mistakes made by zealots on your side and ours, the blood of
revolutionary Muslims and communists are joining together.219
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This group seems to be more to the point with the idea of appealing to Muslims’ inherent
revolutionary fervency. Theirs was a more tactical unity than strategies of political unity
aimed at forming a government. They usually did not mention bigger political objectives.
In their writing means through which power is distributed in the state is not mentioned.
However, they employ many words used by Muslims. In the following passage they use
such terminology to stress Muslim-Marxist solidarity. They appealed to sentiments and
feelings of Muslims by mentioning blood and sacrificing of life, a familiar tone related to
Muslim allegories and the lives of the original martyrs of Islam. In the tradition of the
Mojahedin they refer to Islam’s ultimate utopian society, a society similar to the Marxist
version of classless communism. Two months after the revolution calling upon the
revolutionary Muslims they wrote:
We are once again speaking to you, our natural allies. Yes, despite all zealous
beliefs, dogmas, and closed-mindedness of the left and right, we recognize you,
the true fighters against exploitation and oppression, sincere supporters of
‘faithful classless society,’ as our natural allies and ourselves as your true
friends…our solidarity is a sacred solidarity manifested in trenches of battle and
[going through] ablution220 by the blood of our best comrades… we, as our part,
hold dear this blood ridden promise, like the pupil of our eyes, despite the closed
mindedness and deception of opportunists on the left and right.221
Despite Marxist ideas on religion and deity, this group wrote as if they also believed in
God in the same manner as Shi’a Muslims. They used the Islamic terminology
comfortably while addressing the Muslims. Unity with Muslims was the most important
goal to achieve. Once unity was established, they move on to why and how such unity
would be possible. Calling the revolution and democratic one, they wrote:
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Our revolution has a democratic nature. People have risen to gain freedom, a true
liberation for everyone and all classes; for women, men, for Turk, Arab,
Armenian, Assyrian, Turkman, and Baluchi. In the vernacular of such revolution,
(Allah-o-Akbar) ‘God is Great’, means ‘Long Live Freedom.’ For God being the
greatest means that no one on earth can be superior to others and limit other
people’s freedoms.222
They clarify whom they mean by Muslims who do not fight for freedom and
equality. According to their literature, there are two different types of Muslims. There are
those who nominally support Islam but believe in perpetuating capitalism and
exploitation. Then there are others who are truly against capitalism and remnants of the
previous regime. The latter are basically the clergy and clerics and the former, what they
call, nationalist bourgeoisie. There is, they claim, “a difference between the Islamic
Republic of Mr. Bazargan and Amir-Entezam, on one hand, and the Islamic Republic of
Ayatollah Khomeini and Taleghani223 on the other hand.
To explain the collusion of Marxists and Muslims, this group uses some regional
(Middle East) examples and concludes, therefore, that such solidarity is the ultimate truth
of revolutionary resistance:
Why is it that the so-called Islamic government of Saudi Arabia is among the
most anti-communist regimes in the region, while in Palestine communists and
Muslims are united? In Algeria there are close relations between communists and
Muslim Mojahedin. And the Islamic revolution in Libya is strengthened through
the aid and support of communist liberation movements.224
They mention that there is a steady increase of Muslims who truly believe in
independence and freedom and a united classless society using guidelines of scientific
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Marxism. Everyday Muslims find it to be true that communists are not the enemies of
revolutionary Islam but their most genuine and sincere comrades.225
In their publication, commemorating May 1st (Worker’s Day) there was more class
analysis on the state and specifically the Islamic state. Addressing workers on whether
clerics were among friends of workers, they explained that the clergy make up a sector of
the intellectuals of our society and we know that intellectuals are generally from the
middle class. But they “may follow and defend the interests of capitalists, middle- class,
or workers. Progressive clerics have acted in solidarity with the people of Iran, and have
at times—especially in this revolution—directly taken on the role of leadership.” 226
A subtle attempt was made in this publication to minimize the shortcomings of
some of the clerics. While the group condemned Bazargan and Amir-Entezam and
bourgeoisie and claimed that other folks were not to be trusted, their treatment of similar
thoughts among the clergy was milder. In the same publication, they mentioned
Ayatollah Shariatmadari as one who supports the reconstruction of the state and its
military, which is in the hands of national capitalists, who do not particularly “defend
workers and toilers.”227 Shariatmadari’s ideas, they wrote, are held up and supported by
the Islamic Republic Party of the people of Iran. On the other hand, they claimed, “the
Islamic Republic Party also supports Ayatollah Khomeini’s defense of the oppressed.”228
The Liberation and Equality Group often defended and reiterated statements made by
Khomeini and Taleghani. There is a distinct difference between two interpretations of
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Islam, according to the group. First, there is the conservative interpretation of Islam and
then the revolutionary interpretation.
If revolutionary Islam is able to devise a clear program to achieve workers’
demands, it can assume state power and will eventually be able to achieve
national and democratic goals. To reach this goal, there must be a united front
built that is made up of workers and revolutionary Muslims.229
There is no talk of revolutionary Marxists here. Apparently, workers are to be lead by
revolutionary Muslims. Or it may imply that as long as workers are present, one can
assume Marxist ideology is also present.

Ehsan Tabari and Islam
Even more interesting was a book written by another Tudeh party member, Ehsan Tabari,
a sociologist educated in East Germany, who was one of the most intelligent members in
this group. Like Kianuri, he comes from a religious family. His father was a well-known
cleric (Sheikh Hussein Tabari) in the city of Saree, in the Caspian province of
Mazandaran.230 He wrote extensively, and his ideas often gave direction to not only
supporters and members of the group, but also to its central committee. The title of his
book, Kazhrahe (Diversion) was intended to imply what he believed had happened to his
party over the years. Compared to books and memoirs written by other party figures, it is
rather short. Kianuri, for example, published his memoirs of over 700 pages. Tabari
covers major issues related to the party during its almost 70-year lifespan. The most
interesting part, related to the subject of this paper, is what he feels—or better yet, what
he believes—about Islam. His main point in this book is how Marxists were, and still are,
making grave mistakes by not recognizing Islam as the ideology of liberation. Marxists
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have become isolated as a result, and this reality has become apparent to some zealous
Marxists (namely himself) who “dared to compete with Islam with their shameful
thoughts of failure.”231 For Tabari, Marxism has now become an outsider’s point of view.
It comes from the West, and Iranians who have Islam as a liberation ideology, should not
waste their time looking to the West or the East for help. In a section of his book
subtitled, “Why Marxism Failed in Iran,” he gives the following analysis:
The acceptance of their ideology can be divided into two branches of
Westoxication and Eastoxication. The meaning of Eastoxication is the process by
which one is intoxicated by Eastern European ideology. This has been dominated
by Eastern European countries. It is obvious that Western European liberalism
and Marxism, both Western ideologies, are different in content. However, the
ideological difference between the two is not much when compared to Islamic
culture and principles. It is obvious in comparing lifestyles of people in capitalist
and socialist countries.232
According to Tabari, Marxism practiced by Iranians has left its advocates isolated
in their own worlds. This loneliness is not, at the same time, a symptom of Iranian
Marxists only. He feels that Marxists in all Islamic countries are suffering from this
outcome:
Isolation and alienation of Marxists in Iran is a familiar setting for all Marxists in
Islamic countries. …While writing this memoir, with a free and open view about
my close and not so close relations, things look very different today. Under the
light of the Islamic Revolution, individuals and events that were once grand and
significant have lost meaning and have diminished into mere shadows.233
For him as a Marxist, there is something in Islam that is illuminating and liberating. He is
among those who do not believe Marxism has any convincing answers for social ills. The
failure of Marxism in Iran does not only reflect the problems within Marxism. It is a
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more profound phenomenon that has roots in not understanding Islam. The “alienation
from people and their own nation was one of the reasons for the isolation of [Marxists].”
There is another reason that led to the boycotting of Marxists in Iran. “It was the lack of
belief in religion and especially the religion of Islam and their incessant disregard toward
the bountiful teachings of Islam.”234 For Tabari, Islam is equivalent to a prophetic gift of
life to Iranians. His usage of words like temptation, worship, and abandoning God,
sounds convincingly Islamic. Islamic revolution, he believes, is
…the strong foundation of a profound cultural uprising which entirely changes
the facade of the individual and society. …The web of life of these characteristics
has been knitted during the time when God was forgotten, and temptation and
selfishness prevailed. All that was built by colonialism and its lackeys was
destroyed by this revolution. Thus was built the human spirit by the material of
worshipping God, work, sacrifice, and humanity. Such reconstruction and
profound leap in spirits is not the work of Marxism.235
His views, in the book, are usually contrary to what the Tudeh party had said to that
point. He further questions the sincerity of the party, even when they cooperated with the
Islamic Republic, and calls it pretentious. Here, Tabari questions all types of Marxism
and ends by stating that Islam is liberating and free of all rigid structure and dogma
because it has God on its side.
The Tudeh party was pretending to be supportive of the Islamic Republic and the
Revolution. They even agreed with the Line of Imam and condoned its social and
political principles. They even briefly explained and justified, in Mardom (the
official organ of the party), the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy of “neither east,
nor west”236 and announced their concession to such policy. …This so-called
school of Marxism-Leninism, despite its many forms: Stalinism, Trotskyism,
Maoism, Titoism, and Brezhnev’s neo-Stalinism, decisions in today’s Soviets, are
all the same in content but with different interpretations. When we refute
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Marxism-Leninism, we will not have to pay attention to such interpretations since
we reject both the political product of a state, which is socialism, and further
oppressive politics of the Soviets. Approving Islam means total rejection of
Marxism…237
Finally he rejects his party as hardheaded and uncompromising. The irony is that the
Tudeh party, especially after the 1953 coup in Iran that brought back the Shah, has been
labeled as the most compromising of all parties and groups. But Tabari is probably not
referring to the Tudeh party compromising with the Islamic Republic. He is stating that
one must have deep beliefs in Islam. Toward the end of his book he says:
Islam, contrary to Marxism, is free of such dogma and rigid structure. A war
against monarchs, and defending the poor, is understood by Islam with the
profound understanding of historical and popular particularities because its
teachings rise from the prosperous process of God’s word.238
For a few years, the convergence of Islam and Marxism in Iran seemed for some
as natural as any ideological collaboration. It turned out, however, that it was not an
enduring relationship. The collaboration did not last long. As soon as the Islamic regime
became stable enough by repressing the opposition it was time to end the three-year
accord. Both Tudeh Party and Majority were declared illegal. By early 1983, the Islamic
Republic banned all material published by any Marxist organization or group including
the Tudeh Party, Majority (Fadaeean), and all those that genuinely or not merged with
Islamic ideology. This forced both groups to go underground and a majority of the
leaders of both groups went into exile.
The subject of the next chapter is hybrid and Muslim organizations, and individuals. It is
the story of how many groups and individuals converged in unity to build a solid front.
Primarily, the Gilan Socialist Republic is looked at as a historical precedent to
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convergence of Marxists and Muslims. Later, the two nationalist fronts, National Front
and Liberation Movement made up of both Marxists and Muslims is examined. In
addition, there is a brief history of a very prominent individual who combined Islam and
Marxism to explain the Iranian political trajectory. Dr. Ali Shariati, a Muslim who
borrowed from Marxism theorizing on social conflict and social inequality had great
influence on both Muslims and Marxists. And lastly, there is an examination of Muslim
groups that played a significant role in the Iranian political opposition.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HYBRIDS AND MUSLIMS
Islamic Ideology was a set of religiously charged, Islamically informed, and ideologically
alert political notions articulating the specific ways throughwhich the status quo had to
be altered. As articulated by its chief ideologues, “the Islamic Ideology” was an attmpt
to assimilate contemporary (secular) political objectives into “Islamic” ideas.
Hamid Dabashi
Within the Iranian resistance movement in the past several decades, we can see
several instances of hybrid groups, individuals, and events. Following are some of the
major ones, but by no means all. They were selected based on the significant roles they
played in opposition to both the Shah and his father, Reza Shah. Here they are discussed
in the order in which they entered the Iranian political stage. We begin with the Socialist
Republic of Gilan, a historical event that introduced Marxists to the Muslims. Also
included in this chapter are the two prominent nationalist organizations, the National
Front and the Liberation Movement and the Organization of Iranian Peoples Mojahedin,
as well as Dr. Ali Shariati, one of the most significant Muslim theorists in Iran’s political
history.

Socialist Republic of Gilan
The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational
convergence in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leaders, both
Marxist and Muslim, were killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of
Muslims belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement”239 and Marxists who
established the Communist Party of Iran. This collaboration was in response to an abrupt
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change implemented in Iran through England and France. During the 1920s and 1930s,
modernization by western thought had set the political discourse for Iranians and Iranian
political activists. The Muslims were led by Mirza Kuchak-Khan, a prominent figure
involved in fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional Revolution of
1906. Marxists, originally from a group called “Fergheye Democratic” (Democratic
Faction), were led by Haydar Khan (Haydar Amoughlu) and Soltanzadeh. This was the
first cooperation between Marxists and Muslims as an organized political-military force.
By the end of the 1920s, this movement, known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” with
the support of the Red Army with its 1500 guerillas, was prepared to proclaim its
independence and eventually take on Tehran’s central government. Both movements had
been active before the Russian revolution of 1917.
Although the objectives of the Marxists and Muslim factions were quite
dissimilar, the means of a military takeover of the central government was commonly
shared. The unprecedented alliance lasted nearly two years. The defeat of this republic
was probably due more to internal conflict and a political agreement signed between the
nascent Soviet Union and the new government of Iran than a military defeat, according to
Katouzian.240 This view perceived Muslims as being responsible due to their cooperation
with the central government. However, according to Moises Persits, a Russian researcher,
it was the Soviet support of the wrong communists that resulted in a war between
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Muslims and Marxists. Defeat of the republic could have been avoided had the Soviets
supported Amoughlu rather than Soltanzadeh.241
Before examining the reasons behind their conflict, however, we will inspect their
points of commonality and events that led to their cooperation. It is especially important
to delve into this joint activity since it was historically the first social movement that
made a Marxist-Muslim convergence possible. A major contributing factor to such a
close relationship was the presence of a foreign power, either the United States or Britain,
and a local government supporting the foreign invaders.
The occupation of Northern provinces by Russia and southern provinces by
Britain was a major factor contributing to mass protests.242 Some authors believe that the
conflict had deeper roots and may have started independent of a nationalist movement
rejecting foreign invasions. They claim it had more to do with the defeat of the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906.243 The discontent with Mohammad Ali Shah’s (of
Ghajar dynasty) central government, and its incapability, led to invasion by Britain and
Russia. This invasion intensified mass protests, especially in the northern region of Gilan
by the Caspian Sea. In clashes between the people and Russian soldiers in the Gilan
region, hundreds of people were killed and injured. Russian forces found themselves in a
great military quagmire with the Jangal Movement guerillas (jangalis), which consisted
of small landowners in Gilan. Mirza Kuchak-Khan, a landowner himself, led this
movement.
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After the Russian revolution of 1917, more volunteers joined the Jangal
Movement, hoping to force a Russian military retreat. With the temporary withdrawal of
Russian forces, Britain became the main military presence in the northern regions. By
this period, other non-Muslim groups and individuals had joined the fight. Marxists,
encouraged by the revolution in Russia, became more involved and even better
organized. Their discontent against Britain and the Iranian central government was a
major contributing factor for collaborating with the Jangal Movement. Most of the
leaders from a Marxist movement, who later formed the Communist Party, were
influenced directly by Bolsheviks. Their main leaders were Soltanzadeh, Ghaffarzadeh,
Javadzadeh, and Haydar Khan.244 With Armenian origins, Soltanzadeh had spent most of
his political life in a Bolshevik underground organization in Russian Azerbaijan.
Ghaffarzadeh, an old revolutionary, was the contact person for the Russian
Communist Party’s organ, Iskra, responsible for its delivery from Europe to Iran.
Javadzadeh (Pishevari), who was born in Iranian Azerbaijan, was a teacher in Baku,
capital of Russian Azerbaijan. While in Baku, he came in direct contact with the
Bolsheviks, and became the chief editor of a leftist newspaper called Hurryat (freedom).
Ultimately there was Haydar Khan. He was a Marxist who went underground because he
did not recognize the legitimacy of the last Ghajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah, after
the Constitutional Revolution. With Marxist tendencies quite different from the other
three leaders, he continued his opposition against the government. These four later
organized the Communist Party of Iran with hopes of taking over the weak central
government.
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By the end of 1920, the Socialist Republic of Gilan had become a threatening
force for the central government. Their coalition was able to fight against both the British
forces and the Iranian central government. According to John Foran:
The Communist Party of Iran, led by Haydar Khan Amoughlu, and the Jungle Movement,
led by Mirza Kuchak Khan, had formed an alliance to build a soviet socialist republic. In
addition, they sent a letter to Lenin asking for assistance in ‘freeing us and all of the
oppressed from the chain of Iranian and British oppressors.’ They also sent a letter to
Tehran proclaiming the monarch government illegitimate.245
For a while it seemed as though the nascent Socialist Republic of Gilan was
gathering enough popular and political support to serve as a model province for the rest
of the country. It was especially important because two ideologically opposite
perspectives joined forces and emphasized a strategic view of democracy. But despite
desires of the population of Gilan, including Marxist and Muslim leaders, the dream
quickly ended.
What the two factions had in common was a combination of political and
economic objectives, but what divided them were cultural issues. The veiling of women
and Islamic ethics and principles were divisive issues, while land reform and discontent
toward the central government contributed to the unification.246
But Mirza Kuchak-Khan’s Islamic cultural beliefs did not interfere with his
politics of joining forces with Iranian Marxists and the Soviets. For him it was more
important to defeat or weaken the British, who were an unwelcome occupying force. He
explained why he had cooperated with the Soviets:
After overthrowing the Czarist government in Russia and establishing the Soviet
Republic, Iranian revolutionaries relied deeply on the fraternal solidarity of the Russian
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socialists … and we were dreaming about getting rid of our worst enemy (after Czarist
Russia) meaning England. … Even before the Bolsheviks entered into Iranian
Azerbaijan, in order to ensure victory, I wanted to contact them. So I sent some of my
people to contact the Bolsheviks.247
On May 19, 1920, Abookov, a high-ranking Soviet military member, said to the
people of Anzali, a popular port where the Soviet battle ships had docked: “One of the
reasons for the Soviet military to enter [Anzali] is an invitation by the Iranian
revolutionary Mirza Kuchak-Khan.”248
By June of 1920, Kuchak-Khan had gathered up to 8,000 troops, among them
5,000 Soviet soldiers.249 Britain put up minimal resistance at the port and later retreated
into the city. After relaying the defeat of the British to Lenin in Moscow, the Bolsheviks
emphasized that Soviet military must show no political interest in the matter and keep a
low profile. According to Persits, it was a direct order by Trotsky addressed to the Soviet
military that, “you must announce the news on the radio that Anzali was conquered by
Kuchak-Khan and his troops and that he has requested our stay in the city and he has
allowed it.”250 In order to secure the amicable stay of the Soviets, Trotsky requested the
following:
First, that no military encounter takes place by Soviet troops with Soviet flags.
[You must] insist on our absolute non-intervention [in Iranian domestic matters].
Second, Kuchak-Khan should be assisted in all matters by our volunteers, experts,
and monetarily, and allow his troops to take over territories we have occupied.
Third, if our battleships are needed for Kuchak-Khan’s future fights, they must
raise the flags of Azerbaijan Republic and assisting Kuchak-Khan should be
generally done through this Republic.251
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This position facilitated Kuchak-Kahn and his Jangal Movement in working with
the Soviets. With the help of the Soviets, he was able to publicly announce his program,
through which he first declared the establishment of a Committee of Revolutionary War.
He then announced the ousting of the British and promised the distribution of land among
the peasants after they pushed further and took over Tehran. Further, he said that once the
takeover of Tehran was complete, they would call the country the Iranian Socialist
Republic. According to Persits, even though Iranians were following the Soviet model,
there was not even one communist among their ranks at the time. The program of the
Republic, besides armed struggle against the King and Britain, demanded the “support for
private property [land] and Islam, for [the entire] human race, and for nullifying all
agreements forced upon Iran by foreign forces.”252 In this manner, forty square
kilometers of the northern province of Gilan was pronounced as the Gilan Democratic
Republic.
By July 1921, the Soviets decided to take their troops out of Iran; it took until
December of that year for them to completely pull out. According to Persits, the Republic
of Gilan suffered a defeat mainly because it refused to become another Soviet
Republic.253 The Soviets pulling out of Iran on the one hand, and the distrust KuchakKhan had developed toward Iranian communists on the other, fomented the beginning
stages of the collapse of the Republic of Gilan. For many reasons, as Persits states,
Kuchak-Khan feared that “communists were trying to take over the leadership.”254 As a
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result, he decided to get rid of Amoughlu, who had become one of the most prominent
leaders.
Kuchak-Kahn’s troops attacked the headquarters of the Communist Party and
arrested Amoughlu. Kuchak-Khan and his Jangal Movement, afraid of Marxist
repercussions, decided to act before they were destroyed. Haydar Khan, despite his nonconciliatory policies toward the Soviets, was killed by Kuchak-Khan’s troops.
Clashes continued until October 23, 1921, when Kuchak-Khan was no longer
able to resist the army with a small group of supporters. While escaping from government
forces, he froze to death in the mountains of Gilan province. When his frozen body was
found, his head was taken to Tehran as proof of an end to the Republic of Gilan.255 The
death of major leaders of both groups led to disbandment of the coalition and an abrupt
end to the first socialist-Muslim movement in Iran. Such convergence of ideas between
the two distinctly different schools of thought did not occur again until the 1979
revolution.
On February 26, 1921, according to two Soviet experts on Iran, M. Pavlovich and
Teria S. Iranski, the Soviets signed an agreement with the Iranian government to ensure
their pulling out of Iran.256 There was controversy on whether the Soviets were actually
there to aid the Iranians or more specifically, to help the Jangal Movement and the
Communist Party of Iran establish a people’s republic. Pavlovich and Iranski briefly
mentioned the Soviet incentive to both occupy and leave Iran. According to the 1921
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pact, the Soviets would withdraw their troops only if the British would stop intervening
in Iran and withdraw from the country.
The experience of Marxist-Muslim cooperation in the Republic of Gilan left its
mark for a long time. Among those greatly influenced by this hybrid view was a secular
Muslim in the city of Rasht. Mohammad Nakhshab, who began his political career in his
late teenage years, founded a Muslim group with socialist inclinations under the name of
the Theist-Socialist Movement (nehzat-e khodaparastan-e socialist). This group was
among the six organizations that originally formed the National Front. Nakhshab was
also among the four leaders of Liberation Movement abroad along with Ebrahim Yazdi,
Mostafa Chamran, and Abbas Amir-entezam.257
Nakhshab, a Muslim who also believed in a secular government with socialist
beliefs, was among the oldest in this group. In 1944, while still a high school student, he
had become involved in politics by joining the Party of Iran258 (hezb-e Iran), a nationalist
opposition group. Not long after its establishment, many members of the Party of Iran
proposed to join the Tudeh Party. In a protest to the Party of Iran’s joining the Tudeh
Party, Nakhshab left to organize his own group. He first organized the Theist-Socialist
Movement (jonbesh-e khoda parastan-e socialist) and later The Party of People of Iran
(hezb-e mardom-e Iran). According to Abrahamian, neither of the groups could gather
enough force to contend in the realm of politics.259 However, Nakhshab was the first
individual Iranian who made an effort to bring Shi’a Islam together with European
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socialism. It is interesting to note that Ali Shariati’s father was a sympathizer of the
Theist-Socialists. Consistent with his father’s tendencies and influenced by Nakhshab’s
views, Shariati advocated similar views of secular Islam. In fact, by his own admission,
Shariati was merely perfecting the same principles that commenced with Bazargan,260
Taleghani,261 and Nakhshab.262 [See later section in this chapter on Dr. Ali Shariati.] This
was a secular religious belief that did not offend traditional merchants of the Bazaar or
masses of Iranians who believed in Islam. Meanwhile it attracted new-leftist intellectuals
under the banner of nationalism and secularism. It resulted in the creation of an upcoming
nationalist movement, which despite the Islamic tendencies of its leaders, practiced a
secular agenda. Among such nationalist groups were the National Front (jebhe-ye melli)
and the Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi).

The National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli)
A major organization that made its mark in the protection of national interest was
the National Front, originally founded in the fall of 1949 in Tehran by Doctor
Mohammad Mosaddegh and his colleagues.263 This group was one of the most enduring,
and at times, most popular political organizations advocating reform. From its founding
until 1979, it went through three phases of development. As a political organization it had
significant impact upon the process of social change in Iran. However, the National Front
is mentioned here not for its political pertinence but rather for its members’ contributions
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to the formation of other Marxist groups. It was a midwife that helped give birth to many
Marxist revolutionaries, many of whom later became founders of some of the major
organizations, such as the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas.
In its first meeting, Mosaddegh264 was elected chairman. In its first political flyer,
the organization made three distinct demands:
1.
2.
3.

Just elections
An end to martial law
Freedom of the press265

By November 1, 1949, the National Front had openly declared itself as a political
front consisting of many organizations and parties. At the time, the National Front was
able to get eight of its members elected to the sixteenth congress of Majles.266 In March
1950, according to Katouzian, they put forth their program asking for reforms within the
parliament and opposing an oil agreement between Iran and Britain. Their fight mainly
revolved around legal issues, and not much attention was paid to other social and
economic problems, such as social justice and the question of democracy and democratic
rights.267
Two major factors had contributed to the creation of the National Front. First,
Tudeh, as a major political group, was unable to draw Muslims to its socialist programs
and Marxist ideology. Second, the presence of foreigners and their interest in Iranian oil
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instigated deep nationalist feelings among Iranian masses. Other than the Tudeh Party,
there had been no widespread movements for about twenty years. Nor had there been a
political organization after the defeat of the Gilan Republic. Nonetheless, by the early
1940s, as an aftermath of the occupation of Iran by Allied forces, political activity was
rehabilitated. In a short period of time, a large number of parties, committees, groups, and
unions of groups were organized. Among them were nationalist groups that basically
formed to protect national sovereign rights and Iranian oil. According to some authors, a
nationalist organization may have been a more feasible solution to socio-political
problems than the ways of a Marxist organization like the Tudeh Party.268
But the nationalists were not the only members of the National Front. Leftist and
radical members had more in mind than parliamentarianism. Their fight was not merely a
legal fight. They consisted of the Party of Iran, the Organization to Oversee Elections
(sazman-e nezarat bar entekhabat), the Party of Iranian People, the Movement of Theist
Socialists, the Population of Islamic Fadaeean (jami’at-e fadaeean-e eslam), and the
Committee of Muslim Mojahedin (hey’at-e mojahedin-e mosalman).269 All organizations
making up the main body of the National Front agreed on one principal issue, that Iranian
oil belongs to Iranians. With this guideline, they were able to attract masses of people to
their political arena, allowing them to build a strong front that went beyond its
intellectuals’ desires. They were successful in nationalizing the oil industry by 1951 and
in making Mosaddegh the Prime Minister. His prime ministerial position lasted until
August 19, 1953, when his cabinet was toppled by a coup with the help of the CIA and
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British MI-6. The Shah, who had previously fled the country fearing mass protests, was
put back in power.270 As a result, many National Front leaders and members were
arrested and imprisoned. This marked the official collapse of the first National Front.
The covert and repressed political inclinations within the National Front finally
erupted in a major split. Gradually, the National Front was revived by 1965 and early
from its re-inception it was divided into two factions. The more secular and modern
leaders established what they called the second National Front, which was primarily
formed by the Party of Iran. An alliance of four other organizations271 established the
third National Front.
The second National Front and third National Front were founded after the
original National Front had ceased to exist as a result of political repression and internal
conflict among its members. The second National Front, due to its many initial internal
political differences, was not an enduring movement. A major factor contributing to its
collapse was a cleric-led uprising on June 6, 1963. The government’s severe suppression
forced many in the National Front to change their political position. Some members who
previously advocated legal-constitutional resistance against the regime were now
convinced that possibilities for open political alternatives had been exhausted. In the face
of the Shah’s authoritarian regime, how effective was open resistance?
The third National Front declared its existence by the summer of 1965. This was a
more radical and more skeptical group. It conducted its activities openly, but at the same
time, very cautiously. The Third National Front was made up of four major opposition
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groups. It included the Liberation Movement, the Society of Socialists (jame’e-ye
socialist-ha), the Party of Iranian People, and the Party of Iran. The more religiousleaning leaders, however, established the new Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi),
which was, in reality, the outcome of the third National Front. In a matter of three short
weeks, most of the leaders were arrested and imprisoned. This put an abrupt end to the
third National Front.
A fourth National Front was created after about 12 years of non-activity. Guided
by a new way of thinking, they decided to take advantage of the Shah’s ‘open political
space.’ They were more optimistic about an open political movement. In the face of a
growing urban guerilla movement, an organization advocating nonviolence with no
armed intentions, such as the new National Front, was good news for the Shah. On
October 7, 1977, they declared themselves to be back on the political scene again.272
According to the flyer, the new National Front consisted of the Socialist Society of the
Iranian National Movement, the Party of Iran, and the Party of Iranian People. This was
the period in which most groups announced their political activism one way or another,
including the Tudeh Party, most Muslim and Marxist guerilla organizations, and the
Liberation Movement. Several days later, the newly organized National Front established
two important positions in a flyer. Responding to an article about “Iran and Black and
Red Oppression,”273 the National Front took sides with Ayatollah Khomeini and declared
that all clerics have clearly taken the side of Khomeini. They claimed that people’s
demand for Islam had nothing to do with the left and that the clerics’ objective was not in
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conflict with freedom and independence for Iran.274 Two of its leaders met with
Khomeini in Paris to strengthen their solidarity with him specifically, and Muslims in
general. Some of the more prominent leaders of the National Front played significant
roles during and after the revolution.
Nationalism drove the four stages of the National Front’s activity and political
ideology. They were able to send a message of a) political involvement as a necessary
condition for social rights, and b) organization as another necessity to achieve any sociopolitical objective. From the rank and file of the National Front rose many significant
individuals and groups. After understanding how important it was for opposition to take a
stance, they thought of expanding their political organization to mobilize and include
masses of people. All major leaders and theorists in both Marxist organizations, such as
the Fadaeean, and Muslim groups such as the Mojahedin, were in one way or another
involved with the National Front. This was especially important since there were both
Marxists, e.g. Tudeh, and Muslims, e.g. Clerics, outside and independent of the National
Front.

The Liberation Movement (Nehzat-e Azadi)
The Liberation Movement, which had split from the third National Front, played a
major role as an opposition force, especially during the few years just after the revolution.
Many members of this group later broke away to form the Mojahedin, and many of the
leaders made noteworthy imprints during the revolution.
This group, which endured its internal conflicts and the Shah’s repressions,
played a major role during the 1979 revolution. By May 17, 1962, the Liberation
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Movement had declared itself an official group within the opposition. Three major
leaders, all former members of the National Front, founded this new organization, which
had stronger Islamic tendencies. The three included Mehdi Bazargan, Ezatollah Sahabi,
and Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleghani. Bazargan and Sahabi were old, experienced
activists with strong Islamic inclinations. Taleghani, a cleric who later became an
Ayatollah, was another activist cleric heavily involved in the fight against the Shah. The
Mojahedin, for instance, speak of Taleghani as one of their major ideological figures. The
Liberation Movement’s main declaration about its members and supporters was “Muslim,
Iranian, and Mosaddegh-i.”275 They believed in Islam as an ideology. Being Iranian
implied nationalist Iranian in opposition to foreign forces, including Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States. Furthermore, a member had to be a supporter of
Mosaddegh’s belief in an independent national economy. Their main difference with the
National Front, consistent with inclinations of the three founders, was greater emphasis
on an Islamic ideology.276
After the defeat of the nationalist movement, there were no traces of the clergy.
Their non-presence took the political struggle back to the universities. Some of the
younger intellectual clerics, who could not find opportunities for political activity due to
the Shah’s despotism, began cultural activities such as publishing a magazine on the
school of Shi’ism.277 They insisted upon a coalition of the nationalist movement and a
movement based on Islamic ideology, including Tudeh and other Marxists. They felt that
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within the opposition to the Shah, there were only two groups that actively practiced their
political ideology:
[They are] either revolutionary Muslims who fight, they attack the enemy and are
attacked in turn, or they are non-Muslim Marxist revolutionaries. Therefore…the
establishment [of Liberation Movement] reflected a historical necessity of the
development of a new Islamic movement and their [Marxist] coalition into a union.
And it is precisely this two-dimensional nature that enabled the Iranian Liberation
Movement to accomplish its historical responsibility at the right moment.278
After the suppression of the clerics in the 1963 uprising, the Liberation Movement
advocated a more radical position against the regime in support of the clerics.
Furthermore, it was this event that fomented a greater separation between the National
Front and Liberation Movement. More pressure was put on the National Front by the
Liberation Movement to condemn the regime for its murderous actions in Qom.279 The
National Front, wanting to remain a legal and open political group, refused to take such a
position. This forced the Liberation Movement to distance itself from the National Front.
Now more radical Muslims, with nationalist ideas, were sympathetic to the Liberation
Movement. Faced with an influx of imported western culture, they found more support
for defending Islam and Iran in the Liberation Movement.
The main leadership of the Liberation Movement was deliberately avoiding an
antagonistic struggle against the Shah, but younger members and supporters had other
ideas. This created a duality about the nature of the Liberation Movement. In some of
their documents, they referred to the concept of Mojahedin, a Muslim who thought a
Jihad fights against the forces of oppression:
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After the 1963 uprising [cleric uprising in Qom] the Liberation Movement, on its path to
development and growth, was able to become such Mojahedin-breeder which produced
so many proud Mojaheds for the people of our country.280
This is referring to those who split from the Liberation Movement to found the
Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin. Therefore, it can be said that the Liberation
Movement gave rise to a more radical group of Muslims, who later advocated an all-out
armed struggle against the Shah. Many intellectuals, young political activists, and
students, especially those with Islamic tendencies, supported the Liberation Movement.
According to Nejati, the Liberation Movement was the first party with an Islamic
ideology that coordinated all activities of nationalists with the clerics and the Islamic
movement.281
The Mojahedin, who had split from the Liberation Movement, had organized its
own group by 1966. Radicalized by the Shah’s suppression, frustrated by the Liberation
Movement’s reluctance, and deeply impressed by Marxist guerillas, they started their
own urban armed struggle against the Shah. According to Abrahamian, “Even though the
Mojahedin were Muslims, with a revolutionary interpretation of Islam, they put forth an
ideology which was not much different from the Marxist Fadaeean.”282

Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e khalgh-e Iran)
This organization was founded by three former members of the Liberation
Movement in the summer of 1965. Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad, Ali Asghar Badizadegan,
and Saeed Mohsen had split from the religious wing of the Liberation Movement to
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found the Mojahedin. They were able to organize themselves amid other turmoil within
the Liberation Movement. This occurred precisely when most of the leadership from the
Liberation Movement was arrested under subversive charges, tried by a military court,
and sentenced to years in prison.283
Hanif-Nezhad was born in 1938 in Tabriz, Azerbaijan, into a family of traditional
merchants. He first joined National Front, then the Islamic Society, and finally the
Liberation Movement. In 1962, he was arrested and sentenced to prison for seven
months. In 1963, he graduated from Tehran University with a degree in agricultural
machinery. He started his military service and became an officer before leaving the
service. Disenchanted with the economy and alternative political parties, he thought of
starting an underground group. The second founder of the Mojahedin was Saeed Mohsen.
He was born in 1939 into a religious family in Zanjan. Active among student committees
of the Liberation Movement, he was arrested and briefly imprisoned several times in
1961. He graduated from Tehran University in Industrial Engineering during the same
year. After finishing military service he, like Hanif-nezhad and Badizadegan, helped
found the Mojahedin. He was active in all realms of the struggle for the Mojahedin for
ten years before he was arrested the last time.
Asghar Badizadegan, the third major figure and among the founders of the
Mojahedin, was born in 1938 in Isfahan. He too began his political life with the
Liberation Movement. He graduated with a degree in chemistry and served in the military
henceforth. He served his time in an arms manufacturing factory and was later hired by
the same factory. His familiarity with arms made him a good candidate for arms training,
and in1970 he was sent to Palestine to the Fattah military camps for training. After
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several months of training he returned to Iran. His training was not in vain however.
Before Badizadegan was sent to Palestine, the main founders of the organization had
decided on commencing an armed struggle against the Shah’s regime. They also studied
an amalgam of Marxist books including Economy, Money for All, Worker’s Wage,
Contradiction by Mao; State and Revolution, and What Is to Be Done? by Lenin, How to
be Guerilla, and How to Be a Good Communist, by Leo Chaochi, Guerilla Warfare, by
Che Guevara, Wretched of the Earth, by Fanon, Strategies of an Urban Guerilla, by
Abraham Gilan, Revolution in Revolution, by Regis Debray, and many others.284 Their
studies of Islamic work were much more limited: the Koran, Ali’s Nahjolbalagheh, The
Path Traveled, Infinite Particle, and Love and Worship. Such books may have
contributed to a general understanding of Islam and morality rather than a specific
political strategy.
Their ‘ideology team’ suggested to other members several books to read. Among
them were Imam Ali’s Nahjolbalagheh. They later published a book called, Imam
Hussein. This work included an analysis on Islam after the life of Mohammad and
Hussein’s struggle against the Ummaye dynasty. An important event that shaped the idea
of martyrdom among Muslims, especially Shi’as, was Hussein’s willingness to fight
despite being disproportionately outnumbered. Islamic ideology was prevalent in this
organization until the early 1970s. Members also read some Marxist works in order to
enhance their understanding of other revolutions. For them, however, Islam was
sufficient to explain class conflict and revolutionary activity.
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Ali Shariati
Ali Shariati was born in 1933 in Mashad, in the northeastern province of
Khorasan. After graduating from high school and training as a teacher, Shariati started
teaching in a village there. Several years later he started his university education and
graduated with a degree in Persian Literature in 1953. With a scholarship to continue his
education, he traveled to France. He finished his graduate studies and received a Ph.D. in
Comparative Linguistics in 1964. His five years in France may be what instilled in him
his political identity.285 The 1960s, the period of political turmoil in France, also educated
Shariati as a political activist. He experienced one of the most radical leftist political
movements in all of Europe at the time. It was through these movements that he realized
the major differences between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. In many
ways Dr. Shariati’s ideas of using Marxism to aid the oppressed, while keeping his
Islamic ideas intact, was similar to the Liberation Theology of Latin American countries.
The use of these ideas in his writing reflects his understanding and personal experiences
with both. He met and had long discussions with intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon286
and Jean Paul Sartre.287 While participating in political demonstrations defending the
Algerian government, Shariati was injured, and this injury played an important role in his
becoming even more involved in the world of political resistance. Consistent with his
Islamic beliefs, he joined the Liberation Movement’s chapter abroad. Two years later, he
was appointed chief editor of Free Iran (Iran-e Azad), the National Front publication.
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After receiving his Ph.D. in 1964, he went back to Iran. His activities in Paris,
known to the government in Iran, caused his immediate imprisonment. After six months
in prison, he was released, and despite his doctoral degree, he was allowed to teach only
in a high school in his hometown of Mashad. Later, because of his relatively good
behavior, he was permitted to teach in the university in the same city, but his tenure
lasted just several months. As he was constantly under surveillance by the secret police,
his ideas grew even more radical. He accepted the invitation of some politically active
Muslims to speak in what became a famous mosque (Hosseinieh ershad) in Tehran. His
lectures consisted mainly of Islamic theology, sociology, and the history of Islam,
especially resistant Islam. He was warmly received by the youth, who promoted his tapes
and books nationwide. For almost seven years, from 1966 to 1973, he was able to speak
in the same mosque and at other gatherings.
Shariati’s father had purposely chosen life in a small town and did not much care
for big city glitter. He taught Islamic history in different small towns and villages in the
same province. Choosing Khorasan to teach Islamic history was probably not a
coincidence. It was where he was born and raised. Moreover, there was a population that
did not appreciate the city and its secular living—the non-Islamic, nontraditional
behaviorisms. Ali Shariati, following in his father’s footsteps, was also interested in
politics. They both participated in political meetings and joined a group called the
Movement of Theist Socialists.288 These meetings probably played a big role in giving
Shariati his first taste of Iranian socialist and Marxist thought.
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In the early 1950s, when he was teaching in Mashad’s high schools, he
translated a book, originally written in Arabic by Abdolmajid Jodat-al-Sahar, which was
highly controversial for the times, not only for questioning state authority but also for
giving new ideas to the Muslim population. The title of the book was Abuzar: The
Socialist Theist. It was about the life of Abuzar, one of the first people to join
Mohammad in Islam. Abuzar defended the poor and oppressed, and fought against the
rich and powerful. It seems as though Shariati, like other Middle Eastern radicals, thought
of Abuzar as the first Muslim socialist.289 In his speeches given at the popular mosque in
Tehran, he persistently used Islamic metaphors and analogies to critique the Shah’s
government. He never addressed the regime directly and never joined any specific group.
This was why he was not perceived as a threat by the regime. The Shah’s secret police
SAVAK was concentrating most of its forces on the nascent guerilla movement, so
speeches made in opposition of the regime seemed harmless at the time. For more than
two years, Shariati was able to make his popular speeches with no consequences.
According to Zibakalam, the SAVAK thought that:
Those in opposition to Shariati, namely the conservative clergy, would eventually
attack the mosque of Husseinieh Ershad and close it down. This would resolve
the Shariati problem for SAVAK. Eliminating Shariati by closing down the
mosque where he spoke, clerics would reduce tension between the SAVAK and
the people. 290
He was able to get away with the speeches only for so long. Because he spoke in a
particular vernacular, using words with irony and dual meanings, he had gone undetected
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for several years. But by 1971, he was being scrutinized closely by the SAVAK, and was
finally arrested and imprisoned for eight months.
During his speeches, he distinguished two types of Islam, Alawi Shi’ism291 and
Safavi Shi’ism,292 He considered those two schools of thought to be the major conflict
between all Muslims in the world. He spoke about Hussein’s martyrdom in Karbala as
the quintessential Islamic struggle against injustice. He emphasized an unending fight
against injustice, and said that the “most essential tradition of Islam is martyrdom and
human activity that has been combined with the history of struggle against oppression
and establishing justice and supporting human rights.”293 Marxist and Muslim guerillas
also believed in the ideas of martyrdom and human activity to hasten the achievement of
a just system.
Doctor Ali Shariati was a significant force of opposition against the Shah’s
regime. He had strong convictions in Islamic beliefs, especially Islam as an ideology of
resistance. He would not only qualify as a hybrid within the general Marxist-Muslim
resistance movement but also a hybrid among Muslims themselves. He advocated Islamic
morality but was not a cleric. And while he was a leftist intellectual, he was not a Marxist
or secular intellectual.
He was one of the Muslims who applied principles of Marxism to his Islamic
beliefs. He was outspoken against the Shah and his regime, especially during the late
1960s and early 1970s. During this period people attended his lectures by the thousands.
Even women, who rarely attended such lectures in the mosque, were present when he
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spoke in Husseinieh-ye ershad. He was relentless in explaining the world as a conflicting
dichotomy, a world of the oppressed and a world of the oppressor. For him the same
division existed within Islam, an Islam that is utilized by the oppressors and an Islam that
comes to the aid of the oppressed and justifies resistance against the oppressor.294 He
believed that a real Islam can only be brought about and implemented by progressive
intellectuals and not the clerics. He wrote:
There are two Islams. An Islam as ideology to progress in life, [to] socially
advance and develop, and the other [Islam] a collection of knowledge, values, and
information like the written word, principles of theology by Islamic icons. Islam
as an ideology creates Abuzar,295 and Islam as a culture creates Ibn-Cinna [Avicenna].296 Islam creates believers as a culture. Islam creates intellectuals as an
ideology…an uneducated individual may have understood Islam and thinks more
Islamic than a cleric, a philosopher, and a master (Aref).297
He often disagreed with high clerics and criticized their involvement in
oppressive governments. He insisted that clerics like all Shi’a Muslims must take a
political stance. No longer was defending Islam as merely a religion sufficient for a true
Muslim. In one of his more famous books, Islam-ology (studying Islam), he wrote:
Today, it is no longer enough to say that I disagree with religion or I believe in
religion; this makes no sense. One must take a position on which religion does
one believe in. The religion of Abuzar and Marvan Hokm are both Islamic. Fine,
you believe in Islam, but which one, an Islam that pillages the people or one that
is isolated in exile? If you claim that religion is an instrument to justify poverty,
you could be right. Uthman298 used to say the same thing. But we can see that not
only does Islam not justify poverty but advocates justice, equality, and struggle
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against poverty. In mere defense of this concept, many of the greatest in Islam
have been sacrificed.299
Shariati’s political positions and relentless critique of conformist clerics made him
even more popular. His criticism against the Shah’s government attracted a larger
audience. The Shah’s secret police grew concerned with his popularity and finally
intervened and banned him from speaking in Husseineh ershad. By 1973, they shut down
the mosque, arrested Shariati, and banned his writings.300 After his arrest, he spent two
years in prison. He was finally released through political mediation and negotiation by
the Algerian government. Despite government restrictions not to leave the country, he
fled to London where he resided for the next three years. He died there in late spring of
1978. Although investigators diagnosed his cause of death to have been a massive heart
attack, many still believe that the SAVAK was responsible for Shariati’s death.
Shariati insisted on maintaining an independent mindset on political and social
issues. He adhered fully to no extant ideology. He was particularly leery of any “isms” in
political thought. Nonetheless, he thought of Marxism as one of the most comprehensive
social thoughts.301 Based on his writings and terminology, he was able to articulate a
revolutionary Islam through Marxism. He felt, for example, that all Shi’a Muslims should
use the day of commemoration of Hussein’s killing by Mu’aviah as a day to protest
oppression, or even rise for a revolution. This indeed took place starting some months
before the 1979 revolution. He said inequality and poverty in Iran was a consequence of
world imperialism, international Zionism, cartels, multi-national corporations, racism,
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cultural imperialism, and finally ‘westoxication.’302 His usage of Marxist terminology
and concepts had many people intrigued. This duality of thought created enemies and
friends on both sides: Marxists and Muslims. According to Abrahamian:
[Shariati’s relationship with Marxism] was a love hate relationship. On the one
hand he accepted that without Marxism one cannot comprehend society and
modern history. Therefore, [he] accepted the division in society as an economic
foundation, a class-based infrastructure, and a political ideological superstructure.
He even confessed that almost all religions must be considered as part of the
superstructure, because all rulers deceive people by the promise of heavenly
rewards. He also accepted that history of people is a history of class struggle. But
he adds that the main fight is over political power and not material goods. He
claims that since Kane and Abel, humanity has been divided between two sides
consisting of the oppressed (people) and the oppressor (rulers).303
Most of his political writings and speeches referred to a dichotomy of wrong
Marxists and wrong Muslims. On the one hand were the wrong Marxists of the Tudeh
Party, the ‘Stalinist kind’ as he would call them, and on the other, the conservative
Muslims, who were apolitical and who held wrong interpretations of Islam. So Marxists
and Muslims would think of him as either a Muslim-Marxist or an anti-Marxist Muslim.
He claimed to be neither. He thought of himself as a radical thinker who got his ideas
from Shi’a Islam and used the methodology of Western social science, especially
Marxism, for political analysis. He defended the true Marxist from attacks by clerics who
claimed Marxists to be godless, immoral, corrupt, and sinful. In a pragmatic way, he said
that it is what Marxists practice—fighting against oppression and for truth—that the
Koran expects. According to the Koran, its definition of kofror kafir304 refers to one’s
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practice and not what is in one’s mind as thought.305 He stated that Marxists must pay
attention to the deep Islamic beliefs of Iranians. He scorned the Tudeh Party for not
understanding the struggle of Muslims. It is due to this fact, he said, that not many people
were attracted to this party in Iran. In his book, The Return, (bazgasht) he wrote:
Look at their [Tudeh Party] books through which they are trying to introduce
themselves to our Muslim population and to the spirits of our religious people:
‘Dialectical Materialism,’ ‘Spiritualism and Material Principles,’ ‘Spirits Are
Material Too,’ ‘School of Ancient Greek Philosophy,’ ‘Marxism in Linguistics’
(edited by Stalin), ‘Dialectics of History,’ etc… As a consequence, this is what
our people think of the group’s thoughts and actions. ‘These are religion-less
people, enemies of God, people, religion, ethics, and all that is sacred, all honors,
all traditions. They are the destroyers of all rules, beliefs, and protestors of God,
integrity, and everything. Their sole objective is to take away our religion and
import non-religious beliefs from abroad, and that is all.306
In the same writing, however, he showed an awareness of what some clerics
would do to discredit Marxism, and defended Marxist thought by catching some clerics’
deception. He said that clerics deceive people by exploiting people’s ignorance, for
example when a cleric lies to people and claims that komo [in Persian] means God, and
neest [in Persian] means ‘is not.’ So komoneest [the Persian way of saying communist]
really means there is no God. It is funny, Shariati claims, but it is a popular
understanding. Furthermore, Shariati wrote:
Is it not true that we are addressing the population, a population with 90 percent
peasants from villages as opposed to 90 percent proletariat like Germany? A
population that belongs to feudalism and religion and not of industrial capitalism,
a population that resulted from two centuries of renaissance and one century after
the French revolution. This is how much effort was put into forgetting religion but
not much opportunity to kick big landowners out of the village. Peasants and
workers’ consciousness was crammed with the Koran, prayer, and Ali.307 But they
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never became conscious of the truth about exploitation, the meaning of
oppression, the philosophy of poverty, and alienation. Our translators and writers
wrote and translated books about materialism and dialectics, linguistics, the
engine of history, the refutation of Berkley’s philosophies, superstitious of
idealism, the nonexistence of God and spirit, and principles of ethics. But among
the thousands of books they published for the people, there was no translation of
das Kapital.308
There are strong Fanonist influences in Shariati’s writings. Shariati, like Frantz
Fanon, the radical Algerian Marxist, felt that nationalism for Third World countries was
the only path to liberation. He claimed that people in the Third World could only defeat
imperialism through the return to their original cultural roots. Their national and cultural
traditions would help them prevail over social alienation and reach a stage of
independence. In his speeches, he referred to African and Latin American intellectuals on
their way to ‘returning to the self.’ Shariati was successful with the youth and Muslim
intellectuals. Most young Islamic intellectuals also felt that Shi’a Islam could be used for
a revolutionary movement and that traditional clerics were too conformist. They rejected
non-political traditions of Islam having to do with prayers, absolution, scholastic
teachings, and superstition of healing through religion. Like Shariati, the Muslim youth
wanted to use Islam as an ideology to protest the Shah’s dictatorship and foreign
imperialism.
Even though he did not live to see the revolution take place, and more
interestingly its consequences, he contributed immensely to ideas that mobilized the
masses. Among his students were many leaders of the Mojahedin and other revolutionary
Islamic groups. His desire to change Iranian society may have come true if only
temporarily. In a letter to his son, he wrote:
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We are speaking of a society with half its population asleep and under a spell and
its other half who is awake are fleeing the country. We want to wake up the
spellbound and force them to ‘stand up’ and make those who fled return and
stay.309
According to John Foran, Shariati bridged the gap between Khomeini, his
followers, intellectuals, and students. Even though Shariati did not approve of a
government ruled by clerics, in two ways his analysis was quite close to the clerics. First,
he thought of Islam as a completely just system, and second, good Muslims should give
power to their leading clerics.310 Discourse on whether Shariati would approve of an
Islamic Republic in Iran still continues. However, as far as Shariati was concerned, it was
imperative, as he said in the letter to his son, that we wake people up. And to that he
certainly contributed tremendously.
Not since the Gilan Democratic Republic were Marxists and Muslims working so
closely. This time the collaboration was against a common enemy using a particular
method of struggle to achieve victory. Although independent organizationally, and
distinct ideologically, the Marxist borrowing of ideas from Muslims was noticeable. The
idea of martyrdom, as proof of an authentic revolutionary, determined popularity of the
group. Serious revolutionaries not only engaged in armed struggle they also gave their
lives for it. This made an impact on other smaller groups in the opposition. They were
involved in the resistance movement. But the impact was mainly made by those who used
martyrdom to demonstrate a genuine revolutionary.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ORIGINS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THREE MAJOR MARXIST
ORGANIZATIONS
The Iranian revolution was an Islamic revolution, but in Iran
there was, as elsewhere, an intellectual culture of Marxism.
The adherents of this culture lost many savage battles, but they
helped make the revolution possible and shaped postrevolutionary Iran.
Forrest Colburn
Three major organizations permeated the Marxist political movement in Iran: the
Tudeh Party, The Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas, and Paykar.
Multitudes of other leftist and Marxist groups were active before the revolution, but these
three groups were able to organize Iranian leftists and intellectuals more effectively than
others. Part of their success was their persistence and seriousness in the struggle to topple
the Shah’s regime. This chapter presents a brief history of the three organizations. Their
history is particularly important because in one way or another, their leaders had a
relation with Islam and/or Islamic movements.

Tudeh Party
Tudeh is the oldest Marxist organization that has been able to revive itself in one
form or another. It has survived the imprisonment and execution of its leaders, members
and supporters, many splits, controversies among its leadership, and most importantly, a
growing disappointment and disenchantment among the Iranian people. Founded in 1920,
the Communist Party of Iran became the country’s first Marxist group.311 There is a
connection, however, between the Communist Party and the Tudeh Party that goes
beyond their relationship with the Russian revolution and the Communist Party of the
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Soviet Union. It started with the participation of Iranian workers who had traveled to
Russian Azerbaijan for work. In the Russian revolution of 1905, they had a chance to
participate in a political-social struggle for the first time. Wanting to use their experience
in an organization, they established the Party of Justice (Hezb-e Edalat), and the
Endeavor Society (Jamiat-e Hemmat).312 The Party of Justice, also known as the Social
Democratic Group, changed its name to the Communist Party of Iran in 1920.313 They
demanded: the end of imperialist domination in Iran; confiscation of foreign
corporations; confiscation of land belonging to big landowners and its distribution among
peasants and soldiers in the revolutionary army; finally, they demanded an alliance with
the Soviets and the Workers International Movement.314
To popularize their politics, they joined the Jangal Movement,315 which was led
by Mirza Kuchak Khan.316 Ideologically, two individuals from the Communist Party
played significant roles: Jafar Javadzadeh (Pishevari), who published the party’s organ
The Communist, and Haydar Khan, also known as Haydar Amoughlu, who led the central
committee of the party. This was the first instance of a Marxist-Muslim convergence in
Iranian history. Through efforts of the leaderships from both sides, by Mirza Kuchak
Khan, Amoughlu, and Javadzadeh, the first Democratic Society was established.317
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By 1920, the Communist Party denounced Reza Khan, the new monarch and a dictator,
for being an obstacle to progress. They asked workers, peasants, and the petty
bourgeoisie to unite against him.318
By 1926, the Communist Party had regrouped and reiterated its view on Reza
Shah as an obstacle to progress. They claimed that the only way to fight against his
government was to organize workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.319 At the same
time, Reza Shah made all communist activity and literature illegal in 1931 by passing an
amendment through the parliament. This move forced the Communist Party to turn
inward and concentrate its activities among intellectuals. One of these, who later joined
the party, was Taghi Arani, a chemist educated at the University of Berlin in Germany.
He came to know Marxism while in Berlin, which motivated him to write several critical
articles about Iranian culture. Upon his return to Iran, he began publishing an intellectual
newspaper by the name of Donya (World).320 By 1931, Reza Shah had gathered enough
support to denounce the Communist Party, and he proclaimed as illegal all activities by
communists or communist groups. This act forced the Communist Party to go
underground and conduct most of its activities among intellectuals. Taghi Arani was
among them.
So complicated were Arani’s articles that the government initially perceived the
material as non-threatening.321 Articles under titles like “Historical Materialism,”
“Science and Elements of Material,” “Meaning of Human Materialism,” “Women and
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Materialism,” and “Material Basis of Life and Thought” may have been too dense for
even university students. His problems came not with his theoretical writing but rather
with a flyer he wrote in 1937, on May 1st, International Workers Day, and distributed on
university campuses.322 This led to his arrest and a ten-year prison sentence. During his
trials he compared Iranian police with the Nazis and accused them of torture. He stated
that anti-socialist and anti-communist laws were against the constitution. He said,
according to Abrahamian, “If you want to imitate Western clothing, methods, facades,
technology, and style of living, you must also put to work Western political
philosophy.”323 Arani died after only ten months in prison. Controversy surrounds his
death since the cause was never established.
The Tudeh Party was founded by 27 of the 53 individuals who were arrested
along with Arani but were able to find each other later. Officially the Tudeh Party was
established in 1941, and despite efforts by different governments to eliminate this group,
it has persisted to this day. Since its inception, it has split into many more radical or more
conservative groups, which exist now under different names. Some authors have argued
that the Tudeh Party was originally created not as a communist party but as a united front
for anti-fascist activities and constitutional rule, and this is precisely why the name
“Tudeh” was chosen as opposed to the Communist Party or the Workers Party.324 There
were three reasons that contributed to that decision:
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1. Since communist activity had become illegal in 1931, any name making a
communist distinction did not seem wise, especially since this was not perceived
by members as an underground subversive organization.
2. Any name referring to Marxism or communism would undoubtedly repel and
fend off clerics and religious individuals, as well as many politically radical
Muslims.
3. Tudeh, meaning “mass of people,” would also attract and appeal to all sects and
divisions of society, not only the working class.
According to Morshedizadeh, the name Tudeh was chosen in an attempt to
conceal the real communist nature of the party since Iranians thought of Marxism as
hostile to religion and Islam.325 Tudeh leaders looking to organize intellectuals, students,
and workers openly could not possibly have chosen a name affiliating them with
communism, Marxism, or the Soviets. Moreover, according to Abrahamian, a noncommunist name would draw distinctions between the old Communist Party of Iran and
the new, more youthful Tudeh Party.326 In a pragmatic sense, the anti-communist law
passed in 1931 might be the reason.
The party chose a Ghajar prince, Soleiman Mirza Eskandari, as their leader
because he had been an important figure during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.327
By 1942, the new party had published its preliminary program and started its political
activities in Tehran. Their first conference was held in the fall of that year. Thirty-nine
members from the provinces and 87 members from Tehran attended the conference.
Their initial program was based on four objectives according to Abrahamian:
1. Freeing the remaining members of 53
2. Making the Tudeh Party an official party
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3. Publishing a newspaper
4. Creating a program that, contrary to previous anti-religion programs, would not
exclude clerics and would attract young Marxists and non-Marxist radicals.
It took six months for Tudeh to accomplish these plans. They started gathering in
Tehran and had organized their first conference by September 1942, which was attended
by 126 members (87 from Tehran and 39 from other cities). During the conference, the
following membership conditions were delineated. Members must:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Be Iranian citizens
Be at least 20 years of age
Accept the party’s ideology and structure
Go through a three-month training period in one of the party’s branches328
The two types of Marxists who made up the main body of the Tudeh Party were

quite different. This was apparent in both their class and educational background:
Founders of the Tudeh Party were mostly young Persian-speaking men from
Tehran, whereas members of the former Communist Party were middle-aged,
from Azerbaijan, and spoke Azari. While founders of the Tudeh Party were
university-educated intellectuals who had come across Marxism through leftist
movements in Western Europe, founders of the Communist Party were self-taught
intellectual activists who had reached the same conclusion through Leninism of
the Russian Bolshevik Party. While the founders of the Tudeh Party, these
European-educated Marxists, saw politics only from the class perspective, the
leadership of the Communist Party—having witnessed ethnic massacres of
Ghafghaz and local uprisings of Khiabani and Mirza Kuchak Khan—saw society
not only from a class perspective, but an ethnic view. These differences were not
apparent from 1941-1943, but surfaced later.329
In time, these differences became a major source of conflict. Given Iranian
society’s lack of a working class proletariat, copying Soviet-style communism had
become a problem. Conflict rose among party members from the First Congress of the
party. One of the more important issues was the communist nature of the party. The issue
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was whether communism was appropriate for Iran’s particular social makeup.330 They
were facing a political dead-end. Some members felt that the party was not serious
enough about class struggle and armed struggle in achieving socialism, and that the party
had replaced workers with intellectuals. Others argued that there was not enough open
and democratic discussion within the central committee, which harbored too much
control. Yet there were others who underscored reasons outside the party, such as
political suppression and British imperialism conspiring in Iran.331 Despite such political
differences, they were able to publish their views concretely without seeming
contradictory.
This time, however, there appeared a new line of class struggle in their program,
demonstrating a new socialist/worker inclination vis-à-vis an old nationalist/ethnic line.
After the first congress in 1944, the formulated principles of the party were put forth in a
paper as the following:
The Main objective of the Tudeh Party is to mobilize workers, peasants,
progressive intellectuals, merchants, and artisans of Iran. In our society today,
there are two main classes: those who own principle means of production, and
those who do not own much. The second group includes workers, peasants,
progressive intellectuals, merchants, and artisans. Those who work are not
rewarded for their work, and are oppressed by a small group. If the social
structure is completely turned upside-down and the principle means of production
is shared by the people, this class, for losing a little, will gain a whole lot in
return. … When we say our intention is to fight against despotism and
dictatorship, we are not addressing particular individuals but a class structure that
creates such dictators and despots. In August of 1941, many people thought that
with the overthrow of Reza Shah, dictatorship would also disappear overnight.
But now we are aware of the mistake we made. We can see with our own eyes
that the structure that created Reza Shah still remains. Such class structures,
furthermore, will create mini Reza Shahs through oligarchies in the form of

330

Kolaee, p. 91.

331

Abrahamian, p. 383.

166

landowners and oppressive capitalists, who will control society by owning the
means of production.332
Ideological conflicts on what takes precedent—ethnic and nationalist struggle or worker
struggle—continued to persist within the Tudeh Party.333
An interesting development within Tudeh was its Women’s Organization. The
Women’s Organization of the Tudeh Party, which was created in 1943, was supported by
another group of women called the Society of Women. By 1949, both groups had joined
to form the Society of Democratic Women. Interestingly, the members were mostly
related to male members of the Tudeh Party.334 The subject of women’s rights and the
political activities of women was a point of contention for clerics, one that may have
played a major role in creating a rift between clerics and Tudeh. The women’s branch of
Tudeh managed to organize women to fight for literacy, voting rights, political and social
rights, equal wages, and the building of more schools for girls. This is while clerics were
trying to close all institutions open to women.335
Among the most radical branches of Tudeh was its military chapter. It was
announced an official chapter of the party in 1951, and by 1954 it had hundreds of
members. During the same year, 500 of its members were arrested and 21 were
executed.336 Tudeh was especially active in recruiting members from the working class.
In their first conference, they proclaimed a neutral position toward worker’s religious
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affiliations, language, and political views. They organized many strikes demanding
higher wages and improved work conditions for workers. According to Foran:
By 1941, only three strikes, involving 50 workers, had taken place, but by 1944,
the number of strikes had reached 57. It reached a peak by 1946, with 183 strikes
in total. By May 1, 1944, International Workers Day, four workers’
confederations joined forces to form the Central Council of the United Trade
Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers (shora-ye mottahed-e markazi-ye
kargaran va zahmatkeshan-e Iran). This council was led mainly by old activists
of the workers movement and members of the “fifty-three.” The council grew
rapidly until 1946, when it claimed to have organized 335,000 members including
industrial workers, artisans, merchants, non-skilled wage laborers, and service
sector employees.337
In 1948, as a consequence of an assassination plot against the Shah, martial law
was declared and all Tudeh Party members were arrested. Two weeks later, the prime
minister announced the Tudeh Party responsible for the attempt by presenting some
documents. He linked the alleged assassin to an Islamic Newspaper, the Flag of Islam
(parcham-e eslam), Tudeh, and United Committee of the United Trade Unions of Iranian
Workers and Toilers.338 Furthermore, citing the 1931 ban against communism and
communist groups and literature, the Tudeh Party was proclaimed illegal and it was
indicted with charges, which, according to Abrahamian, included destabilizing the
constitutional monarchy, organizing hunger strikes and plotting riots in the southern
region of Abadan, arming workers in the northern province of Mazandaran, and
encouraging the secession of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.339 Leaders were arrested, the
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party line along with its members went into disarray, and internal conflict arose.340
According to Katouzian, there were some members of Tudeh Party who could have spied
for the government.341 Two hundred members were arrested and some executed. With
the advent of the 16th Congress, some political activity was permitted. This allowed the
Tudeh Party to start publishing a political organ and begin organizing protests and strikes.
Despite several years of inactivity, they were able to rebuild and organize once again.
By 1953, they had gathered more support and resurfaced. Their serious political
activities enabled these Marxists to gain the trust of the population as an opposition
group. All throughout the 1940s and until 1953, when the Tudeh Party failed to organize
the masses to protest the coup against Dr. Mosaddegh, they had set the political discourse
for Iranian opposition. On May 1, 1953, International Workers Day, they organized
protests in almost all major cities. On other occasions, they were able to mobilize up to
100,000 people to participate in political protests.342 But according to some of their
leaders, they failed for not supporting Mosaddegh. Eskandari writes:
During the nationalist movement, we did not support Mosaddegh, who
undoubtedly represented the national bourgeoisie. We believed that Mosaddegh is
fighting for nationalizing Iranian oil, but American imperialist support of this
movement means they are also behind it. Therefore, we mistakenly concluded that
communists must not support the movement of the nationalization of oil.343
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Eskandari neglected to mention the role of the Soviet Union in this decision.
According to some authors, the party’s decisions were made with the interests of the
Soviet Union in mind.344 The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States had plans for
the Iranian oil industry. In a speech in Majles, Mosaddegh put forth his “negative
equilibrium” policy, suggesting that new concessions on Iranian oil should not be made
until Iran could plan for nationalization of Southern oil under the control of Britain. To
give the Soviets Northern oil concessions, and have the British already in the South, was
“negative equilibrium.” Tudeh published articles blaming Mosaddegh for being one-sided
and claimed that all governments had spheres of influence in Iran, including the
Soviets.345After the 1953 coup, The Tudeh Party was seriously damaged. In a period of
five years, 1953-1958, up to 3,000 members were arrested. From 1960-1963, several key
members of the party fled Iran to Europe.
From the perspective of many writers, political activists, and intellectuals, the
Tudeh Party contributed significantly to the defeat of Mosaddegh by withdrawing their
support precisely at the moment when he needed it most.346 Their political positions and
actions that had been based on a Soviet connection literally pushed the Tudeh Party out
of the political picture. Leadership’s mistake caused the arrest and incarceration of
hundreds of supporters and members.347 Hundreds received life-sentences and dozens
were executed. Many splits occurred within the party. Meanwhile, the government began
a widespread campaign of labeling the Tudeh Party as a Soviet puppet and agent. Many
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who were not arrested fled to Europe, mostly to East Germany, with the help of the
Soviets.
In 1962, four former members returned to Iran to start a new organization
consisting of what remained of old members and supporters. By 1963, they managed to
create a new publication called the Appendix to Mardom (zamime-ye mardom) through
which many lost members were able to reestablish their connections with the party. For
the first time, Tudeh voiced its sympathy for clerics and the movement led by the clergy.
They called the uprising, led by Khomeini in 1963, an “uprising of anger and revenge
against the Shah.” They praised all clerics involved and reiterated the necessity for all
opposition groups to unite. By 1966, many members were arrested. This resulted in a
dissipation of members and supporters, and again led to a period of inactivity. It was not
until early 1970s that the Tudeh regrouped once again and published four different organs
under the names Navid, Mardom, Donya, and Sho’le, meaning “good news,” “people,”
“world” and “flame” respectively. By the summer of 1975, several years short of the
1979 revolution, they announced their ideology of Marxism-Leninism.348 During these
years, heady discussions between Tudeh and Fadaee guerillas and the Mojahedin took
place. Until 1978, the Tudeh Party remained an underground organization; two days after
the revolution, it surfaced and announced its reemergence. The party mostly advised
groups to stay away from armed struggle because it would only contribute to their
martyrdom in vain. Two months before the February revolution, they wrote:
Our primary and most important responsibility of the party is to work
comprehensively with popular forces and mostly with forces led by Ayatollah
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Khomeini. It is our duty to warn people about potential threats while we defend
the progressive government of Bazargan and his national[ist] government.349
Anti-national bourgeoisie and anti-Islam in the 1950s, the Tudeh Party had turned
completely around in support of both during the 1979 revolution. As discussed in the
following sections, the Tudeh Party, of all the Marxist organizations, came closest to
converging Marxism with an Islamic ideology.

Tudeh and the Soviet Union
Historically, ever since its inception, there had been a peculiar, yet robust and
persistent, relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union. This relationship
has always been a “major point of controversy in the history of the Iranian communist
movement.”350 Different political entities have generated various views on the Tudeh
Party. The Shah’s regime, and also the government of the Islamic Republic, both believed
the party to consist of spies working directly for the Soviets. Groups within the
opposition, both Marxist and non-Marxist, were less conspiracy-driven and analyzed the
Tudeh Party more politically. They believed that the Tudeh Party was so ideologically
dependent on the Soviets that they were copying Soviet policies and interests despite the
necessities of the Iranian working class and the oppressed. Although the close
connections between the Tudeh Party and the Soviets had been clearly shown, the extent
and nature of the relationship was never clear. That is, who was influencing whom? As
quoted by Behrooz from one of the Tudeh Party’s original leaders, Avanessian, the
Comintern outlined the Tudeh Party’s policy, which was to “fight against fascism
through propaganda and other means; to fight for the establishment of democracy; and to
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make the Iranian people understand that the Soviet government only wanted their wellbeing and freedom.”351
Extant factions within the party also had different views on the Soviet influence.
The two prominent leaders, Kianuri and Tabari, felt that the party was an extension of the
CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Eskandari, however, thought of Tudeh as
more independent. According to Eskandari, “The Soviets had different departments in
their government that sometimes pursued contradictory policies.”352 He claimed that “as
long as Tudeh was operating inside Iran and had a mass following, the Soviet influence
was less, but that after exile between 1960 and 1979, [when party leadership fled to] first
the Soviet Union then the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the influence
increased.”353 Connections between the 1953 coup and the Soviets can only be speculated
upon since there are minimal sources of information. Joseph Stalin’s death five months
prior to the coup to overthrow Mosddegh’s government may have affected both entities.
His death caused political instability in the CPSU. Different factions of the CPSU had
started their own internal struggle to fill the vacuum left by Stalin. At the same time, the
Tudeh Party was affected in their directives from CPSU. This may “explain the paralysis
of the party [Tudeh] leadership in confronting 1953 coup.”354 According to Kinzer, the
Tudeh Party’s lack of participation in defending Mosaddegh during the coup was also
directly related the Soviet’s non-participation, but this time, like most of the world’s
Communist Parties, Tudeh was controlled by the Soviet Union, and in times of crisis it
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followed orders from Moscow. On this day, however, no orders came. Stalin had died
several months earlier and the Kremlin remained in turmoil. Soviet intelligence officers
who would normally have been concentrating on Iran were preoccupied with the more
urgent challenge of staying alive.355
Political turmoil in the Soviet Union and a CIA coup in Iran contributed to the
demise of not only the Tudeh Party but generally the Marxist left in Iran. As Kinzer puts
it:
Undoubtedly, there would have been no coup in August 1953 if not for the CIA.
The CIA devised Operation Ajax, paid a large sum to carry it out—estimates of
the final cost range from $1 million to $20 million, depending on which
experiences are counted—and assigned one of its most imaginative agents to
direct it.356
There are also some accounts of an infiltration of the CIA in the Tudeh Party. The
CIA “had infiltrated the Tudeh at a very high level during the coup period, and the
Lankarani brothers [Tudeh members] were in fact MI-6 [British equivalent of the CIA]
agents.”357 As far as party politics toward Mosaddegh were concerned, “leaders of the
Tudeh Party took their orders from the Soviet Union, and the Feudal reactionaries were in
connection with the Brits and the Americans, and both these groups acted against the
interests of the country [Iran].”358
After the 1979 revolution, the Tudeh Party admitted to mistakes they had made
during and after the 1953 coup. They held their leadership responsible, yet never
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mentioned the Soviet role or lack thereof in the coup. Nejati quotes from one of the
documents published by the Tudeh Party after the 1979 revolution:
Not knowing the national bourgeoisie in Iran, not realizing its nature, and not
recognizing the anti-imperialist characteristics of the National Front caused our
party to make great mistakes. …The party leadership, instead of defending
nationalization of the oil industry throughout the country, which was supported by
masses of people and a common ground among all anti-imperialist forces, came
up with the slogan to nationalize the Southern oil fields and nullify the pact [made
with Britain] vis-à-vis the National Front’s demands.359
What the above quotation neglects to mention is the Northern oil fields that were
contracted out to the Soviets. So when it came to nationalization of oil in Iran, the Tudeh
Party was still partial toward the Soviets. As more books were written by former and
current members of the Tudeh Party after the 1979 revolution, the role of the Soviets and
their influence in the party became clearer. As discussed below, the Soviets may have
perceived the Tudeh Party as their agents in Iran in a geopolitical context. Knowing full
well that the Iranian government had in mind the interests of Britain and the United
States, the Soviets did not entirely give up on the Shah. They maintained a close
relationship with his government while they influenced the Tudeh Party to act on their
behalf. This paradoxical relationship between the Soviets, the Shah’s government, and
the Tudeh Party was seriously questioned by emerging Marxists. The Sino-Soviet conflict
and China’s alternative to Soviet peaceful coexistence, in addition to important victories
in liberation movements worldwide, deeply affected new and youthful Marxists. They
were thinking of new means—other than legal and constitutional struggles, to overthrow
the confident dictator. The new Marxists moved away from a Tudeh-like organization
only able to function under legal and semi-legal conditions, and dependent on foreign
powers, to one independent of outside influences and conditioned to operate under the
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extreme repression of a police state. A reverence for the Bolshevik revolution, a hallmark
of the previous generation, was diluted by the experience of Chinese, Cuban, Algerian,
and Vietnamese revolutions.360
Several questions may be raised on the relationship between the Tudeh Party and
the soviets. Who consulted whom on the matters of Iranian politics? Did the Tudeh Party
play a more significant role in determining Soviet attitudes toward Iran or were they mere
agents of the Soviets?
This intriguing relationship is crystallized through the following events. A reform
group that split from the Tudeh Party in 1948 released a communiqué in which they
stated that Tudeh’s program should be appropriate for Iran’s socioeconomic conditions
and not simply another copy of the socialist countries. The fate of the reform group was
sealed, according to Behrooz, when “the Soviets condemned it…Many who joined the
group started to desert once the Soviet position became clear. The group virtually ceased
to exist after the Soviet condemnation.”361 Similar unpopularity of the Soviets surfaced
when they abandoned the Iranian Gilan Republic and supported the Iranian government.
Such sentiment was enhanced several decades later when the Soviets refused to support
the nationalist movement led by Mosaddegh. However, diligent members did not cease to
protect Soviet foreign policy. Tabari, a prominent and fleeing member of the Tudeh Party
at the time, published an article in the party journal suggesting that all governments had a
sphere of influence in Iran, including the Soviets. He claimed that “If the American
government, as we mentioned, is after spheres of influence, and is interested in being
strongly engaged in the post-war politics and wants its companies to explore the
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Baluchestan oilfields, then it is quite natural that our northern neighbor, in its
international interest, do the same.”362
Many believed the 1953 coup that brought the Shah back into power could have
failed had the Tudeh Party resisted. Behrooz quoting Jazani on the 1953 coup stated:
The August 19th onslaught could have become a turning point for intensifying the
struggle and for the passing of the movement from a political phase to a military
one. Had the head the Tudeh Party, with its inadequate forces, chosen to resist
between August 17th and 22nd, [they] might have been able to defeat the coup.
This resistance could have become the beginning of a revolutionary movement for
mobilizing and arming masses for a people’s war against the enemy.363
While the Soviets were condemning those who split from the Tudeh party, other
conflicts were broiling. The Tudeh Party’s support for the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet
dispute and other disagreements caused yet another split. The Revolutionary
Organization of the Tudeh Party of Iran split from the Tudeh Party and defended China’s
position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This group was against Khrushchev’s deStalinization and the Soviet Communist Party’s peaceful co-existence thesis.
A contributing factor in a popular criticism of the Soviets, and thus Marxism and
communism, was the relationship between the Soviets and the Shah’s regime. This led to
the proposal for an armed struggle, which increased in the 1970s. Jazani comments on
this relationship:
In this new situation, the Soviets gave their support to the land reform program.
Soon after, the economic relations between the two countries [the Soviet Union
and Iran] expanded greatly…meaning that right at a time when the regime was
repressing the people and strengthening the dictatorship, a honeymoon between
Iran and the Soviets was starting. This development proved, once more, that the
Iranian revolutionary movement must take an independent path, vis-à-vis Soviet
politics or any other foreign powers, and rely on the power of the people. [This is
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so] since the Soviets and other powers and world movements have ignored the
interests of our movement and have coordinated their relations with Iran
according to their own interests.364
While the Tudeh Party reported to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it was the
Soviets that made the final decisions. And it was the Tudeh Party that took directives
from the Soviets during most of its activities in Iran. For the Iranian masses, the Soviet
Union and the Tudeh Party represented Marxism and communism.
The Tudeh Party was one of the major organizations that converted to political
Islam and accepted an Islamic Republic as a legitimate political alternative. They
defended Islam and the Islamic government until they became the victims of political
persecutions and widespread suppression. In the eyes of Iranians, however, the
relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic Republic regime was imbued with
skepticism, and the Tudeh Party’s defense of political Islam was constantly criticized by
many other Marxist groups.

The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (OIPFG)
Among the new Marxist theoreticians was Masoud Ahmadzadeh. In his book,
Armed Struggle: Both Strategy and Tactic, he wrote:
To defeat reactionaries, we need to mobilize peasants into the struggle. The only
way to defeat reaction is to defeat the reactionary army and to build the people’s
army in a protracted guerilla war. And guerilla war is not only necessary as a
military strategy in order to defeat the conventional army but also as a political
strategy in order to mobilize the masses. …This is the lesson we learned not only
from Cuban but Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary wars. Can anyone claim
that Chinese masses were conscious before [their revolutionary war] that they had
realized the necessity of armed struggle?365
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This new generation of Marxists seemed to be more confident, more daring, and
ready to become martyrs at any given point. Many members of the Mojahedin and
Fadaeean carried cyanide under their tongues, ready to be broken in case they were
captured. They were independent, not expecting help from any foreign powers. They
strongly criticized the Tudeh Party and ridiculed its conciliatory policies toward the Shah.
Nothing short of an armed struggle was acceptable in the face of the Shah’s despotism.
As Ahmadzadeh reminded the young revolutionaries in his book:
How can we set the foundations of a movement, the path through which the
masses will realize their own interests, realize their invincibility and enormous
power, and be drawn into the struggle? How can we penetrate the large dam
[barrier] of suppression that has made progressive leadership useless, [that has
reinforced] the regime’s propaganda against intellectuals and people, that has
caused a rift between the necessity of a struggle and struggle itself, and [how do
we] guarantee the release of the vast flood of the masses? The only way is armed
action.366
Further, it was not only the new generation Marxists who questioned the old
Tudeh Party and its conciliatory policies toward the Shah. Muslim revolutionary forces as
well no longer found mere words of clerics or the National Front to be effective in the
face of the Shah’s repressive military and secret police. Bazargan predicted the proximity
of the coming radical movement: “We are the last to politically struggle in accordance
with the constitution [the law]. We expect the head of this court to convey this point to
his superiors.”367
Muslim organizations, specifically the Mojahedin, proved Bazargan right. Their
armed struggle, which began in the early 1970s following the Marxist organizations, was
366

Ahmadzadeh, p. 79

367

Nejati, p. 373

179

much more radical and by no means constitutional or legal compared to those in the past.
One could say that both new generation Marxists and Muslims had moved away from
their traditional movements. New Marxists criticized and distanced themselves from the
Soviets and their local branch, Tudeh, while new Muslims criticized and separated
themselves from the clerics and other Muslim groups.
The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e chereekha-ye
fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran) was founded in 1971 by the joining of two groups whose
activities went back to the 1960s. The first group was established in the summer of 1966
at Tehran University with the help of six students;368 it was later called Jazani Group.369
Its members studied techniques of armed struggle for a year. In 1967, due to the
penetration of an informer, a former Tudeh party member who was working for the
SAVAK, most members except two were arrested. Farahani and Ashtiani were able to
flee to Lebanon, where they received some training at PLO camps. Farahani returned to
Iran in 1969 and was able to locate three other members. After finding revolutionary
conditions ripe in Iran, he returned there in 1970 with the necessary arms. The newly
formed group took on two important tasks at this time. First they started a long study of
rural areas in the Northern provinces; second they established contact with another
Marxist group that was also working toward an armed action against the regime.
This second group had also started reading Marxist works from different parts of the
world. They were especially interested in the Algerian, Cuban, and Chinese revolutions,
plus the Vietnam War and the Vietcong armed struggle. Masoud Ahmadzadeh and Amir
Parviz Pouyan were the group’s main organizers and theorists. They had written books on
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how an armed struggle could bring about a strategic and long-term revolution to the
country. They were both born and raised in the Muslim holy city of Mashad.
Ahmadzadeh’s father, a well-known religious man, was among the intellectuals of
Mashad who organized meetings and protests against the Shah. He ardently defended
Mosaddegh and his nationalist ideas, and became even more active in political
movements after the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh’s government. When the Shah was
put back in power through the CIA’s covert actions,370 Ahmadzadeh’s family announced
their solidarity with both the Liberation Movement (Nehzat-e-Azadi) and the Resistance
Movement (nehzat-e-moghavemat), both of which were inclined towards Islam.
When Masoud Ahmadzadeh was in high school in Mashad, he organized the Society of
Islamic Students, which announced its solidarity with the National Front. At eighteen, he
started his university education in Tehran. During his second year in university in 1967,
he, along with several other students, initiated a new underground organization with
Marxist inclinations. They began their study sessions on revolutionary writings of Latin
America, studying Regis Debray, a French leftist who wrote on the Cuban revolution,371
and Carlos Marighella, who wrote, Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla.372 They also
studied Che Guevara, the Argentine revolutionary. In 1970 Ahmadzadeh, as the main
theorist of the Fadaeean, wrote his book on the necessities of an armed struggle, Armed
Struggle, both Strategy and Tactic.

370

Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men…

371

Regis Debray. 1967. Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin
America. Translated by Bobbye Ortiz. NY: MR Press.
372

Carlos Marighella. 1985. For the Liberation of Brazil. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

181

Amir Parviz Pouyan, who was Ahmadzadeh’s close friend, also joined his group in
Tehran while he was attending another university. He too was originally active in Islamic
societies. He later developed Marxist tendencies and joined Ahmadzadeh’s group. He
defended the Cuban revolution and Latin American revolutionaries. He developed a
belief in armed struggle and felt that a revolutionary’s first duty is to fight selflessly
without the fear of losing his life. In his book, The Necessity of Armed Struggle and
Refutation of Theory of Survival, he reiterated this idea. In it, he fundamentally dispensed
with the notion of preserving the lives of leading figures in a revolutionary
organization.373 He therefore laid out the idea of martyrdom as a guarantee to the survival
of a revolutionary line. Although other Marxists believed and practiced martyrdom
during their revolutionary lives before, Pouyan, was the first to put the phenomenon in
theoretical-ideological perspective. It was not merely giving one’s life for the cause;
rather, doing so would:
a) Demonstrate vulnerability of the Shah’s regime
b) Impact the population who believed in the “two absolutes”374 with entirely
different effects compared to merely legal and political activity
c) Prove an irrevocable path of struggle of the Marxist guerillas
d) Encourage the masses to participate in a struggle that essentially belongs
to them
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The Marxist formulation of martyrdom put a more rational and political cloak on
the phenomenon. The concept of sacrificing one’s life for the cause, nonetheless,
remained consistent as the theological concept of martyrdom in Islam. Consequences of
martyrdom and what it would achieve were different, but the necessity of giving life for
the cause remained the same.
Consisting mostly of university students, the two groups established contact and
set the foundation for one of Iran’s largest Marxist organizations. This group, with its
strict belief in armed struggle, began its practice of revolutionary theory in 1970. In the
fall of that year, one of the groups affiliated with Ahmadzadeh and his friends robbed a
bank in a populated area of Tehran (Vanak) and got away with 1,600,000 rials (close to
$23,000). The money allowed the two groups, Ahmadzadeh and Jazani, to support a
coalition formed to conduct the first armed attack on the Shah’s regime.
A third group, led by Farahani, began an exploration of the Iran’s Northern provinces
(Gilan and Mazandaran). After a six-month study of the region, including both forests
and mountains, they announced a tentative date to begin their attack. A total of 33
guerillas were to form both rural and urban forces. According to their theory, the rural
team could survive only if supported by the urban team. They split up accordingly and
began their work. Their original plan was to attack a police precinct in an area called
Siahkal, confiscate their arms and ammunition, and swiftly flee the area. They labeled the
action “armed propaganda.” It was to break what Pouyan had referred to as the two
absolutes. Theoretically, people observing such brave sacrifices by the guerillas would
consciously rid themselves of both absolutes.
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While the attack was perceived as successful by the group, since they confiscated arms
from the precinct, some complications arose. They were surrounded by the police force
in this mountainous region. With minimal food and ammunition, they were able to fight
off the military up to 29 days. Delaying their arrest for so long helped the group achieve
one of its goals. The entire population of the region learned of their political agenda.
However, contrary to their belief, that did not necessarily translate into popular sympathy
for the group. Due to lack of cooperation on the part of the rural population, many of the
guerillas were held captive until military backup arrived. Ultimately, 17 out of 33 were
arrested and later executed.

Marxist Mojahedin (Paykar) sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-e tabaghe-ye kargar
The Organization of Combat for Emancipation of the Working Class
Islamic movements, not only in Iran, but elsewhere in the Middle East, have been
able to put forth guidelines for struggle, and have led people’s struggles using an Islamic
ideology. In the case of Marxist Mojahedin, later called Paykar, Islam had apparently
fallen short of becoming a revolutionary praxis. Several factors contributed to this,
although these were never thoroughly explained by either side.
By 1974, most members of the Mojahedin were studying revolutions led
predominantly by Marxists; these included Cuba, China, Algeria, and the Vietnamese
Communist Party fighting against the U.S. military. By mid-1974, there were talks about
converging Marxist ideology with Islamic ethics. In an abrupt move, in the fall of 1975, a
published paper announced a change in the organization’s ideology. It claimed the
following:
After four years of armed struggle and two years of political and ideological
discussion, we have reached a decision that Marxism is the only true
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revolutionary philosophy. …We first thought of combining Marxism with Islam
and accepting historical determinism without dialectical materialism, but now we
know that this is impossible. …We chose Marxism because it is the true path to
liberate an oppressed working class…because Islam, due to its belief in God,
Prophecy, and Armageddon, cannot be a dynamic social force and [cannot] bring
victory and emancipate toilers and the oppressed (workers and peasants) from
oppressive structures of society, constructing a new society without oppression
and exploitation where classes do not exist. Therefore, a classless society and
refutation of all exploitation and oppression is not objectively achievable through
Islam.375
The arrest and execution of original members of the Mojahedin probably
contributed immensely to the conflict between Marxists and Muslims within the group.
Muslims, who were forced to organize themselves in a new group, were from then on
called the Muslim Mojahedin, and Marxists continued—since they were the majority—
with the same name, the Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin. Later, just before
the 1979 revolution, they were referred to as the Marxist-Leninist faction of
Mojahedin.376 During the revolution they combined forces with other Maoist
organizations and picked an entirely different name for the group. In February 1979, the
group officially changed its name to the Organization of Paykar (Combat) for the
Liberation of the Working Class, or simply Paykar, a word meaning combat or fight.
Marxist Mojahedin, not yet known as Paykar, declared its conversion to Marxism in
September 1975. In their first publication they stated:
In the beginning we thought it possible to combine Marxism and Islam and
accepted the philosophy of historical determinism without dialectical materialism.
Now we realize that this thought is impossible…we chose Marxism because it is
the correct and realistic path for the liberation of the exploited working class.377
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In a paper distributed just after the revolution, Muslim Mojahedin accused the
Marxist faction of treason, opportunism, and fratricide. They accused them of being antiIslam and anti-revolution:
There is no doubt that an opportunist betraying faction, with a leftist facade, has
dominated the Organization of the Mojahedin through an anti-revolutionary coup.
[They] have taken a position against the people’s liberation movement in favor of
Imperialism. …Its opportunistic nature, through a sick and psychopathic way
devoid of all principle and ethics, was exposed to all by their traitor leaders.378
In another paper, the Muslim Mojahedin compares the Marxist faction of holding
the same position as Shah’s regime. They mention Islam’s revolutionary nature and put
their ideas into an Islamic context.
Is it not the case that Red Shi’ism, which is the real face of Islam, has consistently
in its pure belief [of classless society] been the guideline of all of the oppressed
on earth (verse 5, Ghassass [of the Koran]), and has it not inspired them [the
oppressed] to ‘wait’ for this period? Now if we truly and steadfastly believe in our
cause, we should have no fear of labels such as ‘confused’ or an Aryamehri
[referring to the Shah’s phrase] label such as ‘Islamic Marxism.’379
The existence of a Marxist faction within the Mojahedin, and its sudden
secession, was not a complete surprise. Since1973, ample political discussions had been
taking place within the group.380 According to Nejati, since no conclusions were reached,
most members decided to treat this faction with a consensual silence.381 Ironically, many
of those who joined the Marxist faction were quite religious and had pious family
backgrounds. Therefore, the split between the Marxists and Muslims within the
Mojahedin also caused splits within families. Husbands and wives, brothers and sisters,
and fathers and sons took sides against each other for either Marxism or Islam.
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Paykar, which had its own peculiar strand of Marxism, continuously vacillated between
Marxism and Islam. Its main ideological mentor was Enver Hoxha, leader of the
Communist Party of Albania. This group rejected both the Soviet type and the Chinese
variety of Marxism. According to Behrooz:
Post-Mao reforms in China [were] extremely hostile to both Soviet Union and
China. Although they considered the United States the main enemy of the
revolutionary movement in Iran, they called the Soviet Union a socialistimperialist power, the Tudeh a Soviet fifth column, and considered the Soviet
threat imminent.382
Paykar, despite its many leftist positions, in fact became more conciliatory toward the
new government of the Islamic Republic. It participated in elections for the council of
experts (males-e khobregan), which designed the Islamic constitution. By 1982, however,
the organization had dismantled. Many of its leaders were arrested and later executed by
the Islamic Republic. The most severe setback occurred when two of its leaders, Rohani
and Sepasi, were arrested. While Sepasi died under arrest, Rohani cooperated with the
Islamic Republic until his execution in the mid-1980s.383
In hindsight, several reasons may account for this duality and the subsequent split
within the Mojahedin. First was the death of many of the original leaders. Four of the
important founding members of the Mojahedin had been killed by 1972. Badizadegan,
probably the most prolific writer in the group, was killed by the SAVAK in 1971. This
was a great blow to the articulation and creation of ideology for the group. In the same
year, 69 members were arrested, leaving the organization devoid of leadership.384 With
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the exception of Rezaee, all central committee members, a total of 11, were arrested,
removing the group’s elite. They were the ones who had generated ideas and theories for
the organization and who were the politically active members. This left the group
vulnerable to attacks from outside and inside and prepared a fertile ground for Marxist
leaders and their takeover. Secondly, the original leaders had wanted to achieve a Marxist
program, giving Marxists within the Mojahedin a reason to exist. After the attack by
Marxist guerillas in Siahkal in the winter of 1971, entirely new conditions prevailed
within Iran’s left for any group serious in its opposition. Influenced by Siahkal, the
Mojahedin, denouncing the Shah, felt compelled to take action that was equally, if not
more, impressive. Parallel with their actions, Marxist ideas were also implemented to
create an acceptable revolutionary program. Precedents for acceptability of this program
had already been set by the actions of Siahkal. Anything short of that would seem
insufficiently revolutionary. Siahkal forced the Mojahedin to hasten their armed
activities.385 According to Mojahedin’s publication, Siahkal had mobilized the
organization so that Fadaeean would not think they are the only vanguard of
revolution.386
Another important factor was the opposition led by Marxists in the Middle
Eastern countries, and more generally in the Third World. Revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam,
China, and revolutionary movements in Latin America, especially those of urban guerilla
movements such as the Tupa Maru in Uruguay, were mostly Marxist and rarely religious
at the time. Consequently, prevalent ideas of resistance moved forward mostly through
Marxist theories of revolution. This also contributed to huge volumes of available
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literature generated by the world’s Marxists. Even Shariati, who was educated in France,
was influenced by thoughts of Sartre and Fanon. In this period, Islamic revolutionary
literature, particularly literature of armed struggle, was rare – almost nonexistent. If
revolutionary Islamic theory was to be taken seriously, it had to be originally produced
by these groups themselves. This may explain why the Muslim sector of the Mojahedin
was not as well equipped to conduct coherent discourse with the Marxist faction. Classics
of Islam, such as the Koran, Hadith, and even Shariati’s work were not sufficient to
delineate strategies for revolution or tactics of armed struggle.
As shown in this chapter, three major Marxist groups in Iran were in some way
affiliated with Islam and the Islamic movement. Islam could be found in their family
backgrounds with fathers and grandfathers as clergy, such as Kianuri and Tabari. Or they
came from a specific Islamic organization, as in the case of the Fadaee Guerillas. With
Paykar, they were Muslims who turned Marxist, having split from the Mojahedin, a
major Muslim organization.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
Most decisively in the confrontation between the Marxists and the Islamist leadership of
the revolution, the Marxists were utterly out-maneuvered by the Islamists on two issues,
radicalism and anti-imperialism
Maziar Behrooz
Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, political movements in the Middle East
were organized against the western oppressors. Nationalism was the leading just cause
connecting all those who opposed the local despots and their western supporters.
Nationalist movements in the Middle East utilized secularism, Marxism, and socialism in
their political struggles. Among these individuals and groups were Muslims; nonetheless,
their nationalist zeal was organized through secular, socialist, and Marxist thought. The
National Front in Iran, the Ba’athist Party in Iraq and Syria, Kamal Abdul Nassser in
Egypt, several groups within the PLO in Palestine, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan
in both Iran and Iraq exemplified the influence of Marxist thought in the Middle East. In
Iran for much of this period, Muslims, e.g., Mojahedin, Dr. Shariati, the National Front,
and the Liberation Movement, borrowed from Marxist ideas to propagate their political
agenda. It was quite different for Iranian Marxists however. On the surface they did not
borrow from Islam, but deep within their version of Iranian Marxism strong Islamic
values were found.
Iranian Marxists looked toward the overthrow of the Shah’s regime and
establishment of an independent social democratic state – a state that was at the same
time anti-imperialist. Muslims too thought of the Shah as an American lackey and were
looking for an independent, anti-imperialist state. The Shah’s disdain toward the people
would explain the reason that Muslims and Marxists found common grounds for
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solidarity based on short-term political goals. Through this solidarity they were able to
achieve their political goal and overthrow the Shah’s regime. The outcome, however,
demonstrated the dominance of Islam and Islamic thought among Iranians.
The Shah’s modernization unlike the modernized European model which resulted
in the building of a strong infrastructure was more of an empty shell. His regime’s
modernization process was forced on Iranians from the top down and contained no real
infrastructure. Productive forces were precarious, sporadic and irregular; they were
almost absent in terms of creating any meaningful social force. Infrastructure was not
built, and not even a solid capitalist class was formed. There were no modern private
capitalist and petite bourgeois social structures. The social relations that had been
implanted from above proved not to be viable. The Shah’s White Revolution, which
supposedly gave land to the peasants, forced a significant number of them off their land
and into the cities looking for work. Unlike in some Latin American countries, the state
did not act to build a viable infrastructure. The peasant migrants were not able to find
jobs in the cities and therefore became marginalized. These marginalized people were
disconnected from their class and were not able to forge new social bonds. Their way of
life was uncertain, to say the least.
The first-generation urban migrants became the main opposition force who gave
their fundamental and unconditional support to an Islamic authority. They transferred
their long-established belief system of Islam, with its patriarchal and traditional values,
into the cities, creating the basis for one of the strongest Islamic mass movements in the
Middle East. This created a fertile ground and the seeds of a revolution. In a peculiar
way, the Shah helped build the same social force that would years later produce his
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overthrow. For most Iranians, salvation came with Islam. Mosques became the only place
where it was possible to criticize the Shah’s regime. Although Marxists fought hard, they
were not able to create the social bonds in their organizational efforts or even in their
vernacular to make the necessary connection to the masses. The Shah’s simulated
modernization (development) did not get rid of religion; rather it strengthened Islamic
ideas and values. The significance and prestige of Islam in the process of feigned
modernization was increased, not diminished.
Marxists in Iran did not criticize the religiosity of the masses and religious leaders
because they held the same values. This revolution was not a criticism of the past; it was
to welcome the past. It left almost no room for criticism of the traditions and the illusions
created by religion. To be sure, Marxists were thinking of ways to interact with the
masses through more religion, not less.
The resentment toward the United States, Britain, and the local despot created a
common denominator to organize a resistance movement that eventually led to the 1979
revolution. Even though non-Islamic groups – Marxists and seculars – actively
participated, the revolution was dubbed an ‘Islamic Revolution.’ Islamic beliefs and
understandings prevailed in most realms of politics and in the culture of the opposition.
As Esposito puts it:
Shi’a Islam proved that it is a most deep-rooted and everlasting tool to mobilize
an effective mass movement and that it is able to create the meaning for identity
and history, common values and beliefs for a strong political-religious leadership.
Shi’a Islam offered an ideological framework through which it gave meaning and
legitimization to the movement of repressed and the oppressed against any
reactionary force, such that many diverse groups were able to join in and become
active. Clerics like Khomeini, Mottahari, Taleghani, and Beheshti, in collusion
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with non-cleric ideologies like Bazargan and Shariati, were able to establish
revolutionary and reformist ideologies.387
Esposito does not mention Marxist groups in the above quotation. Was it because they
blended in so well, or because they did not significantly contribute to the revolution?
Iranian Marxists were organized into several groups and were influential in
shaping the Iranian political discourse, especially in the 1970s; they became one of the
most serious forces within the opposition. There were more Marxists killed in armed
conflict, torture and execution than any other group.388 In the opposition against the Shah,
they played a major role in all aspects of creating an ideology, organization, and
mobilization of the masses. Although they were not monolithic by any means, they held
many beliefs in common with each other and also with Muslim opposition groups.
Despite all of their contributions to the movement, however, Marxists were never
thoroughly accepted by the Iranian masses as a force that could fulfill the ethics and
belief systems of the Iranian culture. Marxists found themselves accepting the Islamic
ethics and beliefs as an unchangeable social fact. They had major theoretical differences
with the Muslims, yet unknowingly held many common beliefs. They converged with the
Muslims contrary to their Marxist beliefs, actually becoming Muslims. This research has
shown that in many ways, Iranian Marxists never abandoned their Islamic beliefs, but
accepted Marxism merely on theoretical grounds. Marxists’ use of Islamic beliefs and
values was two-fold: contextual and ideological. Contextual Islam includes the way
social relationships are concretized through socialization processes e.g., education,
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family, mosque, religious rituals, etc. Ideological Islam includes accepting Islamic ideas,
and social and political analysis, as ideal.

An Examination of Contextual Islam through Sociology of Knowledge
Contextual Islam, for the Iranian masses, for Marxists, and even the ruling class
including the Shah is intersubjective, internalized so deeply it becomes the way of life. It
is what Iranians have internalized to be subjective tool to analyze the world around them.
The sociology of knowledge as a methodology can be used to dissect and demonstrate the
ubiquity and intensity of Islamic belief. It reveals the origins of Marxism and its
immersion in Islam from the conception of this school of thought. Marxism in Iran has
been influenced by Islam dating back to 1920. Once the trajectory of the Marxist
movement is examined, its modes of thought are understood as a part of the history of
Iranian opposition. The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge in examining
contextual Islam is that there are modes of thought that cannot be sufficiently understood
as long as their social origins are not clear. It was indeed true that Marxist organizations
were theorizing on the sociopolitical conditions in Iran without realizing that they were
living amidst those sociopolitical conditions. There was no such metaphysical entity as a
social mind, which thought over and above the heads of these organizations, or whose
ideas the group merely reproduced. According to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge
seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of a historical-social situation. Not
many original ideas emerge outside of this history. Thus, it was not Marxist groups in
general or even isolated individuals within these groups who did the thinking; rather it
was certain Islamic values that developed a particular style of thought in an endless series
of responses to typical situations characterizing their common position. Historically,
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responses to these typical situations were set forth by Muslims and were outside the
Marxist discourse. However, it is incorrect to say that Iranian Marxists were not a product
of their historical social conditioning. Rather, it is more correct to insist that they
participated in thinking beyond what others had thought before them. Every group,
whether Marxist or Muslim, was therefore in a dual sense predetermined by the fact of
growing within a particular society. On the one hand, they existed in ready-made
situations and on the other, they realized that in those situations there were patterns of
thought and conduct. These patterns of Islamic conduct were so strongly rooted that not
even Marxists were consciously aware of their existence.
Social conditioning through Islam involved an internalization of the Islamic ethos
even in the political realm. This also relates to Mannheim’s particular and total ideology.
It made sense for Marxists to agree on particular ideological points with Muslims,
tactically uniting to defeat the enemy. However, given the wide separation between the
two schools of thought in constructing ideal societies and the states that run them, it was
counter intuitive when they collaborated in total ideology.
Peter L. Berger’s sacred canopy further illuminates the Islamic belief and ethos in
a country such as Iran. The sacred canopy of Islam, according to Berger’s concept, was
contextual for not just the clerics and the population, but also for Marxist intellectuals.
That is, certain beliefs, in this case Islamic, became so prevalent and taken for granted
that all activities were filtered, recognized, and managed through them. In the case of
Iran, the argument is that Islamic behavior was not only reinforced by Muslims, who
were influenced through Islam directly, but by Marxists as well. For instance, while
Marxists had formed their political positions using general guidelines of secular political
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Marxism, they were not able to shed the Islamic belief in martyrdom. Islamic belief in
martyrdom became the canopy that hovered over all thought and all activity. Voluntarily
sacrificing one’s life for an ultimate cause was a precondition of achieving a better
society in both Muslim and Marxist thinking. For most Marxists, as depicted in their
literature, martyrdom was a unit through which the authenticity of a revolutionary was
measured. It guaranteed the movement’s future success.
Generally, and consistent with Berger’s notion of a sacred canopy, Islam created
meaning. It was what told people how to behave and presented a world view that had
answers for all human problems.389 Islam became an organizing linchpin with a network
of clergy. Through Islam they were able to resist and oppose inside and outside
oppressors, to mobilize people, and to start revolutions.

Ideological Islam
In addition to the contextual Islamic belief, which was a part of life and political
struggle for Marxists, there was also an ideological aspect to Marxists becoming
Muslims. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the Tudeh Party and Majority Fadaeean were
among those who deliberately used ideological Islam to achieve two objectives: the first
was to get close to the masses, who mostly understood politics through Islamic
terminology and ethics; the second was to get close to the newly established Islamic
government. Alliance with the Islamic Republic guaranteed safety from persecution in
addition to affiliation with political power.
Marxists borrowed Islamic ideology to theorize the nature of the economy and
politics of the enemy. Islamic beliefs were borrowed to organize the masses of people
389
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and certainly to mobilize members and supporters. Without this ideological borrowing,
Marxists would not have been able to create a discourse for their particular movement.
There are quite a few contrary views on this matter. Given the extant Islamic culture and
political activity of the Muslims, Skocpol claims that modern revolutionary parties,
including the Mojahedin and Fadaeean, had nothing to do with revolution making. She
believes that revolution was made through Islamic culture.390 Skocpol’s statements are
true in relation to the days of the revolution, but not quite precise on the years leading up
to the revolution. According to Nejati, the Mojahedin and Fadaeean fought against a
regime that had suppressed all means of struggle. They “turned repressed conditions and
hopelessness into hopefulness. They created a new political atmosphere and selflessly
gave their lives where it was required. They created new values and new meaning, and
cleared the path for revolution.”391
As the revolution was occurring, Muslims were able to create avenues for the
Iranian people to participate and join the revolutionary groups. However, since the early
1970s, it was the Fadaee and Mojahedin guerillas that did most of the damage to the
Shah’s regime. There is quite a difference between what Skocpol and Nejati claim about
the revolution. It is explicable however, if we understand Nejati’s observation as relating
to the seven years before the revolution and what led up to it, and Skocpol’s as the actual
revolution itself.
Agreeing with Skocpol, John Foran’s analysis also included culture more than
secular political groups. He found the culture of resistance and its movement to be shared
among, and result from the efforts of many diverse groups. It became clear that Muslims
390
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and those who attached themselves to Islam created an ideology and a culture that
corresponded to the experience of everyday life.392
Forrest Colburn believes that revolutions have a political mind of their own, that
they are not the consequences of particular economic conditions. Revolutions occur
despite the economic background. Therefore there is a separation between economic
development and political actors, especially those who lead revolutions. He claims that:
“there is a tense mutuality between revolutionaries and the societies that created them;
neither one can be deduced from the other. Economic history does not determine political
history.”393 Colburn’s statement about the role of the intellectuals also holds true. He
claims that the values, expectations, phraseology, iconography, and implicit rules
expressed and shaped collective intentions and behavior in the Iranian revolution. Like
other authors, he believes that Islam as a belief system, and Muslims as organizers, were
better prepared to lead the masses:
Several factors explain the success of Islam as a revolutionary force where
Marxism-Leninism had failed. The clerics in Iran had a wider and more effective
organizational base than the Marxists from which to mobilize popular opposition
to the Shah. And Islam had a resonance and legitimacy with the entire population
that Marxism-Leninism could only aspire to have. Finally, the moral authority of
Islam protected the clerics from the kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier
by secular organizations.394
Skocpol, Foran and Colburn have touched upon some social facts that are usually
overlooked by researchers and social scientists who wrote about the Iranian revolution.
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Although they neglect the role of Marxism and Marxists before the revolution, they
concisely analyze the power of Islam and Muslims.

Developing Common Terminology
This research found concrete and historically sound common denominators and
forces that converted Marxists into Islam. Although at many points of the Iranian
opposition movement it may appear a mere convergence of ideas and that each converged
as much as the other, it was Islam that prevailed. The contextual Islamic belief system
disavowed the serious penetration of Marxian thought in Iran, yet they agreed on many
points. Four factors facilitated Marxists convergence with Islam:
1.
2.
3.
4.

An anti-despotism ideology (movement) against the Shah
Anti-Imperialism, beginning with Britain and later against the United States
A race to demonstrate the abilities of an authentic revolutionary
The sacred canopy of Islamic ethics, especially that of martyrdom; the concept of
Fadaee perceived as an inevitable method of struggle
Due to these factors, common organizing tactics and political terminology

emerged. Nationalists, Muslim clerics, and Marxists used the same language. Beginning
in the 1960s, Khomeini, as one of the main opponents of the Shah’s White Revolution,
linked a few political issues to add to the significance of resistance. He was able to
concentrate an amalgam of issues into one overarching problem induced by the Shah’s
regime. It included women’s right to vote (he argued that they should not have the right),
land reform, and the Shah’s close and unholy alliance with the United States, Israel, and
international corporations. He posed this concoction as a grave threat against Islam and
the lives of Muslims in an independent Iran. He mentioned the U.S. as the main enemy of
Islam in all his speeches. The real nature of the U.S., according to Khomeini, was
noticeable in America’s foreign policy in the Middle East – supporting Israel and
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exerting influence in Iran. In a speech against both the Shah and the United States, he
stated:
The government of Iran has sold our independence, put us among the colonized
countries and labeled Muslims inferior to animals. …If clerics had anything to do
with it, they would not allow Iranians to be enslaved by England and the United
States. If it were up to the clerics, they would not allow Israel to control Iran’s
economy so that Israeli goods would be sold without tariffs. …Should we be
under American boots because we are a weak people, because we do not have
dollars? The United States is worse than England, England is worse than the
United States, and the Soviet Union is worse than both…Today we have to deal
with the United States.395
Such antagonism in terminology was not only used by the clerics. Many leftleaning nationalists also had the same criticism of the West. Jalal Ale-Ahmad, a Marxist
and former member of the Tudeh Party, warned Iranians of Westoxication (infected,
poisoned, and intoxicated by the west):
Westoxication, I say, is like being infected by cholera, or at least like putrefaction.
Have you seen how it rots wheat? It is from the inside; the peel is still there but
nothing remains inside. Just like the shell that’s left by the butterfly on the
tree…and now under this banner, we remain an alienated tribe, [we are] alienated
in our own clothes, our own homes, our own food, our literature, our journalism
and most dangerously in our culture. We are developing Western-like [farangeemoab] and Western-like we look for solutions to our problems.396
There were also Muslim intellectuals who mentioned the U.S. and the west in
general as the real cause behind all social and economic ills in Iran. Doctor Ali Shariati
attacked the west and used the same word, ‘Westoxication,’ in his writings: “Let us,
comrades, dispose of Europe, let us end the nauseating imitation of Europe, and let us
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betray Europe which speaks of humanity everywhere by suppressing human beings
wherever it goes.”397
For all those in the opposition, the idea of western culture meant a corruption of
Iranian and Muslim culture. Anti-west language and terminology was found in literature
written by Marxists, Muslims and nationalists. The notion of the west lurking to invade
Iran and Iranian culture created a common cause, which required collective ideas to
foment action. It forced members of the opposition, as far apart as they may have seemed
ideologically, to look for common grounds to oppose and overthrow the Shah. The
following is an example of such amalgamation of forces. It involves Islamic clerics, a
Marxist-Muslim group, and Marxist groups. Hojjat-ol eslam Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani,398 recalled how he originally met the Mojahedin in prison. It was the
Mojahedin who told Rafsanjani about the Marxists and Marxism.
They [Mojahedin] told me we have a common goal [with the Marxists]. We must
be united and share all [capabilities organizing for the revolution]…but we
[clerics] did not accept. One of their theorists gave a short analysis of the
revolution that, we [Mojahedin] learned the science of struggle from the Marxists
and without them victory is not possible. On the other hand in the Iranian society
one cannot fight without emphasizing Islam. Therefore, we need to construct a
bridge between Marxism and Islam, so we can have both the science of struggle
and its foundation which is religion. [they came up with an] analysis of religion
which found no contradiction with Marxism, and they kept repeating the same
methodology that there must be a fusion between Marxism and Islam.399
Although Rafsanjani himself was never fond of Marxism, Marxists, or any leftleaning political ideology, he recalled the proximity of Marxists and Muslims insisted
upon by the Mojahedin. Furthermore, it is important to note that he was willing to meet
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with the Mojahedin to discuss solidarity with the Marxists. The Mojahedin saw Marxists
as their close allies not so much because of their philosophy, but rather due to the
common goal for which they were both striving. Iranian national independence was what
drew the two schools of thought together.

Theoretical Implications of this Dissertation
An interesting concept to explore as the aftermath of the Iranian revolution is the
state-centered theory of revolution put forth by Jeff Goodwin.400 Goodwin argues that
states largely construct the revolutionary movements that challenge and sometimes
overthrow them. The success of the revolution will depend on how much resistance the
state puts up against the opposition and how suppressive state institutions are used to put
out the flames of mass uprisings. In other words, there could be no modern revolution
before there were states; nor could there be revolutions if and when the international state
system is replaced by some other mode of governance.401 Part of what made the
revolution in Iran a success, at least in the sense of overthrowing the old regime, was the
Shah’s resistance to giving some democratic rights to the political opposition. He realized
he should have been more lenient with the use of his oppressive police force a few
months too late. Using Goodwin’s theory, one could conclude that giving some
democratic rights to the population and practicing some leniency could have prevented
the Iranian revolution from taking place, or at least reduced its magnitude.
Goodwin’s state-centered theory also works in explaining why the Islamic
Republic of Iran still remains in power. It is true that the post-revolutionary state has been
400
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far more oppressive against its opposition than the Shah. For the past 28 years, Iranians
have endured worse economic conditions and certainly more political repression than
during the entire time the Pahlavi dynasty remained in power. Yet the Islamic
government remains in power despite its opposition. What the Islamic regime has done
successfully, in contrast to the Shah, is consider reform at the right moment. In the face
of mass opposition, the Islamic Republic has stepped back and succumbed to some
demands of the opposition. The process of presidential elections is an example of such
conciliation. Were the Islamic government to suppress current social movements for
reform, as the Shah had done, it would have surely fomented another social revolution in
Iran. The post-revolutionary state has learned that suppressing movements at the wrong
moment will bring about mass uprisings. In the past decade, the idea of Iranians voting
for the president through so-called free elections is one example of such conciliation with
mass political movements, albeit unorganized. Surely it seems a political paradox for a
despotic regime to claim free elections of any kind.

The Subordination of Class Struggle
There is an irony in Marxists becoming Muslims. Marxists who accepted Islam
ideologically did not foresee their shaky position in the new Islamic government. They
anticipated secure positions of power within the state apparatus. However, they were
disconnected from the Islamic government within two years after the revolution. Once
the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, it proceeded to de-legitimize any type of
opposition. All aspects of struggle were labeled as anti-Islam and anti-revolution when
waged against the interests of the new state leadership. The clerics promoted an
ideological polarization in the state system. Pitting Islam and revolution against all other
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ideas as anti-revolution they justified nation-wide repression. At this point, any signs of
class struggle would bring about severe punitive consequences.
According to Giovanni Arrighi, et al, once national independence is attained, the
use of this ideological separation means a further narrowing of the legitimacy of the class
struggle in the new national government.402
This tendency has two quite distinct roots. On the one hand we have regimes that
have attempted to consolidate their power through an alliance with the political
and economic elites of core zones. In this case, the class struggle was delegitimized as part of the political exchange between core and peripheral elites,
whereby the former respect/protect the formal sovereignty of the latter in
exchange for the latter’s creation within their national boundaries of an
environment favorable to core capital. On the other hand, we have regimes that
have the opposite route of struggle against core elites.403
In Iran, once revolution had reached its objectives of ousting the Shah and
America, class struggle was no longer permitted. The Islamic regime branded all those
who continued to struggle for nationalist, gender, class, or political rights, ‘antirevolution,’ and ‘anti-Islamic.’ Consequently, the class struggle within the country was
de-legitimized as an obstacle to the former struggle of anti-imperialism, which was itself
defined as class struggle at a higher level.
Before the revolution, a moral authority of Islam protected the clerics from the
kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier by secular organizations.404 The ubiquitous
presence of Islamic belief within the population notwithstanding, there were a few events
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that also worked to the advantage of the Islamic Republic. The hostage taking and the
war against Iraq helped stabilize an unstable nascent government.
According to Colburn, “The invasion of Iran by Iraq in September 1980 further
strengthened the clerics and undermined the radicals [opposition]. Iranians were asked to
join the revolutionary guards and the army to defend the ‘Islamic homeland.’”405 Had the
Marxists been better prepared by forming their own coalition among working classes
would the Islamic Republic of Iran still have remained immune from scrutiny?
A comparison of the information available on the social background of the Iranian
Marxist groups shows a disconnection between these groups and the working masses.
Such disconnection has been a historical problem persisting for decades; it was true
before and certainly after the revolution. They were most successful when they were able
to organize non-working masses such as intellectuals and professionals. Iranian Marxists,
those who supported armed struggle and those who did not, never managed to establish a
firm base among the masses – petite bourgeois, working class or the peasantry. The
appeal of Marxism seems to have been limited to the educated, the new middle class, and
especially students. While Muslims were able to connect and recruit their members and
supporters from the Iranian masses and the poor, Iranian Marxists failed to link up with
the main classes of people who could understand their ideology and bring about social
change.406
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Discussion
It was not the collapse of the Soviets that made social movements look for an
alternative ideology because that collapse did not occur until the late 1980s and early
1990s. The Iranian revolution, and consequentially the establishment of the Islamic
Republic government, played a major role in using Islam as a viable revolutionary
alternative in the Middle East. For 28 years the Iranian revolution has been called the
Islamic revolution. Under this title, it has used Islam to defy the west and western culture,
making the Islamic alternative viable. Under the current political conditions in the Middle
East, many believe in Islamic revolutions as inevitable.
However, from what was evident during the 1979 revolution in Iran, one can also
question that inevitability by analyzing the specific role of Marxist organizations such as
the Tudeh Party and the Majority Fadaeean. Events would have unfolded differently had
these major Marxist groups not made Muslims their immediate allies. As Behrooz has
argued, this alliance was partially based on the Tudeh Party as an instrument of the Soviet
Union.407 While this is true, it could only qualify as an external reason behind Tudeh
Party’s conciliatory line. There were also internal reasons that the Party collaborated with
the Islamic Republic government rather than other Marxist and non-Marxist
organizations in the opposition. The Tudeh Party has had a history of conciliation and
appeasement to power when it comes to a serious struggle. That is precisely why there
have been so many splits within the party since its inception. To this day there are some
sectors of the Tudeh Party that appease the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the
Tudeh Party decided to work with the Islamic regime because it was the best way to get
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to power without bloodshed. The Tudeh Party refused to fight against the Islamic
Republic government despite its suppression during the first few years of the revolution.
The outcomes of the Iranian revolution certainly would have been different had
the majority of the Marxists not coalesced with the Islamic Republic. Yet by summer of
1981, most of the Marxist groups plus the Mojahedin were uprooted by the Islamic
Republic regime. Those who joined the Islamic Republic stayed safe, at least for another
year or so, but those who opposed the regime were suppressed. According to Behrooz:
The June 1981 crisis was essentially one which other Marxist elements had
brought about, these being on one hand the Islamic Liberals, with the Muslim
Mojahedin, and on the other the Maktabis, the IRP and state apparatus, backed by
Ayatollah Khomeini. In this battle Marxist groups which supported the Maktabis,
such as the Tudeh, joined the battle consciously. Those who opposed the
Maktabis, the majority of whom also opposed the Islamic Liberals, were simply
drawn into battle without preparation. 408
By the mid-1980s, the organized activity of most Marxists was reduced to
Kurdistan, and by the late 1980s, what little activity was conducted by Marxist groups
was suppressed by the Islamic government’s military in the region. Some of the members
were able to flee Kurdistan and the region altogether and seek refuge in European
countries. Currently their activities are limited to publications, meetings, and
demonstrations against the Islamic Republic in numerous European cities.
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to study some of the literature and
print material put forth by Marxist organizations in Iran in order to extract the
traditionally overlooked Islamic terminology and ideas. A secondary purpose was to
examine and unveil the latent contextual-cultural and the ideological-political
convergence of political Marxist organizations in Iran. This convergence reveals that as
rigid as they may seem, ideologies can be transformed to look completely different. For
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example, a trajectory of ideological convergence in Iran can be shown. Originally,
convergence began with the historical event of the Socialist Republic of Gilan. From this
period (1920), ideology was borrowed, however precariously and momentarily. The
trajectory of the Iranian opposition movement vacillated between Muslims borrowing
from Marxism and Marxists borrowing from Islam. The use of Islamic ideology,
terminology, and resistance, however, became prevalent for Marxists especially during
the months leading up to the 1979 revolution. During the revolution, a majority of
Marxists, consciously and purposefully, and with clear objectives, converged with
Islamic ideology. They viewed Islam as being in the vanguard of ideas and the most
comprehensive of revolutionary concepts. This ultimately marked the unprecedented
mixing of two highly contradictory schools of thought. What Iranian Marxists did not and
have not taken into consideration is the power and challenges of the “tripartite Islamic
complex” mentioned by Mesbahi. It was formidable, and went beyond the early
revolutionary period:
The power of this tripartite complex and the challenge facing the Marxist in the
immediate post revolutionary period could only be appreciated if one consider its
remarkable longevity way beyond its initial impact, and the fact that it has continued its
relevance three decades after the revolution, as most radical and secular forces still have
to deal with its cultural, ideological and political challenges ”409
It may be several years or even decades for seculars and Marxists to realize the
power behind Islamic culture and ideology. Iranian Marxists were both culturally and
ideologically predisposed to support the Islamic revolution. They made important
contributions to the Iranian revolutionary process. They consciously and unconsciously
modified their Marxist perspective to accommodate fundamental Islamic ideals and
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values. This gave their movement a more popular appeal making their political efforts
against the Shah’s regime more effective.
The joining of forces between the two very different belief systems of Marxism
and Islam has shown that in the face of foreign invasion of the country, in this case
foreign presence and control of the economy, historically non-allied forces would join
against the common enemy. The history of collaboration between Marxists and Muslims
in Iran points to one direction. It started as defiance against England and France, the
foreign forces who, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, had invaded Iran. The 1979
revolution similarly involved the collaboration of Marxists and Muslims for the same
sociopolitical reason, but this time against America. This lesson is pertinent and useful in
analyzing what is currently happening in Iraq.
Although 28 years have passed since the Iranian revolution, awareness about what
went wrong or right has not been completely discussed. It is of utmost importance that
analysts of revolution and Iranian intellectuals and groups pay particular attention and
analyze the past correctly—without ideological boundaries and limitations. For close to
three decades still the Islamic Republic controls political and economic power in the
country. The accommodation of Marxists to the Islamic movement is no longer an issue
and nor is it contributing in keeping the regime in power. Does this indicate a demise or a
decline in Iranian Marxism? And will Marxists and seculars be able to play a role in the
future of Iran? These are questions and issues open to future research and investigation.
The issue of Islamic belief not allowing laicization/secularization to make
significant inroads within the Iranian political movement since the revolution is important
because after 28 years the issue of the separation of religion and state is still discussed
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among Marxist and Muslim intellectuals. Such discussions are gradually beginning to
make headway within the Iranian politics. Until recently, such separation had not been
present in the Iranian political or sociological discourse. Although Islamic belief has
prevailed for decades in Iran the gradual evolution of Iranian politics connotes a new
more secular dynamic of support and opposition at work.
The 1979 revolution created an excellent opportunity for all intellectuals, Marxist
or non-Marxist, to begin a process of discussion on this historically necessary issue. I
hope that this dissertation may contribute to creating a source for those who are interested
in the Iranian revolution and its outcome, and the relation between ideology and power. It
also demonstrates the significance of Islamic belief in Iran and, more generally, in the
Middle East.
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Mashad, in the northeastern province of Khorasan, in 1933. His father had purposely
chosen life in a small town and did not much care for big city glitter. He taught Islamic
history in different small towns and villages in the same province. Choosing Khorasan to
teach Islamic history was probably not a coincidence. It was where he was born and
raised, but the other reason was a population which did not appreciate the city and its
secular living—the non-Islamic, nontraditional behaviorisms. Ali Shariati, following in
his father’s footsteps, was also interested in politics. They both participated in political
meetings and joined a group called “The Movement of Theist Socialists.” These meetings
probably played a big role in giving Shariati his first taste of socialist or Marxist
thoughts.
Sharif-emami, Ja’far
Appointed as Prime Minister by the Shah to replace Jamshid Amouzegar. He submitted
the members of his cabinet to the Shah on August 27, 1978. He assumed his position as
Prime Minister as he claimed to rid the country of corruption and creating a safe
atmosphere for the private sector to invest and produce in Iran without any perceived
danger. His government only lasted until November 6, 1978.
Shoa’ian, Mostafa
An independent Marxist who never affiliated himself with any of the Marxist
organizations in Iran. A few years older than most Marxists involved in armed struggle,
he was continuously critical of their analysis. In an effort to join them the Fadaee
guerillas initiated political discussions with him but to no avail. The discussions were
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discontinued in 1974 and continued independently. He was killed in an armed clash with
the security forces in 1975.
Tabari, Ehsanollah
He was the chief ideologue of the Tudeh Party and one of its most prolific writers until
1983. He became a devout Muslim in his later years and published books on the
superiority of Islam over Marxism. He wrote many books and pamphlets during his years
with Tudeh. He studied in East Germany and received a Ph.D. in sociology. He was
heavily involved with the party in the years of the revolution. After the Islamic Republic
began its attacks against all Marxists he was imprisoned
Taleghani, Seyyed Mahmud (Ayatollah)
He was one of the most popular, important, and radical clerics before and during the
revolution. He was not only active with Muslim clerics but also with nationalists and
some Marxists. Taleghani was one of the founders of the Liberation Movement along
with Sahabi and Bazargan. He was closely affiliated with the National Front and The
Mojahedin for many years. At one point he called the Mojahedin the true Muslims. He
was arrested by the Shah’s security forces before the uprising of 1963. He died in 1982.
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INDEX OF EVENTS
The following chronology is between 1920 and 1983, the period depicted in this
dissertation. By 1983, most Marxist organizations in Iran were either destroyed by the
Islamic Republic or surviving members had fled to Europe or the United States. Sources
used for the chronology of events are:
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988).
Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1999).
Gholam Reza Nejati, Tarikh-e bist va panj sale-ye Iran (The Twenty Five Year History
of Iran), 2 vols (Tehran: Rasa Cultural Institute, 1992).
Kennth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New
York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004).

1916
The development of the Jangal Movement
1920
June: The first Communist Party of Iran was established.
December: A movement known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” had begun.
26 February: After a military coup, a new government was established. The Soviets
signed an agreement with the Iranian government to ensure their pulling out of
Iran only if the British would do the same.
6 May: The Communist Party of Iran continued in collusion with Kuchak-Khan.
June: Mirza Kuchik-Khan had gathered up to 8,000 troops, among them 5,000 Soviet
soldiers.
July: The Soviets had decided to take their troops out of Iran.
By 1926, the Communist Party regrouped and revised its view on Reza Shah to be an
obstacle to progress. They claimed that the only way to fight against his
government was to organize workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie
In contact with 52 others, they were all arrested on charges of illegal communist activity
in 1931.
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Reza Shah, by passing an amendment through the parliament in 1931, made all
communist activity and literature illegal.
Articles under titles like “Historical Materialism,” “Science and Elements of Material,”
“Meaning of Human Materialism,” “Women and Materialism,” and “Material
Basis of Life and Thought” may have been too dense for even university students.
His problems came not with his theoretical writing but rather with a flyer he wrote
in 1937, on May 1st, International Workers Day, and distributed on university
campuses.
1941
October: The Tudeh Party of Iran was established.
1942
An affiliate of the Tudeh Party, The Central Union of Worker’s Councils was established.
1944
Election of Tudeh members to the fourteenth Majles.
The first congress of the Tudeh Party.
Reza Shah died in exile.
1945
The Azarbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) was established.
The ADP declared an autonomous government in Azarbaijan
1946
The Islamic Fadaeean was established by Navvab Safavi
The Soviet Army withdrew from Iran
1948
The first major split in the Tudeh Party.
1949
An assassination attempt on the Shah’s life.
Tudeh Party was declared illegal.
Mosaddegh and his friends established the National Front.
1951
Razmara assassinated by Islamic Fadaeean.
Oil nationalization day.
Mossadegh became Prime Minister.
Toilers Party of Iran was established.
1952
Mossadegh resigned as Prime Minister
Under social pressure and mass protests a few days later, the Shah appoints Mossadegh
as Prime Minister again. Mossadegh broke political relations with Britain.
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1953
First coup attempt against Mossadegh failed.
Three days later (August 19) the second coup attempt organized by the CIA and MI-6
was successful, and Mossadegh’s government was overthrown.
12 November: First mass demonstrations against the coup (in November).
7 December: University students demonstrated against Nixon’s trip to Iran. Three
students, Ghandchi, Bozorgnia, and Shariat-razavi were shot and killed by the Shah’s
military. This day is commemorated in Iran as Student’s Day.
1954
Tudeh Party’s printing facilities are confiscated.
First group of Tudeh military officers were executed.
1956
February: Some Tudeh Party members participated in the CPSU’s twentieth congress.
The party acceded with the introduction of de-Stalinization initiated by Khrushchev.
November: Tudeh Party launches its new underground radio station from East Germany
under the name of peyk-e Iran.
1957
The Shah’s notorious secret police the SAVAK was founded with the help of CIA and
Israeli MOSAD.
1958
May: Khosrow Roozbeh, a prominent Tudeh Party member was executed. Tudeh Party
stops political activity in Iran.
1960
July: The National Front, named the Second National Front was reorganized by some
Mossadegh colleagues.
1961
The Iran Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi-e Iran) was established by Mehdi
Bazargan, Ayatollah Taleghani and others.
Ali Amini appointed Prime Minister
1962
Amini’s cabinet approved a land reform bill
The Shah declares his ‘White Revolution’.
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1963
Mass uprising began against the land reform program. The city of Qom was attacked by
the Shah’s army since the clergy were behind most of the organizing.
1964
Hasan Ali Mansur was appointed Prime Minister
Majles approved the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Capitulation Agreement.
Ayatollah Khomeini was sent to exile after attacking the capitulation rights of U.S.
personnel in Iran.
1965
January: Prime Minister Mansur was assassinated and Amir Abbas Hoveyda took over
the position. He remained Prime Minister for next 13 years.
April: Failed attempt on the Shah’s life by an affiliate of the Revolutionary Organization,
a split group from the Tudeh Party.
September: Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin was established by three main
leaders, Badizadegan, Saeed Mohsen, and Mohammad Hanifnezhad.
1967
An armed rebellion started in Iranian Kurdistan, led by Ghazi Mohammad.
March: Mossadegh died in exile.
December: Following the death of Gholamreza Takhti, a popular and internationally
known wrestler, large mass protests were organized by Marxist university students
against the Shah’s regime. It was believed that
1968
The Jazani-Zarifi group, one of the main bodies that later formed the Iranian People’s
Fadaee Guerillas, was discovered by the SAVAK.
Death of Samad Behrangi, a teacher who taught many of the revolutionaries that later
joined Marxist organizations.
1971
February: Jangal group of the Ahmadzadeh-Farahani coalition began its guerilla activity
against the Shah by attacking a police precinct in one the northern provinces in Siahkal.
April: Establishment of the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas.
The Shah’s infamous General Farsio, military prosecutor general, was assassinated by the
Fadaee guerillas.
May: Amir Parviz Pouyan, one of the founding members of the Fadaee Guerillas, along
with another member, Peiro-naziri, was killed in a clash with the Shah’s troops.
August: Iran recognizes the People’s Republic of China.
September: 69 members of the Muslim Mojahedin were arrested.
1972
March: Masood Ahmadzadeh and Abbas Meftahi, both founders of the Fadaee Guerillas,
and eight other members executed in Tehran.
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May: Nixon and Kissinger arrived in Tehran to inform the Shah that the United States is
prepared to sell Iran the conventional weapons systems it requested.
1973
The Muslim Mojahedin assassinated Louis Hawkins, an American colonel, in Tehran.
1974
The Fadaee Guerillas bombed the police precinct headquarters, assassinated one of the
wealthiest Iranians, Mohammad Sadegh Fateh-Yazdi, and Major Alinaghi Niktab, a
notorious SAVAK torturer.
1975
Fadaee Guerillas attack several police precincts across the country.
The Shah declares the Rastakhiz party the only legal political party in Iran.
Fadaee Guerillas assassinated Captain Yadollah Noruzi, head of university security
forces and Abbas Ali Shahriari.
Bizhan Jazani, one of the founders of the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas , executed by
the SAVAK along with six other Fadaees and two of the Mojahedin.
Shah and Saddam sign the Algiers peace accord ending conflict between Iran and Iraq.
Conflict between Marxist and Muslim factions within the Mujahedin ends in
assassination of Majid Sharif-vaghefi. He was one of the leaders of the Muslim faction
who was killed by the Marxists.
Marxist faction of the Mujahedin declares an independent organization called the
Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin (Marxist-Leninist).
Marxist Mojahedin assassinated two Ameican military advisors in Tehran.
1976
Navid, the only active part of Tudeh Party in Iran was created.
Mostafa Shoa’ian, an independent Marxist who never joined any of the Marxist groups,
was killed in a street battle with the Shah’s security forces.
Hossein Nahidi, a SAVAK interrogator/torturer was assassinated by the Fadaee Guerillas
in Mashhad.
Bahram Aram and two other Marxist Mojahedin members were killed in a street battle in
Tehran.
1977
May: Death of Dr. Ali Shariati
Amir Abbas Hoveyda was replaced by Jamshid Amouzegar as Prime Minister.
Shah and his Wife arrive in Washington D.C. and were met by a violent and organized
protests by Iranian student opposition.
Fadaee Guerillas bombed government buildings in Zanjan and southern Tehran.
1978
January: President Carter and his wife arrived in Tehran. Carter called Iran the “island of
stability’.
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Fadaee Guerillas bombed US-Iran cultural center.
7 January: An article insulting to Ayatollah Khomeini appeared in a Ettella’at newspaper.
It fomented many anti-regime events.
9 January: Protests were held in the holy city of Qom against the article. Fadaee Guerillas
bombed a police precinct and the building of Rastakhiz Party in Qom.
More mass demonstrations begin all over the country.
March: Red leftists and black Muslims are attacked by the Rastakhiz part as the ‘unholy
alliance’ of the red and black.
April: Political prisoners in Ghezel Hessar prison began a hunger strike.
Student demonstrations started in Tehran and Science and Industry universities.
May: Anti-regime rioting started in 34 cities.
Mass demonstrations marked the 1963 uprising in Tehran and Qom.
The Shah replaced Nassiri with Moghaddam, as head of SAVAK.
Shah announced that the next elections will be completely free.
August: For the month of Ramadan, mass protests started in several major cities.
Demonstrations in Tehran targeted banks, movie theaters, and nightclubs.
Amouzegar resigned to be replaced by Sharif-emami.
Liberation Movement and National Front demanded Shah’s removal, disbanding of
SAVAK, freedom of speech, and trial of powerful officials within the Shah’s regime.
Fadaee Guerillas attack a police headquarter in Tehran.
8 September: Martial law was declared in Tehran and eleven other major cities. Troops
opened fire on demonstrations killing hundreds of people.
Major strike started by oil industry workers.
5 October: Khomeini left Iraq for Paris, France.
Newspapers and major industries went on strike, hunger strike by political prisoners in
Tabriz.
Khomeini called for a nationwide strike in commemoration of those who were killed on
September 8th Black Friday.
A number of political prisoners were freed.
Oil workers and Iranian Airline employees went on strike.
Riots continued in Tehran and British embassy was attacked.
6 November: In a nationwide television address, the Shah admitted to past mistakes and
told the nation he had heard their demands.
Two-hundred and ten political prisoners were freed.
Shah declared an end to martial law and free elections.
In defiance of curfews demonstrators clashed with troops resulting in many deaths.
Khomeini called on soldiers to leave the military.
11 December: Millions of people demonstrated against the regime in Tehran. Several
soldiers killed in takeover of military garrisons.
30 December: Shapour Bakhtiar appointed Prime Minister by the Shah.
1979
January: Bakhtiar submitted the names of his new cabinet.
Violent demonstrations began in the Azarbaijan provinces.
Fadaee guerillas assassinate a police commander in Tabriz, Azarbaijan.
16 January: The Shah and his family leave Iran.
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President Carter expressed support for Bakhtiar, the new Prime Minister.
Hundreds of political prisoners were released.
February:
1 February: Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and asked for immediate resignation of
Bakhtiar.
Khomeini asked Bazargan to form a new cabinet.
Fadaee guerillas held first open commemoration of Siahkal where hundreds of thousands
of supporters show up in the streets of Tehran.
Clashes between people and armed forces continued until the collapse of Bakhtiar’s
government.
13 February: Tudeh Party declares its reappearance in its sixteenth plenum under the
leadership of Nour al-Din Kianouri. Tudeh Party announces official support for
Khomeini.
Fadaee guerillas issued a list of demands to the provisional government, asking for equal
rights for women, nationalization of all industry, and the expulsion of foreign military
advisors.
Execution of top officials of the Shah’s regime began.
18 February: Islamic Republic Party established.
In mass rally organized by the Fadaee guerillas tens of thousands of people ask for the
inclusion of the Fadaees in the new government.
March:
Khomeini ordered the creation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
Thousands of women held demonstrations in Tehran denouncing the Islamic dress code
and the Islamic government’s actions against women.
Fadaee guerillas denounce forthcoming referendum for not allowing freedom of choice.
Heavy fighting began between Kurds and government troops.
Battle between Turkmans and government forces started.
May:
A group of Fadaee guerillas led by Ashraf Dehghani split from the Organization of
Fadaee Guerillas, calling themselves the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerrillas.
Ayandegan, an independent newspaper shut down its operations due to a dispute with
Khomeini.
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators declare support for Ayandegan in mass rallies.
June:
National Democratic Front accused Khomeini of abandoning earlier pledges to keep
clergy out of state affairs.
Khomeini warned lawyers, writers, and intellectuals to act more cautiously or de
destroyed by the ‘same fist that destroyed the Shah’.
Demonstrations at Tehran University demanded a popular assembly to draft a new
constitution.
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July: Armed clashes between Kurdish pishmarge and government troops in Kurdinsh city
of Marivan.
August: Revolutionary Guards attacked the office of Ayandegan newspaper.
Hezbollah attacked a demonstration led by National Democratic Front and injured
hundreds of the protestors.
Armed clashes began over the control of the Kurdish city of Paveh between government
troops and Kurdish pishmarges. Four hundred people were killed.
Khomeini ordered general mobilization of the military to suppress the Kurdish rebellion.
Kurdish Democratic Party was declared banned while it captured one of the major cities,
Sanandaj.
Khomeini ordered the closing of 22 publications including National Democratic Front,
Tudeh, Paykar, and Fadaeean.
Government troops executed some of the opposition members and supporters in Paveh.
As informal truce was declared by the government and Kurdish fighters Khomeini
rejected truce and ordered troops to crush rebellion.
October:
Fadaee guerillas held their first post-revolution meeting to iron out political differences
that later led to a major split between Minority and Majority Fadaee organizations.
Women were attacked by Hezbollah as they were demonstrating for equal rights.
November:
Bazargan and his colleagues met Brzezinski in Algiers to discuss U.S.-Iran relationships.
4 November: Bazargan criticized for meeting with the Americans
Line of Imam students seized American embassy and took 62 American hostages.
6 November: Bazargan’s government collapsed after 275 days and its duties were taken
over by the Revolutionary Council. Prominent writers and Tudeh Party declare support
for hostage taking.
December:
The new Islamic constitution was approved.
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators denounced the new constitution in Tabriz and
declared support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari.
Islamic Republic of Iran denounced Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
1980
25 January: Abolhassan Banisadr was elected as the first president of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
February: Four Turkman council leaders and Fadaee supporters were killed.
Clashes between Kurdish guerillas and the new government went into its second round.
A major split in the Fadaee Guerillas occurred. Two groups calling themselves minority
and majority emerged.
29 July: The Shah died in exile.
September: Saddam Hosseirn breaks peace accord and attacks Iranian borders on the 20th
of September.
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1981
June: Massive clashes began between Muslim Mojahedin and the Islamic Republic.
Many prominent Marxist and Muslims within the opposition were executed by the new
government.
A massive explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic kills more than 70 top
officials. Blast in Prime Minister’s office killed Prime Minister Bahonar and President
Rajai.
1982
26 January: Communist League (sarbedaran) took over the city of Amol, in the northern
provinces by the Caspian sea.
February: Mousa Khiabani a major figure within the Muslim Mojahedin and several other
members were killed.
March: Abdolrahim Saboori, among the leaders of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas,
Liberation Army killed in a clash with the revolutionary guards.
Number of Fadaee Minority central committee members and others were killed.
Mohammad Reza Hormatijpour, leader of the IPFG, Liberation Army, killed.
1983
February-April: Tudeh Party and Fadaee Majority members arrested and executed by the
Islamic Republic. Second wave of arrests and attacks on the Tudeh and Majority in
Tehran and other major cities.
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INDEX OF ORGANIZATIONS
Marxist Organizations
Communist Party of Iran (hezb-e comonist-e Iran)
This was the first organization in Iran established by Marxists in 1920. Most of the
leaders from a Marxist movement who later formed the Communist Party were
influenced directly by the Bolsheviks. Their main leaders were Sultanzadeh,
Ghaffarzadeh, Javadzadeh, and Heydarkhan Amoghlu. With Armenian origins,
Sultanzadeh had spent most of his political life in a Bolshevik underground organization
in Russian Azarbaijan. Ghaffarzadeh, an old revolutionary, was the contact person for
Russian Communist Party’s organ, Iskra, responsible for its delivery from Europe to Iran.
Javadzadeh, who was born in Iranian Azarbaijan, was a teacher in Baku, capital of
Russian Azarbaijan. While in Baku, he came in direct contact with the Bolsheviks and
became the chief editor of a leftist newspaper, called Hurryat (freedom).
Tudeh Party of Iran (hezb-e tudeh-ye Iran)
Main founder of this group, Taghi Arani was in contact with 52 others, known as the 53group. They were all arrested on charges of illegal communist activity in 1931. The
majority of the intellectuals arrested along with Arani were members and supporters of
the original Communist Party. Officially the Tudeh Party was established in 1941, and
despite efforts by different governments to eliminate this group, it has persisted to this
day. Since its inception, it has split into many more radical or more conservative groups
Some are still politically active, mostly outside of Iran, under different names.
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e cherikha-ye fadaee-e
khalgh-e Iran)
The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e chereekha-ye fadaee-e
khalgh-e Iran) was established in April of 1971 by the collusion of two groups whose
activities went back to the 1960s. The first group, led by Jazani and Zarifi, was
established in the summer of 1966 at Tehran University with the help of six students. The
group was later called Jangal Group following the Siahkal incident. The second group
was led by Ahmadzadeh and Pouyan. The two groups coming together declared
themselves as the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas and the New Communist Movement
of Iran (jonbesh-e novin-e comonisti-e Iran) after the Siahkal operation. The word,
‘organization’ was later added to the name. The newly formed group took on two
important tasks at this time. They first started a long study of rural areas in the Northern
provinces and second established contact with another Marxist group that was also
dwelling on an armed action against the regime.
Organization of Combat (Paykar) for the Liberation of the Working Class
(sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-eh tabagheye kargar)
In the case of Marxist Mojahedin, later called Paykar, Islam had apparently fallen short of
becoming a revolutionary praxis. A few factors contributed to this, although these were
never thoroughly explained by either side. By 1974, most members of the Mujahedin
were studying revolutions led predominantly by Marxists. They included Cuba, China,
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Algeria, and the Vietnamese Communist Party fighting against the U.S. military. By mid1974, there were talks about converging Marxist ideology with Islamic ethics. In an
abrupt move, in the fall of 1975, a published paper announced a change in ideology of the
organization. There they claimed their Marxist inclinations and found the class analysis
of Marxism to be most fitting with sociopolitical conditions of Iran.
Ideal of the Masses (arman-e khalgh)
This was among the smaller groups that independently reached the conclusion that armed
struggle is the only way to topple the Shah’s regime. It was made up of young workers
led by Homayoun Katiraee, Hushang Taregol, Naser Karimi. During their effort to join
the Fadaee guerillas in 1979, they were arrested and later executed.
Palestine Group (goruh-e felestin)
This group of Marxists was led by Shokrollah Paknezhad, Naser Khaksar, and Hosein
Tajer-riahi. It was mainly made up of and supported by university students. The group
had Maoist tendencies, and had come to accept political struggle based on the Chinese
model of starting armed struggle in the rural areas. Many of its members were arrested by
the SAVAK in 1969 and given long prison sentences.
Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (cherikha-ye fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran) (Ashraf
Dehghani group)
This group split from the Main Fadaee organization in the Spring of 1979, just after the
revolution in Iran. They were able to clarify their positions in an interview with Ashraf
Dehghani. In this booklet they held the Islamic Republic to be and dependent and
suppressive government that continues the same political-economic agenda as the Shah.
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e cherikha-ye fadaee-e
khalgh-e Iran-aghalliat) (Minority)
In June 1980, this group broke away from the main Fadaee Guerilla organization. They
published their own political organ Kar (labor). They called the Majority opportunists.
They believed that political differences over the nature and class base of the Islamic
Republic government were irreconcilable.
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaeean (sazman-e fadaeean-e khalgh-e Iranaksariat) (Majority)
This group, which moved to join the Tudeh Party later was formed as a result of the
Minority split in June of 1980. They accused Minority of left-wing sectarianism. They
renounced armed struggle and consistently dropped the name guerilla as part of their
name calling the new organization, the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaeean
(Majority).
Organization of the Worker’s Path (sazman-e rah-e kargar)
This group was manily made up of former Fadaee and Marxist Mojahedin (paykar)
members or supporters who had changed their views on armed struggle while in prison.
After the revolution they began their own publication under the name of Rah-e Kargar
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(worker’s path). The considered the Islamic Republic government a religious petit
bourgeois-national bourgeois which is led by the clergy.
The Organization of Communist Unity (sazman-e vahdat-e comonisti)
Sporadically active before the revolution, this group was mainly made up of a few
intellectuals in contact with the Fadaee Guerillas prior to the revolution. Between 1979
and 1981, it published Rahaee as its official publication. They opposed the Islamic
government but kept their activity limited to writing and political discourse.
Communist League of Iran (ettehadieh comonistha-ye Iran)
Most of the members of this group, later called Sarbedaran, were active outside of Iran
prior to the revolution. Consistent with their Maoist tendencies, they conducted a daring
attack against the Islamic regime’s forces in the city of Amol in June of 1981. Most
members were either killed in the incident or arrested. A few surviving members fled the
country and still continue with their political activities abroad. They later joined the
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, made up of many Marxist organizations worldwide. Their publication under the name of Haghighat continues to this day.

Muslim Organizations
Jangal Movement (jonbesh-e jangal)
This movement consisted of small landowners in Gilan. Mirza Kuchak Khan, a
landowner himself, led this movement. So popular was the movement that even a Marxist
student organization in Germany wrote articles in their newspaper, Kaveh, defending the
Jangalis. The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational
convergence in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leadership,
Marxist and Muslim, was killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of
Muslims belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement,” and Marxists, who
were organized in the Communist Party of Iran. The Muslims were led by a prominent
figure who had been fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional
Revolution of 1906, Mirza Kuchak Khan. Marxists, originally from a group called
“Fergheye Democratic” (Democratic Faction), were led by Heydar Khan (Heydar
Amughlou) and Soltanzadeh. In fact, this was the first cooperation between Marxists and
Muslims as an organized political-military force. By the end of 1920, the movement
known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” with the support of the Red Army, with its
1500 guerillas, was prepared to proclaim its independence and eventually take on
Tehran’s central government.
Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e eslam)
Among those who came to organize themselves, more than any other fundamentalist
organization, was the Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e Eslam). This group was organized
by a young cleric by the name of Navvab Safavi in 1945. They were against all that was
non-Islamic. They were against alcohol, cigarettes, movies, opium, gambling, and
western clothing. Their political goal was to establish a Shi’a Islamic Republic. They
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began their political activities by assassination of some government officials and famous
secular writers.
Committees of Muslim Alliance (heyat-ha-ye mo’talefe-ye eslami)
By the 1960s, many Muslim groups were on a different path of struggle. The first group
was the Committees of Islamic Alliance. The activities of some of its politically
experienced members could be traced back to Mosaddegh’s time, whereas some were
relatively young and inexperienced. Socially, most members were small merchants. The
armed struggle for this group, and many of the Islamic groups, did not seek the same
goals as Marxists. While Marxists advocated armed struggle as both strategy and tactic,
and a way of creating an armed uprising, Muslims had a different idea. Their aim was to
physically destroy certain individuals—a more limited plan—within the Shah’s
government. Although they had generated a list of those to be assassinated, they were not
able to get past their first target. In February 1964, they assassinated Prime Minister
Mansour. Within a few weeks, all 20 members of the group were arrested and four of
their leaders were executed. The rest were given 15-year to life sentences.

The Party of Islamic Nations (Hezb-e malal-e eslami)
There was a second group that made an effort (since they never actually carried out any
armed actions) to fight against dictatorship. This group, a more educated and younger
bunch than Committee of Islamic Alliance, called itself The Party of Islamic Nations. In
1965, the Shah’s secret police was able to arrest 80 of its members and affiliates, 25 of
whom were released and the rest imprisoned. Among the arrested were some prominent
clergy.
Committee of Islamic Alliance (Shora-ye Ettehadi-ye Eslami)
Another major Muslim group that made significant contributions to Iranian Islamic
Opposition was the “Committees of Islamic Alliance.” The death of Boroujerdi opened
the gates of cleric involvement in politics. Until 1961, the year Boroujerdi died, clerics
were discouraged from getting involved in politics. After his death, they no longer faced
opposition in this regard. Ayatollah Khomeini was among those who started this move
by making contentious statements against the Shah’s regime. Khomeini was able to make
a more sophisticated argument in questioning the Shah. He went beyond the two main
reasons for clerical conflict: opposing women’s rights and opposing land reform. He
posed more popular demands that involved other sectors of society. The reason this group
was named the Committee of Islamic Alliance has much to do with Khomeini’s role as a
linchpin.
Organization of Iranian Peoples Mujahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e khalgh-e Iran)
Three former members of the Liberation Movement founded The Organization of Iranian
People’s Mojahedin in the summer of 1965. Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad, Ali Asghar
Badizadegan, and Saeed Mohsen had split from the religious wing of Liberation
Movement to found the Mojahedin. They were able to organize themselves amid other
turmoil within the Liberation Movement. This occurred precisely when most of the
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leadership from Liberation Movement was arrested under subversive charges. They were
tried by a military court and sentenced to years in prison.

Nationalist and Hybrid Organizations
National Front (jebhe-ye melli)
This group was one of the most enduring, and at times, most popular political
organizations advocating reform. Up until 1979, it went through three phases of
development. As a political organization it made some significant impacts upon the
process of social change in Iran. However, the reason the National Front is mentioned
here is not its political pertinence but how its members contributed to the formation of
other Muslim and Marxist groups. It acted as a midwife, giving birth to many other
Marxist groups and individuals. Many of these individuals later became founders of some
of the major organizations, namely the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas. The National
Front was originally founded in the fall of 1949 in Tehran.
Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi)
The covert and possibly repressed political inclinations within the National Front finally
manifested through a major split. The more secular and modern leaders established what
they called the second National Front. The more religious-leaning leaders, however,
established the new Liberation Movement. This group, which endured its internal
conflicts and the Shah’s repressions, played a major role during the 1979 revolution. By
May 17, 1962, the Liberation Movement declared itself an official group within the
opposition. Three major leaders, former members of the National Front, founded this new
organization with stronger Islamic tendencies. The three included Bazargan, Sahabi, and
Taleghani.
Socialist Republic of Gilan (jomhuri-e socialist-e Gilan)
The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational convergence
in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leadership, Marxist and
Muslim, was killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of Muslims
belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement,” and Marxists, who were
organized in the Communist Party of Iran. The Muslims were led by a prominent figure
who had been fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional Revolution
of 1906, Mirza Kuchak Khan. Marxists, originally from a group called “Fergheye
Democratic” (Democratic Faction), were led by Heydar Khan (Heydar Amughlou) and
Soltanzadeh. In fact, this was the first cooperation between Marxists and Muslims as an
organized political-military force. Contrary to some beliefs, both movements were active
before the Russian revolution of 1917. Although the objectives between Marxists and
Muslim factions were quite dissimilar, the means of a military takeover of the central
government was commonly shared. The unprecedented alliance lasted nearly two years.
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